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ABSTRACT  
This study examined the nexus between bank performance and regulatory requirements 
in South Africa. The panel regression approach was used, which applied panel data from 
12 banks that were registered in terms of the Bank Act 94 of 1990 over the period 2009 
to 2019. A quantitative research approach was used to investigate the nexus between 
bank performance, bank regulations, bank-specific factors and some macroeconomic 
factors. A regression analysis was conducted on four bank performance ratios using 
pooled ordinary least square regression, fixed effects, random effects and generalised 
methods moments. The two-step generalised system methods of moments approach was 
preferred over the other methods because it eliminated the problem of endogeneity. The 
results showed that capital adequacy and size have both a positive and negative 
significant effect on bank performance, while interest rates, non-performing loans, liquidity 
coverage ratios and net stable funding ratios had a negative and significant effect on bank 
performance. 
The study concluded that South African banks could enhance their performance by 
tightening their credit risk assessment framework to be more prudent in their lending 
practices in order to improve the lending quality of their loan books. It is recommended 
that banks keep their capital levels at a minimum to avoid excessive risk-taking, and that 
they by embark on efficient revenue enhancement activities such as increasing retained 
earnings. Banks must further look at their clients on an overall basis, not just a 
transactional basis, as this will improve their non-interest revenue income by introducing 
innovative products. Lastly, the banks must lower their liquidity risk exposure by 
collectively managing their capital adequacy ratio, size of the bank, interest rates, non-
performing loans, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio. The South African 
Reserve Bank should tighten regulatory requirements by improving its supervision and 
oversight functions; banks must to adhere to lending practices and foster a healthy and 
adequately capitalised balance sheet. Lastly, the SARB must align its macroeconomic 
forecast for lending rates with regulatory requirements to ensure that economic 
performance is a catalyst for bank performance.  
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This study contributes to the empirical research repository on the nexus of bank 
performance and regulatory requirements. More importantly, it identifies the significant 
factors that affect South African bank performance, by identifying the deficiencies in South 
Africa’s regulatory requirements, which will provide the South African Reserve Bank with 
insight into ways of enhancing its regulatory requirements to improve the performance, 
management practices and sound capital adequacy of the banking sector. 
 
Keywords: bank regulation, bank performance, capital regulation, capital adequacy, 
global financial crisis, interest rates. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Over the past two decades, a number of financial crises have taken place that have 
increased regulators’ concerns regarding the stability of the financial sector (Majumder & 
Li, 2017).  In recent years, the banking sector globally has been the subject of intense 
criticism and scrutiny, in part because many believe that a lack of regulations and 
supervisory structures have brought about these crises. Meanwhile, some scholars argue 
that the financial crisis was a result of deregulation or lack of regulation (Alam, 2013).  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis created great turmoil regarding the stability of the banking 
sector and the effectiveness of banking regulations (Hogan, Meredith & Pan, 2015). 
Economists, academics and scholars have different opinions about the causes of the 
financial crisis (Archarya & Richardson, 2009; Crotty, 2009), which demonstrates the 
need to rethink the role of capital requirements in economic models since the traditional 
models have proven to be inadequate (Marozva, 2017). Peni and Vahamaa (2012) 
proposed different solutions, including increasing bank capital requirements and 
improving transparency in the banking sector. According to Lo (2009), the blame for the 
financial crisis refers to the risk-based capital, which is regulations based on the Basel 
Accord. Risk-based capital has been linked to the build-up of risk in the banking sector in 
the United States of America (USA), Europe and African countries including South Africa 
(Nyoka, 2017; Dowd, Hutchinson, Hinchliffe & Ashby, 2011). This risk-based capital has 
led to the introduction of a global charter that regulates banks’ capital requirements, 
namely the Basel III accord. 
The Basel III Accord aims to make each bank hold capital that is proportional to its credit 
losses (Osei-Assibey & Asenso, 2015). The classical financial market theories such as 
capital adequacy requirements were introduced to address capital holding regulatory 
issues. The holding of proportional capital was then referred to as capital adequacy, and 
this was suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2006). Their 
reasoning for introducing capital adequacy was that capital has long been categorised as 
a critical factor when the safety and soundness of a particular bank are assessed.  
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Capital adequacy aims to absorb possible losses, provide a basis for maintaining 
depositors’ confidence in banks, and serves as the buffer and risk-taking activities 
(Greuning & Bratanovic, 2000). Again, the capital adequacy requirements serve as a 
buffer against risk-taking in terms of lending, which is demanding for all economies, 
especially fragile developing ones because they are vulnerable to sharp cyclical 
fluctuations in financing (Griffith-Jones & Persaud, 2008). The justification for this is that 
it is very challenging and costly to raise equity in developing countries; for example, in 
African countries, the cost of holding capital mostly comes from loan prices. While capital 
regulations are undoubtedly necessary, high capital adequacy regulations can also 
become a disincentive to credit expansion, particularly for perceived high-risk customers, 
which are the bedrock of most African Economies (AE). Posner (2015) believed that 
capital adequacy will make the financial system to be more stable and reduce future 
occurrences of financial crises, when banks are holding more and better-quality capital, 
as well as more robust liquidity buffers. Marozva (2015) believed that the traditional 
measures of capital are basic and inadequate, and do not provide relevant information 
about the banking sector and its linkage to the real economy. The analysis of bank 
performance and regulatory requirements will provide relevant information between the 
banking sector and the real sector economy. 
The most significant recent reform in international banking regulations was in the area of 
capital adequacy. After the reform, questions were raised by regulators as to why capital 
adequacy was adopted as a tool for global banking regulation (Zheng, Xu & Liang, 2012). 
A response by researchers was that many banks had failed during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. These failures were attributed to poor governance practices that were unable 
to manage capital adequacy and liquidity management (Abou-El-Sood, 2017).  Banks are 
key component of the financial sector in any economy, and they perform valuable 
activities on both sections of the balance sheet (Arif & Anees, 2012:181). On the asset 
section, they enhance the flow of funds by lending to cash-starved users, whereas they 
provide liquidity to savers on the liabilities side (Diamond & Rajan, 2001). According to 
Luvuno (2018), banks must maintain sufficient liquidity to bring stability to the financial 
sector, as this will provide confidence in the public sector.  
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For economic development to take place, the onus is on the banking sector to provide 
sound and sufficient liquidity buffers (Mashamba, 2018). Diamond and Rajan (2001) 
argued that liquidity alone is not adequate to measure bank performance; the size of the 
bank is also a contributing factor. According to Arawati and Maksum (2018), Taranhike 
(2017), Bukair and Rahman (2015), Mashonganyika (2015), Dawar (2014) and Jara-
Bertin (2014), larger banks usually face financial distress, which is caused by common 
factors such as excessive risk-taking, by not focusing enough on profitability, and liquidity 
management. It is for this reason that banks are encouraged to hold liquidity buffers of 
liquid assets to be able to enhance their performance (Marozva, 2015; 2017). Therefore, 
the analysis of regulatory drivers of bank performance, such as capital adequacy and 
liquidity requirements, are discussed in this study. 
Scholars such as Okoye, Ikechuku, Leonard, Chinyere and Christioan (2017), Majumder 
and Li (2017), Soile-Bologum (2017), Charmier, Musah, Akomeah and Gakpetor (2018) 
and Aktas, Acikalin, Bakin and Celik (2015) have contributed to the literature on bank 
performance, regulatory requirements and liquidity requirements, and applied different 
measurements of bank performance in their studies. Soile-Bologum (2017) and Okoye et 
al. (2017) conducted empirical studies on bank performance, regulatory requirements and 
liquidity, and identified the following factors – return on assets, net interest margin, return 
on capital employment, capital asset ratio, liquidity ratio and loan on loss. Charmier et al. 
(2018) and Aktas et al., (2015) used different variables, for example, size of the bank, 
performance, liquidity, net interest margin, risk and capital adequacy ratio. Alam (2013) 
examined whether bank regulatory requirements, legislation, supervision, liquidity, and 
monitoring enhance technical efficiency and risk-taking behaviour across the globe, while 
Buallay, Hamdan, Reyed, Badawi and Madbouly (2019) investigated the relationship 
between intellectual capital efficiency and financial performance. Buallay et al. (2019) 
recommended that banks pay more attention to capital requirements to avoid a financial 
crisis and report excellent performance on financial statements. Hutchinson and Xavier 
(2006) indicated that there is a negative relationship between regulatory requirements 
and bank performance.  
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However, the results of all research to date are not conclusive. When this is added to the 
fact that there is no evidence of research to date that focuses on an emerging economy, 
one can see the need for this study to fill the gap in the literature. Sulieman and Alshatti 
(2014) investigated the relationship between liquidity management and bank 
performance in Pakistani banks. Their results revealed that having enough liquidity does 
not guarantee great performance of the bank.  Their findings were inconsistent with those 
of Arif and Anees (2012), who concluded that banks, in general, manage liquidity risk by 
having sufficient cash resources on hand, as this will reduce any liquidity gap by 
minimising dependence on the repo market. 
Global evidence has shown that the deregulation of the banking sector was affected by 
the financial crisis, which contributed to the financial instability of each country (Moyo, 
Nandwa, Oduor & Simpasa, 2014). In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the financial system is 
weak and unstable. This is mainly due to systemic bank failures and non-compliance with 
banking regulations, which has negatively affected each country’s economy (Moyo et al., 
2014). In African countries, the banking sector’s development was generally considered 
suitable for the economy because it encourages financial innovation and promotes a 
financial system that leads to higher economic growth (Nyoka, 2017). 
Banks need to practice prudent risk management and follow regulations in order to protect 
the interests of investors. Existing empirical research studies have shown that a 
regulatory framework plays an essential role in maintaining performance of the banking 
institutions (De Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Beasley, 1996), while a lack of regulatory 
framework causes significant financial losses. These losses negatively affect the bank 
performance, for example, not complying with the capital regulatory requirements result 
to poor bank performance (Constantos, 2015; SARB, 2014).  
The South African banking system has also suffered as a result of bank failures.  The 
reduced application of bank regulatory requirements and liquidity management was 
identified as being among the reasons for bank failures (Marozva, 2015).  
The following South African banks have failed since 1990: Alpha Bank Limited, Cape 
Investment Bank Limited, Pretoria Bank, Saambou Bank and African Bank (Tjiane, 2015). 
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The failure of banks remains a challenge within the banking industry as it gives rise to 
systemic risk (Heffernan, 2010). Successful banks implement prompt corrective action 
and apply an integrated approach to address bank regulations and liquidity management 
while improving supervision and performance. There is a growing trend of research on 
capital regulations for bank stability and soundness (Osei-Assibey & Asenso, 2015). This 
regulation has been restored by the introduction of a global charter that regulates banks' 
capital requirements following the Basel III accord. Alternatively, this can be done by 
reserving a certain percentage from the capital, called the capital adequacy ratio (Nyoka, 
2017:73).  Nyoka (2017) and Hull (2015) elaborated further on Basel, explaining that it 
requires banks to maintain a total asset equal of 8% as the risk-weighted assets that 
encompass credit, market and operational risk.  
This Basel Accord III requirement aims to make individual banks hold proportional capital 
to their potential credit losses (Boora & Jongra, 2019). This is because capital has long 
been identified as one of the critical factors to be considered for capital adequacy 
requirements, and when the safety and soundness of a particular bank are being 
assessed (Tjiane, 2015). In mid-2008, the BCBS issued a liquidity requirement framework 
called Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (PSLRM), which 
were published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2008). The purpose of this 
principle aspect of regulation is to guide the liquidity risk framework and funding liquidity 
aspect (Luvuno, 2018). Again, the policy aspect of complying with bank regulations and 
the liquidity risk framework determines how long a bank remains in business from a 
regulatory point of view. According to the BIS (2015), the Basel III framework, which is 
part of the liquidity framework, highlights the importance of liquidity risk management. 
This includes two minimum standards for liquidity funding risk, the first of which is the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).   
The objective of LCR is to ensure that banks have a robust short-term liquidity profile by 
guaranteeing that they have sufficient high-quality liquid assets coverage to cover a 
significant stress scenario for at least 30 days. Since 2015, banks have been required to 
hold assets against anticipated net liquid outflows for 30 days (BIS, 2014).  
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Liquid assets primarily constitute cash, short term interbank lending, reserves with the 
central bank, marketable securities and any form of lending to the central bank within 30 
days of stress period (Marozva, 2017). The second standard is the Net Stable Funding 
ratio (NSFR). The objective of NSFR is to ensure that banks have a resilient longer-term 
structural profile by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with 
more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis (BIS, 2015). According to Marozva 
(2017), the availability of the stable funding required of a particular bank is likely to be 
driven by its liquidity characteristics and remaining maturities of the different assets it 
holds, including off-balance sheets assets. 
The BCBS and the Financial Services Board (FSB) issued supervisory standards and 
regulatory requirements (SARB, 2011) which make it compulsory for the SARB to conduct 
a continuous assessment on the supervisory departments, national regulatory, and 
supervisory framework to ensure that the SARB complies with international standards 
(Nyoka, 2017). The SARB concluded that the implementation of the LCR and NSFR as 
part of Basel III would be effective as of January 2015 (SARB, 2011). The SARB ensured 
that all locally registered banks in South Africa in terms of Act 94 of 1990 would implement 
the LCR and NSFR framework through regulations, and was issued in 2012 (SARB, 
2016).  
The South African banking sector was affected by the global financial crisis, given that it 
forms part of the worldwide economy (Kumbirai & Web, 2010). In response to these, 
financial crisis the SARB introduced a new liquidity framework as part of Basel III 
published by the BCBS, which has impacted all locally registered South African banks 
because they are now obligated to hold a certain percentage of capital and liquidity 
(SARB, 2016).  
Taking into account how immediate liquidity in the banking sector affects bank 
performance, this study aimed to analyse bank performance and regulatory requirements 
in South African banks.  
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1.2 The goals and objectives of the bank regulatory requirements 
Bank regulatory requirements aim to mitigate excessive risk-taking by individual banks, 
as well as to regulate capital levels to safeguard depositors’ confidence in the event of a 
financial crisis (Taranhike, 2017; Lee & Lu, 2015; Nanda & Nicholas (2014).The 
regulations are put in place by public authorities, do not have a contractual relationship 
with banks. Regulatory requirements are aimed at influencing the risk-taking and the 
overall performance of the banking sector (Ncube, 2009). An objective of the banking 
regulations are to mitigate risk-taking by banks and regulate the capital adequacy level 
that banks should keep, safeguarding depositors' money in the event of a financial crisis 
(Dhouibi, 2016). Another aim is to keep the risk-taking of the bank as low as possible, in 
order to achieve excellent overall performance in the banking sector (Nimtrakoon, 2015; 
Luvuno, 2018). 
Despite such efforts, banks are still underperforming, resulting in banking and financial 
crises worldwide. Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade and Song (2013) noted that there have been 
more than 100 systemic banking crises in the world since 1970. They argued that banking 
crises serve as indicators that there are deficiencies in the banking regulations worldwide. 
Klomp and De Haan (2011) stated that bank regulatory requirements and bank 
performance are an extensive area of study. As a result, the majority of studies have 
focused on the broader range of matters, although recently provided by the BCBS. Again, 
the majority of recent studies have looked at the effects of bank performance using the 
three pillars of Basel III’s guidelines, and a full discussion is set out in Chapter 2. This 
study focused on bank performance and regulatory requirements in South Africa. The 
following review of extant research shows that there are some standard findings, but 
many remain inconclusive, hence the need for this study. 
Andries and Capraru (2013) examined the relationship between competition and bank 
performance in 27 European countries from 2004 to 2010. The results revealed that 
competition has a significant favourable influence on bank performance in terms of 
profitability and cost-efficiency. 
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However, this result contradicts with that of Fungacova, Pessarossi and Weill (2013), who 
found no significant influence of bank regulations on bank performance for Chinese banks 
for the period 2002 to 2011. The findings of other studies on the subject of regulatory 
requirements and bank performance (Taranhike, 2017; Triki et al., 2016; Ifeacho & 
Ngalawa, 2014; Andries & Capraru 2013; Klomp & De Haan, 2011; Keeley, 1990) were 
also inconclusive. Freixas and Santomero (2013) argued that it is the responsibility of the 
regulatory body to provide adequate firewalls so that a crisis does not spill over to other 
organisations in order to maintain banks performance. Klomp and Haan (2015) agreed 
with Freixas and Santomero (2013) that consistency in complying with strict regulations 
will sustain a bank and increase profitability, and also mentioned that the central bank is 
mandated to monitor and supervise the regulations of the banking sector.  
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has the responsibility of imposing regulations 
on, and supervising, the banking sector in South Africa. In executing this mandate, the 
SARB is guided by the Banks Act 94 of 1990. According to section 74(2) of the Banks Act 
94 of 1990, banks are required to report any failure or financial distress, together with the 
reasons for this failure, to the SARB (Shawe, Colegrave & Overy, 2017). The field of bank 
performance and regulatory requirements has been subject to theoretical and empirical 
research which are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The following sections summarise the 
broader studies on bank regulatory requirements and bank performance globally. 
1.3     An overview of bank regulations in South Africa  
The SARB is the central bank of South Africa and is responsible for banking regulations 
and requirements, the supervision of banks, and promoting the soundness of the 
domestic banking system through the effective and efficient application of supervision 
standards to minimise risk (Taranhike, 2017). For this reason, the BCBS requires 
appropriate banking regulations and supervision. In implementing such a mandate, the 
SARB is guided by specific Acts of parliament and legislation (Nyoka, 2017; Ifeacho & 
Ngalawa, 2014). The purpose of the legislation and supervision is to maintain an efficient 
banking system by protecting the depositors' interests and the economy of the country.  
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This function is achieved by issuing licences to banking institutions and by providing 
monitoring activities in terms of the Banks Act 94 of 1990. The Banks Act makes it 
mandatory for banks to comply with this Act; therefore, this study assessed if the banks 
that are registered in terms of the Act comply with the capital regulatory requirements or 
not, and if not, why and how this can be fixed. The Banks Act provides bank regulatory 
requirements and supervision of all banks that take deposits from the general public, 
except organisational institutions that are exempted from the provision of the Banks Act 
(Ifeacho & Ngalawa, 2014). 
It is the primary responsibility of the Registrar and the SARB to ensure that all banks 
registered in terms of the Act comply with its requirements. One of the requirements is to 
comply with the minimum capital regulatory requirements (SARB, 2016). The purpose of 
this requirement is to create an absorption of any losses. If any of the risks to which banks 
may be exposed in conducting their business should materialise, this will provide a 
safeguard against the risk of insolvency. Banks are required to maintain a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio of 2.5% of its liabilities, the aim being to ensure that the banks can 
meet their obligations whenever required to do so and comply with the requirement 
(SARB, 2016). Capital adequacy is one of the requirements that banks must comply with, 
and falls under the CAMELS ratings.  
The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFRIS) developed the CAMELS rating 
and is applied in the banking Sector (UFIRS, 1997). According to Desta (2016), who 
conducted a study on the performance of South African banks, CAMELS is the 
assessment of the financial performance system.  Desta concluded that banks that are 
applying the CAMELS rating are rated as stable and satisfactory when measured in terms 
of CAMEL. 
The CAMELS ratings were introduced in the 1980s by the international rating system for 
the examination of the banking system and is a standard criterion against which every 
bank’s performance is measured (Gupta, 2014; Iloska, 2014). According to Suffian and 
Habibullah (2010), CAMELS involves the use of financial ratios to measure bank 
performance.  
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The purpose of CAMELS is to reflect the financial condition of a bank, its operational 
soundness and its regulatory compliance (Ong & Tech, 2013). The CAMELS rating was 
initially developed in the United States, and applies to every banking system worldwide, 
including South Africa (Gupta, 2016). The purpose of CAMELS is to prevent a bank run 
and provide management with a detailed report on bank performance, regulations, 
liquidity management, and risk-taking.  
The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFRIS) developed the CAMELS rating 
and is applied in the banking Sector (UFIRS, 1997). According to Desta (2016), who 
conducted a study on the performance of South African banks, CAMELS is the 
assessment of the financial performance system.  Desta concluded that banks that are 
applying the CAMELS rating are rated as stable and satisfactory when measured in terms 
of CAMEL. The components of CAMELS, as per Desta (2016), Ifeacho and Ngalawa 
(2014), Ongore and Kusa (2013), Sangmi and Nazir (2010), and (UFIRS, 1997) are 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings, Liquidity and 
Sensitivity. 
Capital adequacy (C) refers to the amount of capital available to support a bank's 
operations and act as a buffer in case of an adverse situation or any shock.  It is measured 
based on the capital adequacy ratio. Asset quality (A) refers to the quality of a bank’s loan 
book, which is a major asset that generates the majority of its income. It is usually 
measured as the non-performing loans ratio. Management efficiency (M) refers to the 
quality of a bank’s management in deploying its resources efficiently and captures, for 
example, total asset growth rate and earnings growth rate. Earnings (E) refers to how 
losses are absorbed; for example, a strong earnings profile of a bank reflects its ability to 
support present and future operations.  
Liquidity (L) refers to a bank's ability to fulfil its obligations, mainly to depositors. Lastly, 
Sensitivity (S) reflects market risk. the degree to which changes in interest rates and repo 
rates can adversely affect banking organisations’ earnings or economic capital. The 
CAMELS rating is a uniform financial institution rating system, as well as useful internal 
supervisory tool for evaluating the soundness of a bank (Desta, 2016; UFIRS, 1997).  
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The bank regulatory body assigns each bank a score for various factors on a scale of one 
being the best and five being the worst. Should a bank have an average rating of two or 
less, it is considered to be a high-quality organisation, while those with a score that is 
greater than three are considered to be less satisfactory (UFIRS, 1997).  
1.4     Bank performance and bank regulation  
The field of bank regulation has been subjected to various studies since 1980 due to 
several factors. Among those factors was the attempt to harmonise bank regulations 
through the publication of the Basel guidelines to improve bank performance (Barth, 
Caprio & Levine, 2004).  Regulations in the banking sector are of the highest interest to 
academics, scholars, economists and regulators due to their contribution to the 
performance of banks (Hassan, 2019). Banks that observe regulation requirements 
minimise moral hazards and excessive risk-taking, and thus improve performance. Barth 
(2013), Demirguc-Kant and Detragiache (2010) and Barth et al. (2004) investigated the 
relationship between bank regulations and bank performance, and the results showed a 
positive and significant relationship. They maintained that bank regulations force accurate 
information, empower the banking sector and promote bank performance and stability. 
To achieve a return on equities, banks can use a variety of techniques and strategies, 
capital regulation being one of them (Duasa, Zain & Al-Kayed, 2014). The relationship 
between capital adequacy and bank performance is of considerable importance in the 
banking sector. Banks are required to maintain a minimum capital ratio by regulatory 
bodies. Yet, they tend to substitute capital with debt to maximise their return on equity, 
which is in contradiction to Modigliani and Miller (1958) and results in poor performance.  
The capital ratio is essential to banks because of the sensitivity to changes in financial 
leverage, which may lead to a low level of equity to total assets. However, Basel III heavily 
regulates capital regulation. In 2015, Basel III published two liquidity standards, namely 
the liquidity cover ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) (Marozva, 2017). 
The relationship between liquidity standards and bank performance is subsequently 
discussed in this study, starting with the LCR.  
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The Basel IIII LCR encourages banks to maintain a diversified pool of high-quality liquid 
assets against short term assets – primarily net cash outflow. However, LCR appears 
noble from the theory perspective because it can reduce bank performance. After all, 
liquidity assets are considered to have low returns (Mashamba, 2018).  
One of the main concerns raised about liquidity standards is that LCR does not guarantee 
the prevention of possible adverse effects on bank performance (Giordana & Shumacher, 
2017). It has raised concerns amongst both scholars and academics that Basel III’s 
liquidity resources are likely to reduce bank performance, as it compels banks to invest 
more in low yield return liquidity assets (Benerjee & Mio, 2017). Benerjee and Mio (2017) 
and Giordana and Schumacher (2017) investigated the relationship between LCR and 
bank performance. Their studies found a negative relationship, whereas Mashamba 
(2018) found no relationship between the two variables. The reason for the inconsistent 
results may be that the studies were conducted in different geographical areas, at 
different times and with various samples. 
Basel III requires banks to preserve stable funding in the form of NSFR as related to the 
structure of their assets and off-balance sheet activities (BIS, 2014) in order to maintain 
excellent performance. Muriithi and Waweru (2017) investigated the relationship between 
liquidity risk measured by LCR and NSFR and bank performance. Their findings indicated 
that LCR does not have a significant influence on bank performance, whereas NSFR is 
negatively influenced by bank performance both in the short and long term. They 
recommended that bank managers pay more attention to liquidity management and, other 
factors affecting bank permeance besides the regulatory requirements (Muriithi & 
Waweru, 2017). Jaouad and Lahsen (2018) examined the relationship between the 
effects of bank-specific characteristics, financial structure, macroeconomic factors and 
bank performance. Slaim, Sathye and Hu (2015) and Makhusha and Nhavira (2017) 
investigated the relationship between other factors that affect bank performance, e.g. 
corporate governance.  
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There are also regulatory requirements that affect bank performance which are guided by 
CAMELS ratings. Gupta (2015) examined the relationship between bank performance, 
the health of the financial system and efficiency in the economy for both public and private 
banks using the CAMELS ratios. Chaudhry and Singh (2012), Prasad, Rivinder and 
Reddy (2011), Gupta and Kaur (2008) and Sarker (2005) empirically analysed the 
performance of banks according to the CAMELS ratings and its impact.  The current study 
is different from earlier studies in three ways: firstly, because of the methodology 
deployed, and the sample coverage.  
Secondly, the present study covers locally registered banks in terms of the Banks Act 94 
of 1990 in South Africa, and this study covers the period during and after the financial 
crisis. Lastly, this study uses accounting ratio analysis and econometric techniques 
because they are useful for differentiating high performing banks from others, they tend 
to compensate for disparities, and they control for any size effect on the financial variables 
being studied (Samad, 2004). Moreover, accounting ratios and econometric techniques 
enable the researcher to identify unique strength and weaknesses, which itself inform 
bank performance and credit quality. 
South African banks made a good test case for this study because they are unique in 
high-profit margins due to the oligopolistic nature of the market. To the best of the 
researcher's knowledge, no empirical analysis of bank performance and regulatory 
requirements has been done in South Africa. The previous studies conducted were based 
on the effects of bank performance and produced inconclusive results. This was 
motivation enough for the researcher in his bid to add to the body of knowledge.  
According to Lawa, Zogli and Dlamini (2017) and Sufian and Hbibullah (2009), bank 
performance can be measured by both macroeconomic factors, for example, 
unemployment and repo rates, and micro-economic factors, for example, capital 
adequacy and liquidity.  
Bank performance has been extensively researched; however, the definition of 
‘performance’ differs among studies.  
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Furthermore, while scholars have attempted to investigate the effects of bank 
performance in the banking sector, some only considered banking characteristics, 
whereas others considered macroeconomic factors. According to Akhatar, Ali and 
Sadaqat (2011), bank performance can be measured according to both micro and 
macroeconomic factors of an economy.  
In this study, the focus was on the analysis of bank performance and regulatory 
requirements in South Africa and, the study adopted the stance of Akhatar et al. (2011). 
1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
An analysis of bank performance and banking regulatory requirements in South Africa 
became more critical after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Amendments were 
thus made to the Basel guidelines relating to bank performance and bank regulatory 
requirements in order to address the financial crisis. 
The present study analysed bank performance and regulatory requirements in the context 
of South Africa for several reasons. The first reason is that, despite the ready availability 
of data for both bank performance and regulatory requirements. The implementation of 
regulatory requirements remains a challenge in South Africa and globally while the bank 
performance and regulation relationship remain unresolved empirical issue. 
Secondly, after the occurrence of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, amendments to 
Basel guidelines on banking and supervision were made. The BCBS revised Basel II into 
Basel II,5 followed by Basel III being rolled out slowly until 2019 (Hull, 2015). Despite 
such efforts, bank failure still remains a global problem.  
Thirdly, most previous studies focused on the impact of capital adequacy on bank 
performance. Few studies have investigated the effects of other Basel III requirements in 
the form of the NSFR and LCR.  
As previous studies have been inconclusive, this study tested the relationship between 
bank performance and bank regulatory requirements. This study was conducted in the 
South African context and provided results consistent with both theory and literature. 
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1.6 Research questions  
This study attempted to answer the following research questions. 
1.6.1 Is there a relationship between bank performance and capital ratio? 
1.6.2. Is there a relationship between bank performance and liquidity coverage ratio? 
1.6.3 Is there a relationship between bank performance and net stable funding ratio? 
1.6.4 Is there a relationship between bank performance and the selected microeconomic 
and macroeconomic variables?  
1.7 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1.7.1 Primary objective 
To determine the impact of regulatory requirements on bank performance.  
1.7.2 Secondary objectives 
• To examine the relationship between bank performance and capital adequacy. 
• To investigate the relationship between bank performance and liquidity coverage 
ratio.  
• To examine the relationship between bank performance and net stable funding 
ratio.  
• To examine the relationship between bank performance and bank-specific 
variables and macroeconomic factors. 
1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to carry out an analysis of bank performance and regulatory 
requirements in South Africa. The study focussed on locally registered and licenced 
banks in South Africa in terms of Banks Act 94 of 1990, which are described in detail in 
Chapter 3. Furthermore, the study aimed to establish whether the regulatory requirements 
are observed and, if so, why some banks are failing. The research was quantitative in 
nature and used panel data regression analysis. Data were collected from the South 
African Reserve Bank. 
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Despite numerous international studies having been conducted on bank performance and 
bank regulatory requirements, research of this nature in the African context is very limited. 
This study contributes to the literature in the context of bank performance and regulatory 
requirements by explicitly focusing on the South African banking context.  
The findings of this study will benefit decision-makers and policymakers in terms of 
providing advice to other small banks. This study also identified factors over which the 
South African registered banks have control and the way to manage those better, to 
ensure that capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are managed effectively. 
Identifying the banks’ regulatory requirements will give the SARB, as the regulatory body, 
insight into ways of enhancing capital requirements to banks’ organisational requirement 
practices better and to help maintain a sound performance in the banking sector. This 
study will also open doors for other researchers to perform further studies in the field. 
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Data on banks in South Africa were only considered from 2009 to 2019, but there were 
missing data for some years. This issue was resolved by focusing on banks with complete 
data and eliminate some of the banks that did not have all the data for the target study 
period. The study was limited to locally registered banks that had operated during the 
entire study period, and the sample was identified as 12 banks. The study relies on 
secondary data, assuming it is a true reflection of actual events. Due to the mathematical 
measurement and difficulty required in estimating the banks' performance, in this study, 
accounting ratios were used to measure bank performance. 
1.10  CHAPTER LAYOUT 
Chapter 1: Introduction, problem statement and objectives  
In the first chapter, the study introduced the research study as well as the goals and 
objectives of the regulations. It further gave an overview of the banking sector, bank 
performance and regulations, the problem statement, the objectives of the study, the 
significance of the study, the limitations of the study, and the structure of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
In the second chapter, the study discusses the main variables, describes the theoretical 
framework, and provides a summary of the literature reviewed on bank performance and 
bank regulatory requirements in general. 
Chapter 3: Empirical studies 
Chapter 3 focuses on observations and findings from studies conducted by different 
scholars on the topic of bank performance and bank regulatory requirements globally and 
in South Africa. 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
Chapter 4 gives more detail on the methodology that was used to address the research 
objectives, as well as the research designs and econometric models used. Lastly, the 
generalised methods of moments (GMM) model selected for this study is discussed. 
Chapter 5: Data presentation, analysis and interpretation 
Chapter 5 provides an analysis and interpretation of the econometric test’s results. The 
chapter begins by presenting descriptive statistics, followed by a cross-correlation 
analysis, and finally, a presentation, analysis and discussion of the empirical results as 
estimated by GMM.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings and makes recommendations for the study, 
before offering concluding remarks on the theoretical and empirical results of this 
research. 
This chapter also includes a summary of the contribution of this study to the existing body 
of knowledge on the effects of bank performance and regulatory requirements. Finally, 
the chapter highlights the shortcomings of this study and provides information on possible 
future research. 
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1.11  SUMMARY CHAPTER 
This chapter began by providing an introduction to the relationship between banking 
regulations and performance. The theoretical linkage was highlighted, and the gap in the 
literature was clearly identified. The goals of regulations were discussed, with particular 
attention being paid to how bank regulations aim to provide stability and enhance 
performance in the financial sector. The South African regulatory environment was then 
introduced, describing the developments over time as well as the responsibility of the 
central bank in the formulation and enforcement of the regulations. The problem 
statement was formulated, and it was identified that research in South Africa on the 
linkages between bank performance and regulatory requirements (capital adequacy and 
liquidity requirement) is scant, and where it does exist, is contradictory. Specific research 
questions and the objectives of the study were presented, before the significance and 
limitations of the study were discussed. Finally, the structure of the dissertation was 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION AND THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
REVIEW  
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the main variables as well as the theories behind bank 
performance. Moreover, this chapter lays a good conceptual foundation and discusses 
the literature reviewed in articles, scholarly journals, textbooks, published reviews, 
dissertations and other sources. Lwoga, Ngulube and Stilwell (2017) claimed that an 
analytical part of a conceptual framework is the use of theories and variables related to a 
study. In the following sections, two main variables of the study (bank regulations and 
bank performance) definitions, examples and the proxies for each variable are provided, 
before the context of these variables is described.  
2.2 BANK REGULATIONS AND BANKS’ REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
Regulations are defined as a set of rules made by a government or authority to control an 
organisation or process (Makonko, 2016; Klomp & De Haan, 2015). According to 
Taranhike (2017), financial regulations are those laws and rules that govern what financial 
organisations, such as banks, brokers and investment organisations, must comply with, 
for example, regulatory frameworks and industry-specific regulations such as the Banks 
Act 94 of 1990.  
Bank regulation refers to a form of government regulation which subjects’ banks to certain 
requirements, restrictions and guidelines, which are designed to create market 
transparency between banking organisations and individuals or other organisations with 
which they conduct business (Elkelish & Tucker, 2016). According to Nyoka (2017), bank 
regulation refers to the minimum capital requirements, which clearly states that banks 
must reserve an 8% portion of their capital in compliance with the supervisory review 
processes that are mandated by the SARB and, complying with international regulations 
in terms of Basel III; these types of compliance determine for how long a banking 
organisation will remain in business from a regulatory point of view.  
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Vianney (2011) emphasised that capital requirements are bank regulation, which sets a 
framework in terms of Basel regarding how banks and depository organisations should 
handle their capital. Freixas and Santomero (2013) noted that it is the responsibility of a 
regulatory body to provide adequate minimum capital requirements and firewalls so that 
a financial crisis does not spill over to other organisations, as well as to minimise the 
likelihood of banks failing. The failure of a financial organisation is common in the banking 
sector and, may lead to another organisational failure within the same industry (Freixas 
& Santomero, 2013). Klomp and Haan (2015) concluded that consistency in complying 
with strict regulations would sustain a bank, prevent bank failures and increase efficiency.  
A study by Alam (2013) examined whether bank regulations, legislation, supervision and 
monitoring minimise failures, and enhance technical efficiency and risk-taking behaviour 
across the globe. The study found positive results that legislation is an important 
instrument used by the government to minimise bank failures, organise society and 
protect its citizens, as legislation governs the rights and responsibilities of the individuals 
and authorities to whom the legislation applies (van Vuuren, Leenen, Phahlamohlaka & 
Zaaiman, 2014). The legislation regulates dealings between a business and its suppliers; 
regulates the rights and duties of people representing the organisation and ensures 
fairness; and it authorises, provides, sanctions, grants, and protects individuals within a 
business (Freixas & Santomero (2013).   
According to Klomp and De Haan (2015), bank regulatory requirements have two main 
objectives, namely, to protect the interests of depositors, investors and creditors; and to 
safeguard the public interest by promoting the integrity and reputation of financial services 
markets. Dufey and Giddy’s (1984) and the South African Reserve Bank’s (2013) reasons 
for why banks need to be regulated include: monetary policy, the ability of the bank to 
create money; channelling of credit and investments and the allocation of credit; ensuring 
healthy competition and innovation amongst banks; and mitigating the problem of 
asymmetric information. 
In light of the above, Howells and Bain (2005) stated that for banks to channel credit 
effectively, and investment well in the market, they should have adequate liquidity. 
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Following the financial crisis of 2007-2009, several banks experienced financial difficulties 
because they had failed to manage their liquidity (Marozva, 2015). The risk faced by 
banking organisations and their core role in financial intermediation has resulted in the 
banking sector becoming highly regulated worldwide (Taranhike, 2017). Some of the 
reasons for this include protecting depositors’ funds, ensuring the safety and stability of 
the banking system, and protecting the safety of banks by limiting credit to a single 
borrower. For these reasons, the BCBS implemented an international regulatory accord 
that introduces a set of reforms designed to improve banking regulations using Basel. 
The Basel guidelines were introduced in an attempt to formulate a banking regulatory 
framework worldwide. The shape of the regulatory framework varies from one country to 
another and affects bank performance and the risk-taking of banks in those countries 
differently. The BCBS introduced a consecutive set of rules and guidelines known as 
Basel I, II and III, each of which had different objectives (Naidu, 2011). Currently, the 
Basel IV regulations are guiding banks internationally in terms of application issues for 
standards. 
Basel I was introduced to maintain financial stability by improving the quality of banking 
rules worldwide (Taranhike, 2017); it set out the minimum capital requirements of financial 
organisations to minimise credit risk. Basel I is also known as the Basel Capital Accord, 
and was intended for capital measurement and capital standards for the financial 
organisation for the coverage of international banks over their exposure to credit risk 
(Vousinas, 2015). Basel II followed in order to address the deficiencies identified in Basel 
I and to improve credit risk measurement in financial markets (BCBC, 2004; 2006) after 
substantial losses in the international market post-1992. Basel II also relates to the 
supervisory review process and explains the roles of banking supervisors and the powers 
conferred to them (BCBS, 2004). 
Basel II was followed by Basel III, which is an international business standard that 
requires financial institutions to maintain enough cash reserves to cover risks incurred by 
their operations.  
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Basel III was introduced to protect the economies from the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
The implementation of Basel III was intended to address loopholes in Basel II, and 
consists of the same three pillars as Basel II, namely, minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review and market discipline (Boora & Jongra, 2019).  Basel III is more 
stringent on bank regulations and consists of the following components: capital norms, 
liquidity standards, leverage and risk coverage (Chen, Shen, Kao & Yeh, 2017). Tanna 
(2016) noted that Basel III introduced stringent capital and liquidity standards to ensure 
financial stability. The aim was to ensure that banks accept a level of responsibility for the 
financial economy they operate in, safeguard against financial collapse, and implement a 
banking regulatory framework across the world (Nyoka, 2017; Taranhike, 2017).  
The aims and objectives of the banking regulatory framework are meant to mitigate risk-
taking by banks and to regulate the capital adequacy level that banks should keep to 
safeguard depositors’ money in the event of bank failures (Triki, Kouki & Dhaou, 2016). 
Another aim of banking regulatory requirement is to improve banks’ risk-taking as well as 
the overall performance of banks and the banking sector (Luvuno, 2018). Despite such 
efforts, banks are still failing, resulting in financial crises worldwide. Barth et al. (2013) 
noted that there have been more than 100 systemic banking crises in the world since 
1970, and argued that these serve as an indicator that there are deficiencies in the 
banking regulatory framework around the world. 
The South African banking system has also suffered financial crises resulting from bank 
failures. Insufficient liquidity, a poor bank regulatory framework, and inadequate 
management have been identified as some of the reasons for these failures. The South 
African Reserve Bank is the central bank in South Africa, and as such, is responsible for 
the prudential regulation of banks in pursuit of maintaining good financial system stability 
(SARB, n.d.). 
This study adopted the definition of regulation proposed by Elkelish and Tucker (2016), 
Taranhike (2017) and Nyoka (2017), which emphasises the three pillars of Basel III: 
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process and market discipline.  
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2.3 BANK PERFORMANCE 
As a starting point, to be able to assess the effects that regulations have had on bank 
performance, a definition of bank performance needs to be provided. Rose and Hudgins 
(2010) defined bank performance as an analytical tool that was created by the Financial 
Organisation Examination Council to assist in supervising and examining banks. Bank 
performance examines liquidity, capital adequacy, earnings and other possible factors 
that could damage the stability of a bank (Arif & Nauman Anees, 2012). 
Bank performance reflects the way in which banks uses their resources to achieve their 
objectives. Alternatively, it refers to the adoption of a set of indicators that serve as 
indicators of a bank’s current status, and the ability of a bank to achieve desired results 
to maintain stability and sustainability (Kana, 2017; Rengasamy, 2012).  
Bank performance further refers to how adequately a bank is meeting the needs of its 
stockholders, owners, employees, depositors, creditors and borrowing customers, as well 
as if it is keeping government regulators satisfied that their operating policies, loans, and 
investments are sound, and protecting the public interest (Rose & Hudgins, 2010). The 
adequate performance of banks is critically important to customers; the price and quality 
of the bank products determine efficiency and competition. Efficiency and competition 
cannot be observed directly, but some indirect measures in the form of simple indicators 
are used in both theory and practice (Boora & Jongra, 2019). According to Terreza (2015), 
performance measurements refer to a way of ensuring that resources available are used 
efficiently and effectively. The purpose of this performance measurement is to provide a 
bank’s management with the maximum return on capital employed in the business.  
Bank performance measures are interpreted differently by different scholars, there is no 
universal measurement. For example, some scholars measure performance using 
profitability, while others use net interest margin (NIM), liquidity, the balanced scorecard, 
financial matrices, the customers’ perspective, or internal and external processes.  
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Many studies, such as those by Anouze and Bo-Hamad (2019) and, Kana (2017) and, 
Vianney (2011), measured bank performance according to two categories, namely 
internal and external factors. Internal factors focus on the profitability of the bank, which 
is in the control of bank management, and this is classified into two categories: financial 
statement variables and non-financial statement variables. While financial statement 
variables relate to the decisions which directly involve items from the statement of 
comprehensive income and the statement of financial position in formulating ratios, the 
literature shows that bank performance could be typically measured using the following 
variables: return on assets, return on equities and net interest margin. These 
measurements are usually expressed as a function of either internal or external 
determinants of bank performance (Kana, 2017). Non-financial statement variables 
involve, for example, the number of branches and the status of a branch. External factors 
are those factors that are outside the scope of bank management. Among the mostly 
widely discussed external variables are market power and regulatory requirements. 
Klaassen and, van Eenghen (2015) observed bank performance from the market point of 
view, by assessing stock returns and, interpreting changes in the market opinions of the 
market and, future projections of the banks. Alternatively, the use of accounting figures 
to determine the ratios can be used as indicators of bank performance (Vianney, 2011). 
Return on assets (ROE) is one of the accounting ratios which is widely used in measuring 
bank performance and is expressed as a percentage of returns on a bank’s average 
assets (Klaassen & van Eenghen, 2015; Arinola & Omolehinwa, 2012). ROE is linked 
through the equity of multiplier, which portrays the leverage of ROE that is due to the 
bank having debts (Popa, Mihallescu & Land Caragea, 2009). A high Equity Multiplier 
(EM) can be achieved through a high asset to equity ratio. In a case of positive ROA, it 
enhances the ROE, however, in a case of negative ROA, it lowers the ROE. The EM of 
financial leverage is a measure of both risk and profit, and high EM values show both high 
capital and solvency risk (Mac Donald & Koch, 2006).  
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Simerly and Lim (2000) noted that bank performance involves measuring an 
organisation's effectiveness, efficiency and use of resources in its operations to generate 
revenues. Measuring what is considered to be bank performance is one of the challenges 
of scholars, because no single parameter can stand alone to determine bank 
performance. Bank performance can be determined by a review of various parameters 
and a detailed analysis of different measures. Anouze and Bo-Hamad (2019) defined 
performance measurement as a way of ensuring that resources are available to be used 
in the most efficient and effective ways; the purpose is to provide the maximum return on 
the capital employed by the business. A bank’s financial performance is very important 
as the board of directors, and stakeholders need to know how well the organisation is 
performing. The performance also determines the sustainability of the bank.  
According to Orazalin, Mahmood and Jung Lee (2016), two accounting profitability 
variable ratios are used to measure bank performance, namely ROA and ROE ratios. 
Other studies use capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity 
and sensitivity, for example, the CAMEL approach (Wang, Lu & Lin, 2012). The purpose 
of CAMEL is to determine a bank’s management efficiency in terms of adhering to 
regulatory requirements and maintaining an effective internal control system and prudent 
practices. The net interest margin (NIM) ratio is used to measure management quality; 
the formula for NIM is net interest income/interest earning of assets (Liu & Sathye, 2019). 
A higher ratio reflects better management quality and therefore, better performance. The 
ROA and ROE are used as proxies for earnings quality; therefore, higher ratios indicate 
the effective and efficient use of a bank’s assets in maximising shareholder value. The 
liquidity measure uses the loan to assets ratio (LOAN 1) and loan to assets (LOAN 2) 
(Matthews, Thompson, 2014). 
This study adopted the definition of bank performance proposed by Arif and Nauman 
Anees (2012); and Rose & Hudgins (2010). 
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For the following reasons; in their studies they focused on examining liquidity, capital 
adequacy, the risk-taking behaviour that may affect the bank, meeting the needs of 
stakeholders, protecting the interest of the public and complying with regulatory 
requirements. They measure performance using ROE, ROA and NIM. 
2.4 Theories of bank performance  
The economic rationale behind bank regulations was developed in western economies, 
considering of implications raised by the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. The public interest 
and private interest theory of regulation are designed to explain why regulation is 
attempted. According to Ping (2014), the viewpoint of economic rationale for banking 
regulation under public interest theory, there is a convergence of the interest of the public 
and some interest of the regulated banks. The opportunity to operate in a stable banking 
sector could be recognized as part of the banks private interest as it enables the banks 
to achieve their goal of profitability. It is in the interest of banks to maintain a safe and 
stable banking regime that also confers benefit on the public. In this light, banking 
regulation not only captured under private interest theory, but also serves the economic 
objective stipulated by the public interest theory. Under circumstances where the public 
lacks mean to participate in the regulatory process, it relies heavily on regulatory 
authorities to strike a balance between the public and private interests (Ping 2014). In this 
instance, it is more likely that a private interest view of regulation would prevail as a 
regulation and can more easily be captured by private parties’ governments and their 
officials than in a public participatory environment. Although the focus of this study was 
pessimist on theoretical framework. 
The following section discusses theories on bank performance, which aid management 
in their undertaking to make the best decisions regarding the financing of their bank. 
There are numerous theories on the subject, and although these theories do not provide 
all of the answers, they do provide useful insights that could aid management in their 
decision-making processes.  
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2.4.1 The market power theory 
The market power theory argues that certain market powers are needed for an 
organisation to achieve a good financial performance. These powers exist in the case of 
barriers of entry to certain markets (Ryan, Toole & McCann, 2014), for example, high 
capital requirements can be a barrier, giving existing players a chance to operate as a 
monopoly. The practice of market power theory leads to improved financial performance 
due to reduced competition. According to Keeley (1990), competition across financial 
organisations may lead to low profits or losses, which may lead to bank failures; therefore, 
a degree of market power is needed for banks to achieve a good financial performance. 
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) noted that poorly performing banks are forced to 
borrow from strong banks that have more market power. Credit assessments conducted 
by banks with market power ensure that subprime lending is avoided and, default 
payments are minimised. Massive capital requirement are needed to support the 
operations of a bank, which can be acquired from players with a high level of capital. 
According to Belkhaoui, Lakhal, Lakhal and Hellara (2014), the market power theory 
proposes two determinants of bank performance, namely market structure and strategic 
bank choice.  
The strategic choice of a bank is either constant or unstable, depending on the market 
structure (Berger, Hasan & Zhou, 2010). According to market power theory, the 
determinants of an organisation’s performance are market structure and management 
behaviour, which are the two most important factors used in achieving performance 
(Belkhaoui et al., 2014). A study by Girardone, Georgios, Chortareas and Garza (2010) 
investigated the relationship between market power and bank performance and found a 
positive relationship between the market power structure and bank performance. Rodolfo, 
Ernesto and Mario (2005) concluded that when a study uses bank performance as a 
proxy, the results indicate that there is a cost efficiency within the organisation.  
Cupian and Abduh (2017) noted that the market power theory captures the degree to 
which an organisation can increase its prices beyond marginal cost and represents it as 
a more accurate indicator in the market compared to standard concentration measures. 
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In summary, the market power theory deals with competition amongst banks in the 
market. Cupian and Abduh (2017) identified two components of empirical approaches for 
measuring competition, namely structural and non-structural approaches. The structural 
approach deals with modelling banks competition conduct, and performance paradigm 
with the hypothesis, that the market power of banking organisations increases with 
industry concentration and, by creating a direct link from industry and the competition 
environment. The structural conduct approach assesses the competitive environment that 
characterises market structure by applying ratios to the organisation using Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index model. Yildrim and Philippatos (2003) concluded that a rise in 
concentration is considered as the increase in collusive opportunities between banks, 
which guarantees higher prices and profitability.  The second approach is the non-
structural approach, which is based on the new empirical industrial organisations. The 
non-structural approach measures competition without using clear information about the 
market structure. Instead, it focuses on attaining estimates of the market’s power from 
the observed bank's behaviour. According to this approach, a bank’s high efficiency helps 
to increase its market share and profits. The competition can also be measured by  
Panzar-Rosse formula (1987), which suggests collective measures of competition and 
the Lerner index, which suggests individual measures for market power (Panzar & Rosse, 
1987).  
The Panzar-Rosse formula 
1n TR It =∝  +𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑊1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑖𝑛𝑊2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑖𝑛𝑊3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑖𝑛𝑍41𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑖𝑛𝑍2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑖𝑛𝑍3𝑖𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                      (1) 
TR It is a dependent variable that represents total revenues, which is measured by the 
interest and non-interest revenues to total assets. The first input is W1, which represents 
a proxy for input price of deposits; this can be done by taking the ratio of the total interest 
expense to total deposits and market funding. The second input is W2, which represents 
the proxy input price of tangible assets and fixed capital. This ratio takes into account 
operating expenses over total assets. The third input is W3, which represents a proxy for 
input price labour.  
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The first three equations were adopted from Nathan and Neave (1989) and Casu and 
Girardone (2006).  Cupian and Abduh (2017) supplemented the analysis by adding the 
other three bank-specific variables: Z1, which represents the ratio of net loans to total 
assets aiming to capture risk components; Z2, which represents the total assets to 
account for possible scale economies; and Z3, which signifies the equity ratio to total 
assets to capture the impact of capitalisation. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents a random disturbance term, 
and 𝑖 represents a particular bank. 
 Nathan and Neave (1989) conducted a study on the competitiveness conditions and 
market power of the Canadian banking system. Their study used the non-structural 
estimation approach to evaluate the elasticity of total revenues for input prices. They used 
the Panzar-Rosse model, and the results revealed that the competition was perfect in 
1982 and monopolistic competition from the period 1983-1984.  
Cupian and Abduh (2017) conducted a similar study to Nathan and Neave (1989), but 
used Panzar-Rosse to examine the market power of the Islamic banking system in 
Indonesia. They added three variables to their model, which is Z1, Z2 and Z3. The results 
revealed that Islamic banks in Indonesia operate at a higher degree of market power, 
which leads to a less competitive market. The banks earn revenues on the monopolistic 
competition.  
A study by Apergis, Fafaliou and Polemis (2015) empirically assessed the level of 
competition in European banks and used Panzar-Rosse for the analysis. The empirical 
findings were robust, and indicated that European banks are still in favour of monopolistic 
competition. 
The Panzar-Rosse (1987) formula offers a means of judgement amongst the different 
market structures through the reduction of the function at the individual’s income of the 
bank. By contrast, the Lerner index measures the degree of market power by focusing on 
the pricing power in the difference between prices and marginal cost (Saurina,  Jimenez 
& Lopez, 2007).  Sahut, Mili and Ben (2012) concluded that the higher the values of the 
Lerner Index, the lower the level of competition amongst the banks. The formula for the 
Lerner Index is explained below: 
                                                                                           
30 
 
The Lerner Index formula 
𝐿𝐼 =
(𝑃−𝑀𝐶)
𝑃
                                                                                                                         (2) 
The price of banking output is represented by P and MC, which signifies marginal cost 
(De Guevara & Maudos, 2007). 
A structural conduct performance was developed by Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), and 
both postulate a one-way causality relationship from industry structure to organisation 
conduct, and from organisation conduct to industry performance. The structural conduct 
performance proposed a framework under which the market structure regulates 
organisation or industry conduct, and in return, the conduct regulates organisations and 
industry performance which are measured by profit or marginal cost. With this approach, 
industry performance and concentration normally measure profit ratios, concentration 
ratios and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. De Guevara and Maudos (2007) criticised this 
approach due to its assumption that causality moves from structure to performance, 
although one can argue that conduct and performance can affect market structure. In 
addition, the limit of traditional measures is that the calculation of the degree of 
competition is chosen from indirect proxies, for example, market structure or market 
shares.  
Classens and Leaven (2004) revealed that banks’ behaviours are not only related to the 
market structure, but also other factors, for example, entry barriers, barriers of foreign and 
activity restrictions which are likely to limit the degree of competition. 
Hamza and Kachtouli (2014) conducted a study on the competitive conditions and market 
power of conventional Islamic banks using a non-structural approach. Their study 
employed three measurements: concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
Panzar-Rosse H statistic, and the Lerner Index, with the use of econometric estimations 
for evaluating the structure of market power by measuring its power using the price 
setting. The results revealed that under the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, both markets 
were low concentrated, while the concentration ratios and the Islamic markets were 
considered moderately concentrated.  
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The econometric estimation results, using Panzar-Rosse H static were linked to the level 
of competition and the Lerner Index of market power. The results indicated that both 
markets (competition and market power) are categorised by monopolistic competition, 
and the Islamic banking system is expressed as banks with a high level of market power. 
Tabak, Gomes and Medeiros (2015) examined the competitive behaviour of the Brazilian 
banking sector by analysing at what level individual banks take a risk in terms of market 
power. The results indicated that the Brazilian banking sector is more dominant in 
monopolistic competition, while another result indicated that the market power is 
negatively associated with risk-taking behaviour, regardless of the capital movements 
changes. Banks that encounter a decline in market power, meanwhile increase their 
capital levels are most likely to higher in risk-taking. 
The above findings are in contrast with Cupian and Abduh (2017), whose non-structural 
approach measured competition without clear information about the structure of the 
market. Instead, it emphasised obtaining estimates of market power from the observed 
bank's behaviour. The formulas for the bank concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index are as follows. 
 The k bank concentration ratio 
CR𝑘 = ∑ Si𝑛𝑖=1                                                                                                                                              (3) 
The k bank concentration ratio is one of the most frequently used measures of 
concentration because of its straightforwardness. The ratio is created by adding up the 
market shares of the k largest banks in the market. 
The formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
HHI = ∑ Si  2𝑛𝑖=1                                                                                                               (4) 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is one of the traditional measures of the competition and 
concentration of the market. This formula is widely applied to estimate the degree of 
competition of a market (Hirschman, 1945; Herfindahl, 1950). 
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 𝑆𝑖 2 represents the market shares of the organisations, while 𝑖 and n represent a number 
of organisations, it simply means that the market is concentrated, and when the 
competition is weaker between market players, the market is considered to be in a 
monopoly position (Belkhaoui et al., 2014). The higher the market concentration, the 
better the performance of the banks.  
Shepherd (1986) criticised the market power theory by stating that the direct source of 
market power is the domination of participants over individual markets, independent of 
the ultimate sources of such domination, hence the emergence of the relative market 
power. Banks with large market share and diversified products that might exert market 
power to determine prices, are likely to make more profits (Mensi & Zouari, 2010).  
Keeley (1990) pointed out that market power in the banking sector undermines the 
financial stability of banks, while Leon (2015) noted that the idea behind the competition 
in the banking sector is that market power is most likely to be harmful to banks. The next 
theory discusses financial intermediation in detail. 
2.4.2 Financial intermediation theory 
Gurley and Shaw (1960) noted that, over the past years, the theories of the banking sector 
were based on transaction cost and asymmetric information.  According to Motelle and 
Biekpe (2014), asymmetric information hampers the efficiency of financial intermediation 
by increasing the gap between lending and deposit rates. The cost of assembling 
information between the depositor and the lender is high and often results in high 
borrowing costs. The transaction cost and asymmetric theory were intended to account 
for organisations that take deposits from the public and channel funds to investors. In 
recent years there have been some changes, including increased intermediation services, 
and expansion of banks’ products varies from money and capital markets (Dzikiti, 2017). 
Although transactions and asymmetric information have declined in the market, financial 
intermediation is receiving more attention, for example, in South Africa, financial 
intermediaries serve as a middleman for financial transactions, generally banks, takes 
deposits from savers and lending to borrowers and lower the transaction cost. 
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Banks are no longer focusing on deposit-taking as their main role, however, and are 
engaging in numerous forms of intermediation. The financial intermediation theory defines 
how financial intermediaries’ processes influence the economy of a country and the 
effects of government policies on financial intermediaries (Gurley & Shaw, 1960). The 
theory also emphasises the roles and functions performed by financial intermediaries in 
the economy (Curott, 2020). 
 Several studies conducted in this field emphasise the role and function of financial 
intermediaries in achieving sustainable economic growth and highlight the role of the 
SARB in the regulation, supervision and control of financial intermediaries. 
According to Allen, Donald and Ndikumana (2000), the financial system reduces liquidity 
risk and facilitates the management of risk by investors, as financial systems collect and 
evaluate information more effectively than individual investors, for example, financial 
intermediaries enjoy economies of scale. 
The principal goal of financial intermediaries is to maximise shareholder wealth. Decisions 
on investing, lending, borrowing, pricing, adding new services, removing of old services 
and other activities thus depend on shareholder wealth. The purpose of financial 
intermediaries is to create lower transaction costs for searching for potential investors, 
borrowers and managing the risk between the two and, mobilising savings and conducting 
an exchange of funds (Levine & Loayza, 2000; Kana, 2017).  
According to Onuonga (2014), the deposit type of financial intermediaries are economic 
units, whose function is to obtain funds from depositors and others, then lend the funds 
to borrowers. As mentioned earlier, banks are one type of financial intermediary. Motelle 
and Biekpe (2014) noted that banks perform a high level of financial intermediation, 
particularly when it comes to transforming deposits into loans, which involves monitoring 
borrowers and the transformation of capital. In light of the above, banks play a principal 
role in intermediation by reducing the transaction costs of researching potential 
investments between depositors and borrowers. 
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The banks act as intermediaries between those who have money and those who need it. 
Commercial banks enhance economic efficiency and economic growth by allocating 
capital to its best possible users (Nyoka, 2017). One of the functions of financial 
intermediaries is the pooling of savings; they can help financial organisations to improve 
their performance by reducing transaction costs between borrowers and savers (Moen & 
Well, 2010).  
Banks encounter uncertainties in the market. The main challenge of uncertainty is market 
resistance, such as transaction cost and information asymmetries, which translate to poor 
performance and market resistance (Motelle & Biekpe, 2014).  Market resistance leads 
to a wedge between interest on a loan that has to be paid by borrowers and interest 
received by savers from their deposits (Beck, 2006). Beck (2006) further outlined the 
three main sources of market resistance, which is intermediation costs, limited options for 
the diversification of idiosyncratic risk. 
Firstly, intermediation costs are linked to regulatory requirements, clearing of funds. 
Secondly, the limited options to diversify idiosyncratic risk encourage banks to include a 
risk premium in their lending rates. Lastly, information asymmetries lead to agency 
problem based on poor choices made on asymmetry information (Onuonga, 2014). Banks 
are finding it difficult to determine the accurate creditworthiness of borrowers and the 
monitoring strategies of loans from customers. This difficulty gives rise to the principal-
agent problem characterised by adverse selection and moral hazard (Erturk, 2015). 
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), adverse selection and moral hazard are linked to 
the size of the financial intermediation. Motelle and Biekpe (2014) argued that the 
information limitation weakens the suitable determination of the borrower’s risk profile and 
leads to a situation where interest rates are used as a screening instrument. Any factor 
that increases the financial intermediation spread by hiking lending rates may lead to an 
increased probability of default by borrowers. The higher cost of monitoring the project 
payment period of loans is likely to create moral hazard difficulties, because the loans are 
used to finance risky projects instead of the project for which the loan is granted. 
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The risk linked to the information asymmetry problem can be managed by indicating that 
financial intermediators serve as delegated monitors of the economy (Diamond, 1984). 
Banks regularly incur the cost of monitoring borrowers through the collection of 
information, which compromises the quality of screening of borrowers appropriately. The 
cost related to monitoring efforts is normally passed to borrowers in the form of higher 
lending rates.  
Rashid (2011) agreed with the above reasoning and developed a model that examines 
the effects of foreign banks to clarify the high financial intermediation spread in domestic 
markets. The model indicated that foreign banks finance borrowers with low risk and leave 
the high-risk borrowers for local banks. Therefore, high-risk borrowers lead to credit risk, 
which is one of the causes of financial crises and affects the performance of the bank. In 
light of the above, the local banks feel the market pressure and react by increasing their 
lending rates. Creditworthy borrowers tend to borrow from foreign banks because of the 
low-interest rates charged. As a result, high-risk borrowers then borrow from local banks 
for the possibility of financial stability. 
A study by Erturk (2015) showed that market resistance, such as asymmetry and 
transaction costs, drive a wedge between depositors and lending rates. Banks normally 
include a risk premium to their lending rate to manage credit risk, liquidity risk and interest 
rate risk. After the banks have granted a loan to a borrower, they remain exposed to the 
credit risk until the loan is fully paid.  
During the term of the loan, there is the possibility that the borrower might default or fail 
to make regular payments, while another risk is linked to the provision of liquidity.  
Liquidity is a concern to both borrowers and lenders. For effective liquidity, banks need 
to adopt Basel III, which specifically deals with liquidity management. Although bank 
liabilities are short term in nature, short term loans normally take longer than expected to 
be paid in full by borrowers. According to Kana (2017), short term loans allow the 
borrowers to improve their credit rating to be more favourable in terms of lending, and it 
also allows lenders to exercise more rapid control over borrowers who are defaulting.  
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As a result, banks need to finance the loans in a manner that guarantees that there will 
always be enough cash to honour the daily demand of depositors to avoid liquidity risk. 
The profitable intermediation of banks depends upon an intermediary’s ability to reduce 
transaction costs between borrowers and savers of funds using economies of scale. The 
reduction in transaction costs should be higher than the charge made by an intermediary 
as outlined in the following formula (Howells & Bain, 2005:17). 
(y+C1B+C1L) < (CB+CL)                                                                                                     (5) 
Where CB = Cost to the borrower in the absence of an intermediary; 
CL = Cost to the lender of funds in the absence of an intermediary; 
C1B = Cost to the borrower when dealing through an intermediary; 
C1L = Cost to the lender of funds when dealing through an intermediary; and 
Y = The intermediary’s charge for supplying the services. 
According to Mathews and Thompson (2014), the role of transaction costs can be 
examined as follows in the absence of a bank as an intermediary: where R represents 
the rate of interest, TB represents the several costs incurred by the borrower and TS 
represents cost incurred by the saver. 
The return to the saver (Rs) = R- Ts 
The cost to the borrower (Rb) = R+Tb 
The spread = Rb= Rs=Tb+Ts 
The coordination of the condition in the above equations is the basis of the livelihood of 
banks (Makina, 2006). According to Mathews and Thompson (2014), the process of 
reducing transaction costs from intermediation meets the above condition in terms of the 
rate of interest. 
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The intermediary financial development can improve productivity through this channel 
because banks may reduce the cost of evaluating investment projects before making 
lending decisions. Therefore, this process would enable banks to make a better allocation 
of capital (Howells & Bain, 2005). 
According to Dzikiti (2017), the purpose of financial intermediation theory is to regulate 
the money creation approach. The method of regulating the money creation process is 
linked to the liquidity and solvability of financial intermediation (Merton, 1995). Therefore, 
the regulation of financial intermediaries has a positive impact on the capital adequacy, 
refinancing and debt recovering method (Diamond & Rajan, 2000).  
The bank capital affects the following: the safety of the bank, the ability of the bank to 
refinance, and the ability to collect repayments of loans from borrowers. The regulation 
of capital plays a crucial role in the financial economy of the country because it helps to 
maintain liquidity. The financial intermediation theory fails to evolve into a general and 
coherent explanation of the basic function of financial intermediate in the market and the 
economy as a whole, according to Ngonyama and Simatele (2015). Hester (1994) 
agreed, arguing that the financial intermediation theory focuses solely on the functions of 
banks and is no longer crucial in developing the financial system. Instead, the focus is on 
the products and services that are reducing the importance to the intermediaries, while 
they are unable to account for those activities which they have become central focus of 
many organisations. The financial intermediation theory thus fails to account for the 
activities which have become a central issue in many organisations. 
To further understand how regulations impact bank performance, the capital structure 
theories are discussed in the next section. Although these theories do not provide all the 
answers, they provide a useful insight, which will assist management in their decision-
making processes. 
2.4.3 Capital structure theories  
Myers (1984) defined capital structure as a mix of debts and equities that are used to 
finance the operations of the organisation. 
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The cost of the capital structure of an organisation is likely to be lowered through the 
implementation of effective capital structure decisions, and it increases shareholders’ 
equity (Nyoka, 2017). Gitman (2009) noted that the corporate finance theory maximises 
profit and specified that the value of the organisation can be increased when the cost of 
capital is minimised. 
The finance literature proves that there is a relationship between capital structure, 
performance and profitability. In the curent study, assessing the effects of capital structure 
on profitability will help the current researcher to understand the potential problems 
regarding bank performance and capital structure. What follows is a brief review of the 
existing theories of capital structure in their chronological order of development. 
2.4.4 The agency theory  
Since the publication of the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , there has 
been some great empirical work done on agency theory in several studies worldwide, 
which have examined the relationship between financial leverage and organisational 
performance. The separation of ownership and control in organisations results in a conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers within the organisation and thus leads to 
agency cost (Dawar, 2014).  According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory 
resolves the conflict of interest between shareholders and management as it can affect 
the efficacy of investment and liquidity decisions of management, which can cause an 
impact on working capital. Organisations with a weak monitoring system and a lack of 
discipline to decision-makers lead to a situation where managers may invest in projects 
with a negative net present value or fail to invest in projects with a positive net present 
value (Kwaku, Marfo & Ansong, 2013). 
For various reasons, managers normally use the resources of their organisation to indulge 
in investments that personally benefit them, rather than maximising the profit of the 
organisation (Jensen, 1986). 
Similarly, managers are reluctant to give up controls and try as best as possible to mitigate 
liquidation, despite acting in the best interest of shareholders (Harris & Raviv, 1988). 
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Therefore, the use of leverage in capital structure can minimise agency cost by 
encouraging managers to act in the best interests of shareholders by regulating the 
choice of investment (Myers, 1977). Therefore, increasing leverage can mitigate agency 
cost and have a significant positive effect on profitability and organisational performance.  
Agency theory deals with conflict between two parties, namely the agency and the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The first part is the agency problem that may arise 
when the two goals of the principal and the agency are in conflict, and when it is difficult 
for the principal to verify what the agent is doing. Boyd (1990) noted that agency theory 
emphasises the monitoring effectiveness role of the board towards directors and 
behaviour uncertainties that might arise within the organisation. 
According to Abou-EI-Sood (2012), agency theory is used as a mechanism, particularly 
in corporate governance, to address agency problems in assessing the organisational 
risk-taking, and applying risk management. For example, the board size, outside 
directorship, liquidity risk and market power are positively associated with a bank’s risk-
taking.  
Business Finance (2011) defined agency theory as a relationship between shareholders 
and directors. This relationship occurs when principals hire agents to perform some 
duties. The purpose of agency theory is to resolve the conflict of interest that may arise 
between the principal and agent.  
The credit relationship can be linked to an agency relationship when a creditor (the 
principal) lends some of his wealth to a debtor (the agent), who is committed to his capital 
payment and interest costs, with the conditions being established in a contract entered 
into between the two parties (Karamera, 2013). One can thus refer to a creditor and a 
debtor, where the principal (the creditor) wants the repayment of borrowed capital plus 
interest to maximise profitability. 
The agency problem, therefore, arises due to possible conflicts of interest between the 
principal and the agent, which may incur a cost (Nyoka, 2017). In general, bank 
regulations, are established to solve agency problems. 
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Howells and Brian (2005) noted that the purpose of bank regulations is to solve the 
agency problems between customers of banks and banks because customers are less 
informed and thus more at a disadvantage about the affairs of the banks. The costs that 
may be incurred due to a dispute are called agency cost, which is discussed below. 
2.4.5 Agency cost theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency cost as the sum of monitoring expenditure 
by the principal; by the agent and residual loss; and a cost that arises due to a possible 
conflict of interest, particularly when both parties in the relationship are seeking to 
maximise their worth within the organisation. The challenge is that the agent will not 
always act in the best interest of the principal.  
There is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of 
the principal because the agent may have his or her own interests to serve.  For example, 
an agent may invest in certain projects which yield the best results in the short term to 
increase their bonuses (Naidu, 2011). It is in the best interests of the principal to limit the 
powers vested to the agent. These may be achieved by the establishment of proper 
incentives for the agent by the principal’s willingness to monitor costs for the activities of 
the agent, so that the principal may not be disadvantaged. 
According to Jensen (1986), agency cost is a type of internal organisation expense which 
arises from the actions of agents on behalf of the principal. These expenses arise in the 
wake of inefficiencies, disruptions and dissatisfactions, which may be caused by a conflict 
of interest between shareholders and the management of the bank. Kwaku et al. (2013) 
noted that the best way to reduce agency cost between the principal and the agent is by 
implementing financial incentives to the agent based on their performance, which will 
assist in motivating them to act in the best interests of the bank.  
According to agency theory, the capital structure of the organisation should, therefore, 
minimise the potential opportunist behaviour in the organisation (Naidu, 2011). 
For instance, a legal system that protects investors’ rights by restraining opportunist 
behaviour by management.  
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Agency cost theory portrays regulatory requirements as a way of raising the quality of 
financial services by improving incentives to perform contractual obligations to avoid 
agency problems (Nyoka, 2017; Karamera, 2013). In the financial services industry, 
regulatory requirements create an outside discipline that controls and coordinates 
industry behaviour. Financial organisations benefit from regulations that enhance 
customers’ confidence, increase the confidence of customers’ transactions, and improve 
organisations’ performance by creating profits. The agency cost theory reconciles 
conflicts between the interests of the organisations, customers and regulators (Lee-Ford, 
2009). 
Sibindi (2017) acknowledged that agency cost theory is more applicable to well-
established organisations and hence does not necessarily explain the behaviour of 
smaller organisations.  
Jensen (1986) also criticised the agency cost theory by proposing the free cash flow 
theory of debt. Free cash flow debt can be beneficial in motivating managers and their 
organisations to be efficient. Jansen (1986) defined free cash flow debt as the cash flow 
above the required funds for all projects that has a positive net present value when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
senior managers over payout policies are likely to occur when an organisation makes free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Senior managers may have the motive to wrongly use the free 
cash flow for personal gain or making bad investment decisions (Rasiah & Kim, 2011). 
According to Grossman and Hart (1982) and William (1987), agency cost can be reduced 
by high leverage and increases an organisation's performance by encouraging managers 
to act in the best interests of shareholders.  
Abou-EI-Sood (2012) noted that the structure of a financial organisation gives rise to three 
circles of agency problems: between management and shareholders, between block 
holders and minority holders, and between internal and external stakeholders. According 
to Grove, Patelli, Victoravich and Xu (2011), the presence of block holders as governance 
positively influence the board decision making by monitoring of bank managers to mitigate 
agency cost. 
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A few studies claim that ownership concentration is associated with the risk-taking of the 
bank due to the monitoring role that regulation plays (Gropp & Kohler, 2010; Elyasiani & 
Jia, 2008). Levine (2004), Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, (2007) and Shehzad, Haan and 
Scholtens (2010) argued that ownership concentration is linked to minimum risk-taking 
for various reasons. For example, the block holders are in a better position to negotiate 
management incentive contracts to align owner-manager interest compared to small 
investors; however, block holders are more effective in monitoring the management of 
non-performing organisations (Sibindi, 2017). Concentrated ownership reinforces the 
benefits of monitoring to avoid agency cost. 
Relating this to bank performance, the agent, in this case, is the senior managers and 
board of directors of the bank, who are expected to act in the best interest of the principal, 
for example, the shareholders. 
 Financial decisions made by management about bank performance are expected to 
benefit shareholders through the profitability of the organisation using the capital 
structure. Capital structure is an indication given by managers to shareholders as a way 
of promoting efficiencies and minimising inefficiencies that may be caused by information 
asymmetry (Handoo & Sharma, 2014). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading off the agent cost against the benefit 
of debt. The optimal structure can be obtained through a tradeoff between liquidation and 
higher investigation cost (Sibindi, 2017). A conclusion was made by Grove et al. (2011) 
that the higher the leverage can be, the larger the organisation, the lower the probability 
of reorganisation following a default, and the higher the debt level. The optimal capital 
structure can be traded off between the benefit of debt and the cost of debt, based on the 
fact that managers are likely to issue debt only when they fear a takeover (Stulz, 1990). 
Diamond (1989) and Hirschleifer and Thakor (1989) argued that the use of debts to 
finance high-risk projects rather than using equities, is likely to be reduced as the 
reputation of managers will be at risk. While principals work hard to maximise their 
expected return on equities, agents also work hard for the benefit of the organisation. 
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Diamond (1989) argued that older organisations choose less risky projects to reduce the 
risk of default, which leads to lower cost of debts. Therefore, this theory suggests that 
small organisations are likely to have less debt than bigger ones. Agency theory has shed 
light on the capital structure; however, it does not detail all the differences in capital 
structures observed in practice (Singh & Sharma, 2016). 
Gwatidzo (2008) introduced mitigation strategies to resolve the conflict between 
management and shareholders as follows: firstly, the issuing of debts as opposed to 
equities obliges management to legally bind themselves to a certain level of payment to 
lenders, which reduces opportunist behaviour. Secondly, the issuing of short term debt 
binds management to the negotiation table regularly. Therefore, management is punished 
by the creditors when they are seen to be harming creditors. Thirdly, in the event of long 
term debt being issued, it must be secured by collateral.  
Lastly, by increasing the debt level in organisations where the potential for opportunist 
behaviour is high. Despite these mitigation strategies, this theory has been criticised by 
researchers for various reasons. 
Perrow (1986) criticised agency theory by arguing that it only focuses on the agent side 
of the principal problem, and neglects that the problem may also arise from the principal 
side. Perrow commented that agency theory is not concerned about the principals who 
deceive, shirk and exploit the agent. In addition, the agents are forced to work in an 
extremely risky working environment and without any scope of intrusion where principals 
act as an opportunist.  Perrow argued that there is another way that humans are principled 
and work ethically for the benefit of the organisation, by acting in the best interest of 
shareholders. This type of argument is common in the finance literature, and is becoming 
prominent as the stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990). 
Researchers such as Eisenhardt (1989), Sanders and Carpenter (2003) and Pepper and 
Gore (2012) criticised agency theory on numerous grounds, and proposed a different 
theory called behavioural agency theory. This theory argues that agency theory only 
emphasises the principle and conflict of interest, agency cost and reliant on both parties 
to minimise agency problems.  
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The agency theory assumes a contractual relationship between the agent and the 
principal for a specified or unspecified future period when the future is uncertain (Panda 
& Leepsa, 2017). The theory assumes that creating contract eliminates the agency 
problem, however practically it faces many limitations such as information asymmetry, 
irrationality, fraud, and transaction costs. The shareholder's interest in the organisation is 
only to maximise their equities; however, their role is limited to the organisation. The role 
of directors is only to monitor managers, and their further role is not defined. Agency 
theory considers managers to be opportunists and ignores the competence of the 
managers. 
2.4.6 Market discipline theory 
Market discipline is mostly used in financial regulations. According to Bliss (2014), market 
discipline refers to the prevention of excessive risk-taking by banks, by regulators and by 
market participants utilising market prices as a sign of creating problems. Market 
discipline refers to obligations by banks to comply with regulatory requirements in 
managing the stakeholder's risk on a day-to-day basis.  
Nier and Baumann (2003) developed a theoretical framework for market discipline which 
includes the risk-taking of the bank, the extent of the government safety net, the degree 
to which uninsured liabilities finance the bank, and the extent of banks’ risk choices. 
According to Flannary (2001), market discipline refers to the power of investors, 
customers and the risk-taking agencies to assess and control the level of risk behaviour 
by banks. Banks are required to publicly disclose their financial operations to ensure 
financial transparency in the form of disclosure. The purpose of disclosure is to 
discourage banks from taking an excessive level of risk. The level of risk-taking by banks 
not only affects their ability to make loans; it also affects the interests of existing 
stockholders and market participants, namely account holders, depositors and borrowers. 
Market discipline limits the banks’ level of risk-taking because risk reflects on the 
disclosure of financial statements, and prospective clients and investors may respond 
negatively to that particular bank. According to Nyoka (2017), market discipline 
encourages banks to complement the minimum capital requirements. 
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The purpose of using market discipline as an adjunct to supervision in the regulation of 
capital in the banking sector started in the mid-1970s (Castagnolo & Ferro, 2013). 
Following the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009, market discipline has become the central 
issue in financial markets. The most recent global financial crisis pushed regulators to 
improve regulatory requirements in the banking sector. The purpose of regulatory 
requirements is to minimise the possibilities of financial crises. The rigorous Basel III not 
only reinforces capital buffer requirements, but it also extends regulations to a risk-
weighted capital framework for liquidity and leverage in bank regulations.  
According to the literature, capital regulation and market discipline facilitate the 
improvement of stability for the organisation (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; Kane, 
2000). Capital regulation improves the banking sector’s capital buffer, and at the same 
time, may negatively impact the risk-taking level of the bank (Blum, 1999). Banks that 
take more risk in response to capital regulation are likely to experience liquidity problems. 
Further, the impact of market discipline may bypass government regulations in some 
countries (Barrios & Blanco, 2003). 
The purpose of capital regulation is to promote financial stability and the soundness of 
the economy of the country in which the banks operate. According to Rose and Hudgins 
(2010), there are three reasons for capital regulations, namely, to minimise the risk of 
failures, to maintain public confidence, and to minimise the losses to the SARB arising 
from deposit insurance claims. These regulations have been strengthened by the 
introduction of the Basel Accords that regulate banks’ capital requirements, Basel III in 
particular. The purpose of Basel III is to make each bank’s capital holdings proportional 
to its potential credit losses (BCBS, 2006). For this reason, capital has long been 
characterised as one of the key factors to be considered when the safety and soundness 
of a particular bank are being assessed (Bliss, 2014). 
In analysing a bank’s level of risk-taking, an adequate capital base serves as a safety net 
against some risks to which the organisation is exposed in the course of its day-to-day 
operations. In this way, capital absorbs possible losses and provides a basis for 
maintaining a depositor’s confidence in a bank.  
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Capital also serves as a determinant of a bank’s lending capacity. According to Osei-
Assibey and Asenso (2015), the availability of capital determines not only the maximum 
level of assets that banks hold, but also the amount and the cost of capital impact on their 
efficiency and competitive position.  
In cases where banks fail to comply with the regulations, investors may tacitly punish 
them for their lack of prudential risk management by insisting on higher returns on 
investments or terminating the investment (Flannery & Rangan, 2008).  
There is growing research on the safety net in the banking sector, for example, Berger, 
Hassan and Zhou (2009) investigated the privatisation of banks in China; Wu and Bowe 
(2012) examined the relationship between information disclosure and depositors’ 
behaviour; and Omotala, Roya and Safoura (2011) analysed the risk management 
practices and management efficiency of banks. Remarkably, after comparing many 
studies on regulatory requirements efforts and bank behaviour in developed countries, it 
is evident that fast-growth of the economy worldwide has brought the attention of 
regulators closely in the banking sector.  
The China Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC) adopted Basel III and made it 
compulsory for banks in China to comply with capital regulations in 2004. The banking 
sector in China responded more positively to the regulator pressure imposed by the 
CBRC, including market discipline, than western countries. Chinese banks are rated top 
of the world according to their size, market capitalisation, profitability and other key risk 
indicators. 
The financial system of China could improve by imposing a compulsory capital buffer 
against unexpected losses (Xu, Lee & Fu, 2015).  In terms of the risk-weighted regulatory 
framework, banks are normally required to have a bigger capital buffer when they are 
taking greater risks. Banks may be required to limit their level of risk-taking behaviour 
under capital restrictions. Although existing studies show that both under- and well-
capitalised banks improve their capital assets ratio, there are arguments about the impact 
of capital regulation on bank risk levels. 
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A study by Gennotte and Pyle (1991) in the US found that strict capital regulation 
increases the probability of bank failures; they argued that compulsory capital ratio 
requirements may prompt banks to invest in more risky asset portfolios. On the other 
hand, Kim and Santomero (1988) were against investing in more risky asset portfolios, 
and concluded that banks should minimise their level of risk-taking when it comes to risky 
asset portfolios.   
In European countries, Rime (2001) and Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998) concluded 
that banks can improve their capital ratios by minimising the level of risk-taking.  
Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004) revealed that under-capitalised banks are likely to lower 
their level of risk and increase their capital levels concurrently. However, well-capitalised 
banks are likely to take more risks when their capital ratio increases.  
In African countries such as Ghana, the recent regulatory capital adjustment that was 
introduced by Basel III in the banking sector has introduced significant improvement in 
bank performance. Regulators have highlighted the various risks that concern the banking 
sector in Ghana, and these were addressed by the Basel III capital requirements. The 
banking sector regulators in Ghana have substantially increased the capital minimum 
requirements on three separate occasions since 2003. These developments forced the 
banking sector of fairly well-capitalised banks to increase their stated capital from GHe 
16.2 million to approximately GHe 1.700 million in 2001 and in February 2012. In 2013, 
the stated capital of banks was increased to GHe 23,45,4; million each year, the growth 
rate was exponential (Osei-Assibey, 2015). The purpose of these increases was to 
ensure that banks keep their capital well in excess of the minimum required on their 
balance sheet.  
In addition to capital regulation, market discipline, as another form of safety net, can also 
have an impact on bank capital buffers and increase risk the level of risk-taking (Kane, 
2000; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004). According to Barrios and Blanco (2003) and 
Gropp and Heider (2008), bank capital build-up is driven by market discipline. Bliss and 
Flannary (2002) argued that market discipline enforces external sanctions on banks.  
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The depositor is considered to be the core component of market discipline, and again, 
the depositor constantly monitors the level of risk-taking by the bank. 
The aim of introducing market discipline theory was to prevent excessive risk-taking of 
banks by regulators; however, this theory failed to prevent banks from risk-taking, which 
caused the financial crisis in 2007-2009 (Min, 2015). According to Vanhoose and 
Vanhoose (2007), the market discipline theory failed more completely than has previously 
been acknowledged. A foundational premise of market discipline was that regulators 
would monitor risk, which would lower the liquidity of the affected banks. 
 That being said, there was no such reaction from the regulators until after the financial 
crisis had already begun. The market discipline relies too heavily on investors who are 
not willing to take an extreme risk with their money, this is because the world has more 
risk aggressive investors than risk averse investors. As a result, this serves as poor 
monitors of banks and neglects the effects of bank shareholders, who are extreme risk-
takers but may have incentives averse to those of public policy. Stephanou (2010) 
conducted a study on market discipline exerted on various liabilities of major banks, and 
none of the key prudential provided signals on the risk-taking of banks or showed any 
indications of elevated risk until long after these banks had taken the actual risk.  
Berger (1991) concluded that the literature is concerned primarily with whether the bank 
liabilities react adversely to information regarding the risk. However, this theory fails to 
reveal the degree to which market discipline is effective as an incentive scheme; for 
example, to what extent does market discipline influence bank behaviour?  
2.4.7 The buffer theory of capital adequacy 
Capital adequacy is used to measure the amount of the bank’s core capital and is 
expressing it as the ratio of its capital to its weighted credit exposure in the form of loans 
(Economic Times Bureau, 2010). Another name for capital adequacy is risk-weighted 
assets, which are used to protect depositors’ money, encourage stability and protect 
financial systems. 
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The purpose of capital adequacy is to have banks hold a certain minimum percentage of 
shareholders’ capital, depending on the total amount of loans given to customers and the 
level of risk-taking of the bank, which is on average 9.75% (BCBS, 2015). 
The capital adequacy buffer theory is one of the determinants of bank performance, 
according to several researchers. The theory of capital adequacy explains why banks 
need to hold higher capital levels and shows the relationship between the two variables 
(Abou-El-Sood, 2012). The purpose of this study is to show whether there is a relationship 
between bank performance and regulatory requirements. 
The most significant recent reform in international banking regulation has been in the area 
of capital adequacy. Questions were raised as to why capital adequacy was adopted as 
a tool for international banking regulation (Zheng, Xu & Liang, 2012), to which the 
response was that many banks failed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. These 
failures have been attributed to poor governance practices that failed to manage liquidity 
risk and capital adequacy (Abou-El-Sood, 2017).  
According to Furfine (2001), the Boards of Directors (BoD) contribute to the failure of 
banks for the following reasons: failure to assess the risk-taking of the bank; failure to 
assess liquidity risk; failure to manage capital adequacy; and failure to act with prudence. 
These failures led banks to economic shocks. Banks are expected to be effective 
monitors of other banks’ performances. The main issue that concerns bank regulators is 
mitigating excessive risk-taking. 
Abou-El-Sood (2017) pointed out the causes of bank failures and bank runs, which are 
due to mismatching assets and liabilities. The importance of mitigating bank runs in 
financing activities and injecting liquidity in the economic system is influenced by capital 
regulatory requirements interest because it helps to mitigate excessive risk (Bryant, 
1980).  
The regulatory capital requirement is one of the measures of modern bank performance. 
According to Rochet (1992), it provides banks with a buffer when they are in poor 
economic condition, and also serve as a mitigation mechanism in advance of risk-taking. 
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Numerous arguments have been made since the introduction of Basel III regarding 
whether adequate capital adequacy can effectively minimise the risk-taking of banks; 
several debates have focused on the theory of capital adequacy and regulatory practices 
(Zheng, Xu & Liang, 2012). 
Banks are required to hold a minimum capital to cover the costs that may occur in case 
of a breach of a set of regulation (Nyoka, 2017). Calem and Rob (1999) maintained that 
banks need to hold sufficient capital to minimise the chances of failing to comply with 
regulatory requirements because non-compliance leads to penalties.  
 Allen et al. (2011) noted that there is a relationship between capital and risk-taking; non-
compliant banks with minimum capital adequacy tend to take more risks, which leads to 
bank failures. Compliant banks with minimum capital adequacy are likely to invest in risky 
portfolios and anticipate higher profits, which may be used for continuous improvements 
in their capital position (Rime, 2001). 
According to Zheng et al. (2012), regulators define the highest limit of bank ratio debt-
equity as a capital controls mechanism. Regulators believe that capital can be used to 
buffer the risk, which guarantees the bank’s solvency for depositors and borrowers when 
the value of assets falls below the market value. Both the theoretical and empirical studies 
conducted to determine the relationship between bank regulations and financial 
performance showed different results. Calomiris and Klein (1991) argued that banks that 
hold capital above the minimum requirement could negatively affect the performance of 
the bank, especially profitability, therefore holding more capital does not necessarily 
benefit the banks. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) conceded that capital improves 
monitoring activities, and the higher the capital, the higher the return on equities. 
Ofoeda, Gariba and Amoah (2016) noted that regulations affect the profitability of a bank; 
however, it is not clear whether it decreases or increases profitability. The regulatory 
activities of banks alleviate the conflict of interest between banking and security 
underwriting, and prevent management from engaging in risky decisions. 
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The regulatory requirements may, however, deprive banks of the opportunity to diversify 
their asset portfolios or exploit their economies of scale, and thus lead to a higher 
probability of failure. 
In the USA, the risk-based approach is used to emphasise the importance of capital 
adequacy requirements gradually, for the reason that the bank’s capital is considered to 
be a cushion that allows banks to absorb adverse shocks (Abou-El-Sood, 2017).  
Therefore, regulators use the risk-based capital adequacy requirements to minimise 
excessive risk-taking by banks (Abou-El-Sood, 2012). Yet regulators impose penalties on 
those banks that hold below minimum requirements of capital. 
US banks and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) classify the range of 
regulatory capital requirements as follows: banks with a tier 1 capital ratio and above 6% 
are classified as well capitalised (Haubrich, 2020; Anat & Hellwig, 2013); and banks that 
fall below the minimum regulatory requirements set by the Basel Accord (4% for a tier 1 
capital ratio) need regulatory involvement, which is costly. The cost of regulatory 
involvement is likely to escalate to bankruptcy, should the bank become significantly 
undercapitalised. The level of regulatory tier 1 capital is a significant determinant of a 
bank’s health and performance (Pradhan & Shrestha, 2017). However, the level of 
regulatory tie one capital raises questions about whether banks’ capital adequacy 
requirements affect the link between bank performance and risk-taking. 
Some research focusing on capital adequacy affecting bank performance and moral 
hazard theory is dominant, which regards capital as an external factor and analyses why 
banks chose risk assets. Pradhan and Shrestha (2017) and Okafor, Ikechukwu and 
Adabimpe (2011) revealed that the total amount of risky assets are likely to be decreased 
by the adequacy regulation. 
In supporting this theory, Gropp and Heider (2010) made an argument that the buffer 
capital adequacy has several functions, for example, to promote, to protect, to regulate 
and for operational functions which are discussed below. The promotional function 
explains how banks ensure that they have enough capital to meet stakeholders’ 
expectations and promote growth to protect the bank.  
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These can be done by mitigating unexpected losses and ensuring business continuity is 
tested and reliable. However, it is management’s duty to ensure that adequate capital is 
reserved. Should there be unexpected losses, these losses will be covered against the 
reserved capital. In light of the above, it is important to protect the bank from a breach of 
capital requirements. Regulators and the operational function support banks’ activities 
and ensure volumes, which will lead to improved profits. 
According to the buffer capital adequacy theory, banks are likely to act aggressively by 
increasing their loan book without increasing the minimum capital requirements.  
For banks to mitigate this risk, they must set their minimum requirements higher than the 
threshold of the regulators (Musyoka, 2017). The excess capital will normally lead to 
increased operations, which will improve bank performance. 
The buffer capital adequacy theory was criticised by Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011), 
who stated that banks that hold capital above minimum regulatory requirements do not 
prevent banks from failing due to a financial crisis. The buffer capital adequacy theory is 
relevant to this study because it supports holding access to capital. Holding access to 
capital will lead to a reduction in costs, which may lead to penalties in the case of a breach 
of regulatory requirements. It may also support the operations of the bank to improve its 
performance.  
2.5. SUMMARY CHAPTER 
In this chapter, key terms were explained, for example, regulatory requirements and bank 
performance. In regulatory requirements, it was noted that there are four Basel Accords: 
Basel I, Basel II, Basel III and Basel IV. These requirements and capital structure theories 
were discussed.  
On the performance side, three definitions of performance were discussed; however, the 
study adopted the definition of Rose and Hudgins (2010) and Arif and Nauman Anees 
(2012) as their studies focused on ROE, NIM and ROA; the risk-taking of a bank; meeting 
the needs of stakeholders; protecting the interests of the public; complying with regulatory 
requirements; measuring performance using liquidity. 
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 The general theories of bank performance were also discussed, namely: market power, 
financial intermediation and trade-off theory, furthermore, the bank performance theory, 
which is explained by capital structure, was discussed; the buffer theory of capital 
adequacy, agency theory and market discipline theory. In the next chapter, the empirical 
research section discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BANK PERFORMANCE AND REGULATORY 
REQUIREMENTS  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines empirical studies conducted by different scholars on bank 
performance and regulatory requirements around the world. Subsequently, quantitative 
theories used in the studies conducted on the relationship between bank performance 
and regulatory requirements are assessed. 
3.2 Empirical studies on regulations and bank performance  
Bank regulations are the main factor that affects bank performance; they are the 
determinant of financial crises. Kale, Eken and Selimler (2015) and Naceur, Naceur and 
Omran (2010) conducted a study on the effects of bank regulation on bank performance 
and observed that structural bank regulations affect bank performance positively or 
negatively in both developed and developing countries. In the case of structural prudential 
regulation, this affects bank performance positively. Vanhoose (2007) concluded that the 
existing literature is insufficient to identify the real effect of structural regulations on bank 
performance. For this reason, the current researcher wanted to conduct further empirical 
studies on regulations and bank performance.  
3.2.1 General bank regulations and bank performance 
Taranhike (2017) conducted a study to establish the relationship between bank 
regulations and supervision, using bank performance and risk-taking as variables. Panel 
data from 15 South African banks between 1999 and 2010 were employed. The overall 
findings indicated that bank regulations and supervision variables did not have statistically 
significant effects on bank performance and risk-taking. These findings were grouped into 
three categories, namely large banks, medium banks and small banks. For large banks, 
their capital requirement improves their performance by enhancing their net interest 
margin and minimising operational costs. Performance, such as the restrictions and 
supervision of banking activities, however, does reduce credit risk-taking for large banks.  
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For medium banks, capital requirements enhance cost efficiency, whereas supervision 
increases the operational costs of the bank. The capital requirements minimise credit risk-
taking and overall bank risk-taking. For small banks, restrictions on banking activities 
negatively affect the performance of the bank. The restrictions on, and supervision of, 
banking activities reduce credit risk-taking for small banks, whereas the capital 
requirement increases credit risk-taking. The conclusion is that banking regulations and 
supervision must accommodate the different sized banks.  
Ofoeda et al. (2016) examined the relationship between regulations and bank 
performance, and found that there is a significant positive relationship between minimum 
capital adequacy and the profitability of a bank. Keeping minimum capital adequacy ratios 
has resulted in improved performances. Capital regulation is thus an effective tool in 
ensuring the stability of a bank, and it improves bank performance.   
Lee and Lu (2015) examined the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank 
performance, efficiency and fragility in the USA for the period 1999 to 2011. A regression 
model was used to analyse a sample of 53 banks. Their findings indicated that capital 
regulation requirement minimises bank fragility and when measured by non-performing 
loans and, when measured by a high level of NIM, it reduces bank efficiency and 
supervision practices that strengthen private sector monitoring of the bank. The 
conclusion can be made that findings support Basel III first and the third pillar, which are 
capital requirement and monitoring. 
Zeidan (2012) examined the effect of violating bank regulations on the financial 
performance of the US banking sector for over 20 years (1990-2009).  An analysis of 84 
banks in the US was conducted using panel data. The purpose of the study was to assess 
whether the regulatory framework was effective in curbing violations. This was done by 
analysing each violation by the banks and comparing them against the performances of 
non-violating competitor banks. The study found contradictory results as there was a 
negative effect of violation on performance, yet a failure to impose any significant 
enforcement actions on banks that were not complying.  
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The study Suggested that policymakers and regulators should impose sanctions and 
speed up the process to minimise violations. 
Yusuf and Ekundayo (2018) examined regulatory sanctions from an emerging economy 
perspective by analysing the impact of regulators’ monetary sanctions on bank 
performance for banks in Nigeria covering 2006 to 2015. Panel data were used to analyse 
the data of 15 deposit-taking banks in Nigeria. The results indicated that fines imposed 
by regulators in the Nigerian banking industry had no significant impact on the bottom line 
of the banks. This is because the Nigerian banks consider the fines imposed by regulators 
to be operational expenses, and transferred them to their customers in the form of bank 
charges. The Nigerian study differed from other studies that examined the effect of 
sanctions on performance by focusing on financial performance using data from an 
emerging economy that is perceived to have weak regulatory requirements.   
Rachdi and Bouheni (2016) investigated how regulatory and supervisory requirements 
affected the risk performance of European banks from 2005 to 2011. A sample of 60 large 
banks was used for six different countries in Europe, and panel smooth regression was 
used to analyse data. The results revealed that the effects of regulations, supervision and 
risk on bank performance were conditional because of the improved results compared to 
studies conducted earlier on, banking governance in Europe by the central bank. 
Soile-Bologum (2017) examined bank failures and the impact of regulatory reforms in 
Africa covering the period 1992 to 2014. A sample of three banks in five countries (Ghana, 
South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia) and panel regression were employed to 
analyse the data. Bank performance was measured using ROA, net interest margin and 
return on capital employed, capital-asset ratio, loan to deposit ratio, liquidity ratio, loan 
loss reserves to gross loan ratio, and cost to income ratio. The findings revealed that the 
regulatory measures adopted so far in African countries have not been significant in 
achieving the desired impact on overall bank performance concerning compliance with 
prudential guidelines and requirements. 
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Majumder and Li (2017) investigated the impact of bank capital regulatory requirements 
on bank performance and risk in the emerging economy of Bangladesh’s banking sector 
for 2000 to 2015. A GMM was used to analyse a sample of 30 banks in Bangladesh. The 
results revealed that banks’ capital regulatory requirements in Bangladesh positively and 
significantly affected bank performance, whereas there was a negative impact on risk. 
The study also revealed that there was a persistence of performance and risk from one 
year to the next. 
Aktas, Acikalin, Bakin and Celik (2015) examined the determinants of capital adequacy 
in South-Eastern Europe (SEE). The period of the study was from 2007 to 2012, and the 
study used the following dimensional explanatory variables: size, performance, leverage 
liquidity, NIM and risk. The feasible GLS regression model was used to analyse the data 
of 71 commercial banks belonging to 10 countries in SEE. The results indicated that 
among bank dimensional explanatory variables, the size, performance measured by 
ROA, liquidity, NIM and risk had a significant positive relationship with CAR. 
Assibey and Aseno (2015) investigated the influence of the regulatory capital on 
commercial banks in Ghana. A GMM model was used to analyse the data of commercial 
banks in Ghana based on a survey by PWC. The results indicated that there was a 
significant positive relationship between NIM and CAR. They also found that a high net 
minimum capital requirement would widen the spread between the lending rates and 
savings rates. 
Different methods were used to measure the relationship between bank regulation and 
bank performance by different scholars; some used Basel III, while others used capital 
regulatory requirements, ROA, capital employed, banking supervision, liquidity ratio, 
deposit ratio and bank-specific variables. Different results were captured, Yusuf and 
Ekundayo (2018), Soile- Bologum (2017) and Taranhike (2017), found no relationship 
between bank regulation and bank performance, while Zeidan (2012) found a negative 
effect of a violation on performance. Majundu and Li (2017), Ofoeda et al. (2016), Rachdi 
and Ben Bouhen (2016) meanwhile, found a positive relationship between bank 
regulation and bank performance. 
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Most of the studies focused on Basel II credit risk management and supervisory review 
process; however, this study focused on Basel III capital adequacy requirements and the 
risk-taking of banks.  
3.2.2 Capital adequacy and bank performance 
Okafor et al. (2011) examined the impact of capital adequacy on bank performance in the 
banking sector in Nigeria. They sampled 20 banks from the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
covering the period 2000 to 2003 using the regression model and the least square model. 
Capital was used to measure the capital adequacy ratio, while performance was used to 
measure net profit before tax. The study found the following four results: firstly, holding 
adequate capital in terms of the regulatory requirements does not guarantee bank 
performance – banks need to have risk assessment strategies commensurate with such 
capital, which will improve bank performance. Secondly, factors such as management 
style and the environment in which a bank operate needs to be taken into consideration 
to enhance performance. Thirdly, the problem with banks is not about having adequate 
or less adequate capital, but the lack of risk assessment in their internal control 
processes. Lastly, non-compliance with capital adequacy requirements appear to be one 
of the issues that negatively affect bank performance. 
Zheng, Xu and Liang (2012) examined the relationship between capital buffers and risk-
taking behaviour of the bank. Their study was conducted with a sample of 14 commercial 
banks in China using GMM estimations for the period from 1991 to 2009. The estimation 
of results indicated that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
capital buffers and risk-taking behaviour of the bank. They further indicated that banks 
with a minimum capital requirement, decreases the level of risk, and when capital 
increases, the level of risk increases as well.  
Almazari (2013) examined the relationship between capital adequacy, cost-income ratio 
and the performance of nine Saudi banks in the Stock Exchange Market (SEM) for the 
period 2007 to 2011. Data were analysed using a linear regression method, with the 
results revealing that there is a significant positive relationship between capital adequacy, 
the cost to income ratio and bank size with the performance.  
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In the Saudi Arabia study, profitability was measured by ROA and ROE and was found to 
have a negative relationship with capital adequacy and bank performance. Lastly, there 
was a negative relationship between cost to income ratio and profitability. The conclusion 
was reached that capital adequacy improves bank profitability and helps to reduce 
unexpected costs, such as financial distress not limited to bankruptcy.  
Sulaiman and Mohammed (2014) assessed the impact of capital adequacy on financial 
performance in terms of profitability saving mobilisation. Data were collected from 
Nigerian corporation banks from 1997 to 2011. The study used the ordinary least square 
method of regression on a time series of data, with the results indicating that there is an 
insignificant impact of capital adequacy on financial performance. The study concluded 
that financial performance is not influenced by capital adequacy.  
Okoye et al. (2017) also conducted a study on the effects of capital adequacy and bank 
performance using selected banks in Nigeria for the period 2010 to 2015. The data were 
subjected to statistical analysis using the Pearson coefficient variant of correlation, 
multiple regression analysis, variance inflation factors, multicollinearity, the 
heteroscedasticity test and the Hausman test. The study revealed that there is a 
significant positive relationship between capital adequacy and bank performance, and 
empirically verified that capital adequacy has a statistically significant effect on bank 
performance at a 5% level of significance. The study recommended that banks should 
not rely more on debt because their proportion of debt affects their capital structure and 
increases their risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
Pradhan and Shrestha (2017) examined the impact of capital adequacy and bank 
operating efficiency on the financial performance of Nepalese commercial banks for the 
period 2005 to 2013, using the published annual reports of 17 banks. The study used 
ROA and ROE as dependent variables and loan ratio, bank operating efficiency, total 
deposits, total loans, equity, core capital, risk-based capital and total capital ratios as 
independent variables. The results indicated that total deposits to total assets and bank 
operating efficiency are considered to be major determinants of the financial performance 
of commercial banks in Nepal.  
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The bank operating efficiency, loan ratio, total deposits to total assets, loan loss, and 
provision to total equities have a significant positive impact on the financial performance 
of commercial banks. On the other hand, the loan loss provision to total loans, core capital 
ratio, risk-weighted ratio and total capital ratio hurt financial performance in Nepalese 
commercial banks. 
Sadien (2017) analysed the impact of the change from Basel II to Basel III on the 
profitability of the South African banking sector for the period 2012 and 2013. Basel III 
came into operation on 1 January 2013, and focuses on capital regulatory requirements 
and liquidity requirements. Sadien’s study used ROA, ROE and NIM as measurements, 
and examined the five largest banks in South Africa according to market capitalisation. 
These banks made up 91.1% of bank assets as of December 2012.  The results of the 
study revealed that there is a positive relationship between Basel III and profitability in 
South African banks, and that banks in South Africa seem to be well capitalised and thus 
comply with the minimum regulatory requirements. 
Nyoka (2017) examined the relationship between bank capital and bank profitability for 
13 commercial banks in South Africa for the period 2006 to 2015. GMM was used for data 
analysis, and the study used determinants of bank performance for measurements. The 
results revealed that there is a positive relationship between bank capital and profitability, 
and between capital adequacy, ROA and ROE. 
Kana (2017) examined the determinants of banks profitability in South African banks for 
the period 2001 to 2013. Their study used internal and external determinants to measure 
the profitability of the banks. The internal factors, also known as banks variables specific, 
included capital adequacy, bank size, loans, savings, deposits, fixed deposits, credit risk, 
net interest income and net interest expenses. The external factors, also known as 
industry-specific factors, included gross domestic product, growth, inflation and lending 
interest.  The results revealed that South African banks are profitable, and both internal 
and external factors affect their profitability.  
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The results reported by, Okoye et al. (2017), Pradhan and Shrestha (2017), Sadien 
(2017), Kana (2017) and Nyoka (2017), Almazari (2013) were consistent with the view 
that there is a significant positive relationship between capital adequacy and bank 
performance. The above findings were different from those of Sulaiman and Mohammed 
(2014), who found an insignificant negative relationship between capital adequacy and 
bank performance. Okafor et al. (2011) found neutral results, for example, banks that 
keep adequate capital on hand are not guaranteed of a good performance. 
The study further indicated that there is a direct linkage between capital adequacy and 
bank performance in the long run. Rime (2001) pointed out that noncompliance with the 
minimum capital adequacy requirements leads to poor performance of a bank; however, 
scholars like Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) argued that banks that hold capital above 
minimum regulatory requirements do not necessarily enjoy a good financial performance. 
These scholars found a negative deterministic relationship between capital adequacy and 
bank performance. 
The overall empirical results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions of the buffer 
theory of capital adequacy, and correspond with the findings of other studies on the 
relationship between capital adequacy, determinants of bank profitability and bank 
performance. Nonetheless, regulatory requirements provided a large amount of insight 
on the relationship between capital adequacy, determinants of bank profitability and bank 
performance. Most of the previous studies focused on bank-specific variables and 
industry-specific variables in the context of capital adequacy and bank performance, 
which is why this study focused on both bank-specific and industry-specific variables, as 
well as bank liquidity in the context of net stable funding ratios and liquidity ratios. This 
study further distinguished between the time during and after financial crises, as 
recommended by Luvuno (2018) who investigated the determinants of commercial banks’ 
liquidity in South Africa.  
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3.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON OTHER FACTORS THAT AFFECT BANK 
PERFORMANCE  
A number of factors affect bank performance, for example. liquidity, size of the bank, 
corporate governance, capital structure and market power. The abovementioned factors 
are discussed below in detail. 
3.3.1 Liquidity and bank performance 
Bourke (1989) conducted a study on the determinants of bank profitability in Europe, 
North America, Australia, and Europe by examining the internal and external 
determinants of profitability using the relationship between liquidity ratio and return on 
assets. The results revealed that there is a significant positive relationship between 
liquidity ratio and return on assets. 
Sulieman Alshatti (2014) investigated the effect of liquidity management on profitability in 
Jordanian commercial banks for the period 2005 to 2012. A sample of 13 banks was used 
to represent the population of commercial banks. The study used the following variables: 
investment ratio, quick ratio, capital ratio, net credit facilities or total assets, and liquidity 
assets ratio, while return on equities and return on assets of available funds were used 
as proxies for profitability. The results showed that there is a positive effect on liquidity 
management, the quick ratio and investment ratio, but a negative effect of capital ratio 
and liquid assets on profitability.  The following recommendation was suggested: there is 
a need for the utilisation of available liquidity in various aspects of investment to maximise 
profitability.  
Repullo (2004) argued that the use of available liquidity in various investments, for 
example, an increase in capital requirements, reduces risk-shifting incentives but lowers 
bank profits. For this reason, the cost of increasing capital regulation is fully transferred 
from the depositors, which reduces profits. Banks thus need to adopt a general framework 
of liquidity management to ensure that there is sufficient liquidity for their operations, as 
well as the ability to achieve a balance between sources and the use of funds (Sulieman 
Alshatti, 2014).  
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Chen et al. (2017) investigated the causes of liquidity risk by evaluating the relationship 
between bank liquidity risk and bank performance using an unbalanced panel database 
set of 12 advanced economies’ commercial banks for the period 1994 to 2006, namely: 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The study used a panel 
data regression model and employed the two-stage least square variable to estimate 
bank liquidity and performance model used by each country.  The results revealed that 
two of the causes of liquidity risk is liquid assets and the dependence of a country on 
external funding, supervision, regulatory requirements and macroeconomic factors. 
Lastly, liquidity risk lowers a bank’s profitability, which is measured by return on assets 
and return on equities, due to a higher cost of funds, but increases the bank’s net interest 
margins (NIM). Banks with a lack of stable funding use liquid assets or rely on external 
funding to meet the demands of the funds; thus, this increases a bank’s cost funding. The 
banks that possess a high level of illiquid assets in loans are likely to receive higher 
interest income. Liquidity risk affects bank performance. 
Le (2017) examined the relationship between the non-interest income and net interest 
margins of Vietnamese banks from 2006 to 2015. A sample of 40 domestic commercial 
banks, and joint venture banks was selected, and data were analysed using a regression 
model. The estimation of the results indicated that there is a negative but statistically 
significant relationship between non-interest income and net interest margins.  
Marozva (2015) analysed the relationship between liquidity and bank performance in 
South African banks from 1998 to 2014. The study used autoregressive distributed lag, 
the bound testing approach and the ordinary least square to examine the link between 
net interest margins and liquidity. Marozva viewed liquidity in the context of market 
liquidity and funding liquidity risk, and found a negative relationship between net interest 
margins and funding liquidity risk. There was an insignificant relationship between net 
interest margin, market liquidity risk and funding risk. Further research was recommended 
to investigate liquidity in the context of assets and liability mismatches.  
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Based on the above recommendations, Marozva (2017) conducted a study to investigate 
further the link between liquidity in the context of assets and liabilities mismatch and 
profitability using 12 South African banks for the period covering 2005 to 2015 using the 
GMM. The study used two forms of measurement – the Aggregate Liquidity Mismatch 
Index (ALMI) and the Bank Liquidity Mismatch Index (BLMI) compared to Basel III 
measurement and traditional liquidity measurements. The results indicated that the ALMI 
gives a better prudential liquidity measure that can be used in dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models, unlike the BLMI which can be used to evaluate the liquidity of a given 
bank under stress events. 
Luvuno (2018) examined the determinants of commercial banks in South Africa by 
investigating the relationship between bank liquidity and bank performance, and applying 
GMM for 12 banks covering the period 2006 to 2016. The results indicated that capital 
adequacy, size and GDP have a significant positive effect on liquidity, whereas there is a 
negative and significant effect between loan growth, non-performing loans and liquidity. 
Lastly, inflation has both a negative and positive effect on liquidity. 
Charmier et al. (2018) examined the impact of liquidity on the performance of commercial 
banks in Ghana using a sample from 2007 to 2016. Descriptive Statistics was used to 
analyse data, and the study used the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and the ratio of 
liquid funds to total assets as measurements. The specific control variables were as 
follows: net interest margin, bank size, capital adequacy, foreign ownership and 
profitability. The results were as follows: the average liquidity assets to total assets were 
20%, while liquidity cover over total interest-bearing liabilities was 1.19%. Another result 
showed that there was a positive relationship between liquidity and ROA using both 
measures, but an insignificant negative relationship between liquidity and ROE, and 
liquidity assets to total interest-bearing liability. With regard to the control variables, there 
was a positive relationship between net interest margin, bank size, capital adequacy, 
foreign ownership and profitability. A recommendation was made that banks must 
determine the level of liquidity beyond which their profitability will be reduced.  
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Pradhan and Shrestha (2016) examined the effect of liquidity on the performance of 
commercial banks in Nepal for the period from 2005 to 2014. The study used investment 
ratio, liquidity ratio, capital ratio and quick ratio as independent variables, and ROE and 
ROA as dependent variables. The study used a regression model to analyse the data 
from 16 commercial banks to analyse the impact of liquidity on bank performance. The 
study revealed a positive relationship between capital ratio and ROE and also indicated 
that the higher the capital ratio, the higher the ROE. However, the relationship between 
ROE and liquidity ratio was found to be negative, indicating that higher liquidity in a bank 
lowers ROE. 
Furthermore, there was a negative relationship between quick ratios and ROE. The 
investment ratio and capital adequacy were positively significantly related to bank 
performance, which implies that an increase in investment ratio and capital ratio also 
leads to an increase in bank performance. There was, however, a negative relationship 
between liquidity ratios and quick ratios, with ROA and ROE indicating increased liquidity 
ratios, and quick ratios decreasing the ROA and ROE of the banks. 
In the context of Nepal, Karki (2004) found that liquidity ratios were relatively unstable 
over the period; however, ROE was found to be acceptable and indicated a positive 
relationship between deposits and loan advances. 
Joshi (2004) analysed financial performance through the use of internal and external 
determinants of bank performance to show the cause of change in the cash position of 
two banks. In the study, profitability was used to measure ROA, ROE and net interest 
margins, with the results indicating that liquidity and bank loans are positively related to 
bank performance. 
Pradhan and Shrestha (2016) noted that few studies have been conducted on the 
determinants of profitability of Nepal commercial banks. Joshi (2004), Karki (2004), and 
Maharjan (2007) also found a positive relationship between capital adequacy, profitability, 
liquidity and bank performance. 
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Ngure (2014) investigated the relationship between interest rates and bank performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya. A descriptive research design was used to obtain data 
from the Central Bank of Kenya for the period from 2009 to 2013. The data were analysed 
using SPSS version 21, and the study found that interest rates have a significant positive 
effect on bank performance. The relationship between interest rates and bank 
performance was also found to be linear, with an increase in interest rates leading to 
higher profitability. 
Iftikhar (2015) investigated the relationship between financial reforms, financial 
liberalisation, bank regulation and banking supervision with NIM. The study employed 
two-step GMM for data analysis for the period from 2001 to 2005, and the bank scope 
database was used for more than 1,300 banks from developed and developing 
economies. The empirical results indicated that financial reforms and financial 
liberalisation have a significant negative relationship on interest margins.  
Kumar, Stauvermann, Patel and Prasad (2016) examined the determinants of non-
performing loans (NPL) in the banking sectors of Fuji Their study was conducted on the 
Fuji banking sector, which consists of five commercial banks and two non-commercial 
banks, for the period from 2000 to 2013. The data were analysed using descriptive 
statistics and a correlation matrix, and took into account the following macroeconomic 
factors: economic growth, inflation, changes in real effective exchange rate, 
unemployment and external factors. The results indicated a statistically significant 
relationship between NPL and ROE, CAR requirements. On the other hand, NIM has a 
significant positive relationship with NPL. 
Dhar and Bakshi (2015) examined the factors that influenced the variability of non-
performing loans of Indian banks in the public sector from 2001 to 2005. Panel data 
regression was used to analyse the data of 27 public banks in India. The findings revealed 
that NIM and CAR exhibit an insignificant negative relationship with NPL.  
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Different methods were used to measure the relationship between liquidity and bank 
performance by different scholars, some researchers used bank-specific variables such 
as ROA, ROE, NIM liquidity ratios and other bank performance ratios, industry-specific 
variables such as unemployment, inflation. 
Varying results from different researchers are captured above. Charmier et al. (2018), 
Karki (2004) and Bourke (1989), found a positive relationship between liquidity ratio and 
ROA, whereas Pradhan and Shrestha (2016) found a negative relationship between 
liquidity and ROA. The reason for these inconsistent results could be that higher liquidity 
lowers ROA. Sulieman Alshatti (2014) and Charmier et al. (2018) found consistent 
positive results between quick ratios, investment ratios, ROE and bank performance.   
Luvuno (2018), Karki (2004), Joshi (2004), Maharjan (2007), meanwhile, found a positive 
relationship between capital adequacy, profitability and bank performance. Charmier 
(2018) and Pradhan and Shrestha (2016) found a negative result between ROE and 
liquidity, quick ratio and ROE, and liquidity ratio and ROE, which highlights that higher 
liquidity hurts bank performance.  
A Majority of the studies above indicated that there is a linkage between liquidity and bank 
performance, which corresponds to findings obtained by other studies on the 
determinants of bank performance worldwide. Previous studies focused more on ROA 
and ROE as bank-specific variables. However, this study focused on ROE, ROA, NIM 
and capital adequacy.  
Basel III sets out the regulations that banks need to follow to maintain a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio in order to resolve their liquidity requirements. These minimum 
requirements assist banks to recover as quickly as possible should there be any financial 
crisis. 
3.3.2 Size and bank performance 
Aladwan (2015) examined the impact of bank size on profitability for Jordanian listed 
commercial banks for the period during and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
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The study employed ROE as a dependent variable which was used to measure 
profitability, and banks were classified according to their total asset size. 
 The results showed a significant variation in the profitability of these different sizes of 
banks; firstly, profitability increases as the bank size decreases, while the bank size 
increases as the profitability decreases. In a nutshell, the size of the bank affects 
profitability. The conclusion reached was that small and medium banks are likely to be 
more profitable than large banks. 
Jara-Bertin, Moya and Parales (2014) analysed the impact of industry-specific variables 
and bank-specific variables to measure the size and performance of Latin American 
banks covering the period 1995 to 2010. A sample of over 78 commercial banks in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela was used. 
The data were analysed using the panel data estimator version of the GMM. The results 
indicated that there is a positive relationship between bank performance and bank-
specific variables, namely size, capital ratio and specialisation degree; and performance 
and industry-specific variables, namely, economic growth, inflation and bank 
concentration. There was a negative relationship between bank performance and 
industry-specific variables, namely credit risk, liquidity and operational inefficiencies.   
Terreza (2015) investigated the effect of size on bank performance by empirically 
analysing 1,270 European banks for the period 2005 to 2012. The study employed capital 
and liquidity as variables, and the data were analysed using panel data which were split 
into three sections: large, medium and small banks. The purpose of this split was to 
compare European banks according to their sizes.  The first result showed homogeneity 
in the behaviour of large banks. With the other samples, to account for performance, a 
dynamic panel model was applied using a GMM. The estimation results showed a 
significant positive relationship between performance and medium banks, and a positive 
relationship between liquidity and bank performance. Lastly, there was no relationship 
between greater efficiency and bank performance, while capitalisation level increases 
bank performance, liquidity risk depends on the size of the bank. The capital has a 
positive effect on bank performance; however, it affects liquidity ratios. 
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Singh and Sharma (2016) conducted an empirical analysis of industry-specific and bank-
specific variables affecting the liquidity of Indian banks from 2000 to 2013. The study 
analysed 59 banks. The industry-specific variables used were GDP, inflation and 
unemployment rate, whereas the bank-specific variables used were bank size, 
performance, cost of funding, capital adequacy and deposits. A liquidity trend analysis 
was performed based on ownership, with the study revealing that bank ownership affects 
the liquidity of banks. The following bank-specific variables, namely bank size, deposits, 
performance and capital adequacy, positively affect liquidity, except the cost of funding. 
Lastly, bank size and GDP hurt bank liquidity, whereas deposits, performance, capital 
adequacy and inflation have a positive impact on bank liquidity except for unemployment. 
Alex and Ngaba (2018) examined the effect of bank size on the financial performance of 
42 registered commercial banks for the period 2012 to 2016 in Kenya. The banks were 
categorised into three groups – large, medium and small. Multiple linear regression 
methods were used to analyse the data. The results revealed that the large medium banks 
have higher ROAs than small banks. Large banks are likely to perform better compared 
to small and medium banks, hence their better profitability. Therefore, the study found a 
positive relationship between size and the performance of the banks in Kenya. 
Westhuizen and Oberholzer (2003) assessed the relationship between different 
performance measures and the size of South African banks from 1997 to 2000. A data 
envelope analysis was employed to analyse the data. The study found that there was a 
positive relationship between some of the performance measures and the size of the 
bank, and a positive relationship between the size of the bank and bank performance 
measures.  
Ali and Pauh (2018) examined the internal determinants of bank profitability and stability 
in Pakistan for 24 commercial banks from 2007 to 2015. The purpose of the study was to 
assess the role of the banks’ internal determinants when it comes to attaining high 
performance. A separate analysis was compared between profitability perspective model 
and stability perspective model using the panel regression method.  
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The results from the profitability perspective model revealed that there is a positive 
relationship between bank size, credit risk, funding risk and stability and profitability. On 
the other hand, there is a negative relationship between liquidity risk and profitability.  
From the stability perspective model, there is a positive relationship between bank size, 
liquidity risk, funding risk and stability, while there is a negative relationship between credit 
risk and stability. Rasid (2017) examined the main determinants of the 29 Islamic banks 
in the Gulf Corporation Council from 2005 to 2012. Data were analysed using GMM, and 
the study found that bank-specific factors, namely equity financing and bank size, 
positively affect profitability. The next section discusses empirical studies on corporate 
governance and bank performance.  
3.3.3 Corporate governance and bank performance 
Peni and Vahamma (2012) examined the effects that corporate governance had on 
American commercial banks’ performance during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The 
study examined whether banks with good governance mechanism practices were linked 
to higher profitability and better stock market performance during the financial crisis. A 
sample of 62 commercial banks from the United States was used, and data were analysed 
using a regression analysis model. The study reported mixed findings. Firstly, the 
research found that banks with good governance mechanism practices were linked to 
higher profitability in 2008, for example, their governance practices may have mitigated 
some of the adverse effects of the financial crisis. The second result was that good 
governance practices might negatively affect stock market valuations of a bank during a 
financial crisis. Lastly, a bank with good governance mechanism practices is likely to have 
after substantial higher stock returns in the aftermath.  
Malik and Makhdoom (2016) analysed whether corporate governance has an impact on 
the financial performance of Fortune 500 organisations in non-USA and the USA 
countries, using Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentive, CEO duality, board 
independence, and frequency of board meetings as variables. The period of the study 
was from 2005 to 2012, covering the time pre and post the financial crisis. The findings 
showed a significant positive influence of corporate governance on financial performance. 
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In addition, organisations with smaller boards are found to generate better financial 
performances, and the frequency of board meetings and CEO incentives also have a 
positive impact on organisational performance. 
Bukair and Rahman (2015) examined the relationship between board structure, 
investment account holders and bank performance in the Islamic banking industry. The 
research sampled data from 40 Islamic banks operating under the Gulf Corporation 
Council from 2008 to 2011. The variables used were bank size, leverage, capital and 
GDP. The results indicated that both the size and board composition have a negative 
relationship on bank performance. On the other hand, the separation of CEO and 
chairman roles have no relationship on bank performance, while the there is a positive 
relationship between the independence of the chairman and bank performance; however, 
GDP had no significant impact on bank performance. 
Mohammed (2012) investigated the impact of corporate governance on nine Nigerian 
commercial banks for the period 2001 to 2010. Regression analysis was employed for 
analysis purposes, and the study revealed that corporate governance affects bank 
performance in Nigeria. The study also conclusively indicated that poor asset quality and 
loan deposit ratios affect bank performance negatively. 
Islam, Sathye and Hu (2015) examined the relationship between comprehensive 
measures of corporate governance and bank performance in Bangladeshi banks from 
2002 to 2006.  A sample of 30 banks was used, and regression analysis was employed 
to analyse the data. The study used ROA to measure bank performance and a corporate 
governance compliance score sheet to measure bank compliance. The results found that 
since the introduction of a Code of Corporate Governance in Bangladesh, banks had 
significantly improved their banking practices. 
Makhusha and Nhavira (2017) examined the relationship between corporate governance 
and the performance of five indigenous commercial banks in Zimbabwe from 2010 to 
2016. The corporate governance control mechanisms for the study were board size, 
independence of directors, equity ownership by investors, employees or executives.  
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The study adopted Basel II-IV for banking and supervision, and the King II-IV code of 
corporate governance. The study found similar results to the study conducted in Kenya 
by Wepukhulu (2016) and Mambondiani, Zhang and Arun (2012), there was a positive 
effect between the independence of the board and bank performance measured by ROE 
and ROA, and there was no relationship between board size and bank performance which 
was measured by ROE. On the other hand, there was a positive relationship between 
board independence, individual ownership and bank performance. Finally, there was a 
positive relationship between executive ownership and bank performance. 
Fanta, Kemal and Waka (2013) examined the corporate governance mechanism and their 
impact on the performance of commercial banks in Ethiopia from 2005 to 2011. The study 
measured corporate governance using the internal and external mechanisms of corporate 
governance and bank performance measured by ROA and ROE. The results indicated 
that board size and capital adequacy ratio positively affect bank performance. In addition, 
the following have a positive impact on corporate governance and bank performance: 
government intervention, inadequate governance practices, absence of a national 
standard of corporate governance, accounting, auditing and weak legal framework.  
Tizazu (2017) examined the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance in the Ethiopian non-financial industries for the period 2009 to 2013. Data 
were collected from 42 organisations in Ethiopia and analysed using the panel data 
regression method. The results showed that there is a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance, which is mostly influenced when there 
are big agency problems. Another result indicated that high-risk organisations such as 
banks adhere to good governance practices. The study identified organisational growth, 
level of risk-taking by an organisation and shareholders as a good indicator for the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. Peni and 
Vahamma (2012) noted that the positive relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance serves as an indication that corporate governance needs carious 
attention within an organisation.  
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Malik and Makhdoom (2016) identified the frameworks of corporate governance and their 
enforcement, additional corporate standards strong financial markets as a tool that can 
be used to minimise financial crises. 
Mashonganyika (2015) explored the impact of corporate governance reforms on 
organisational performance for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
from 2009 to 2013.   
A sample of 99 organisations was used, and a panel data regression model was 
employed for data analysis purposes. The study used King III to measure the corporate 
governance mechanism and ROA and ROE to measure performance.  The results 
revealed that corporate governance and board size do not affect organisational 
performance. 
Tshipa (2017) examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
organisational performance for South African organisations, covering the period from 
2002 to 2014. The study used board size, board independence, board committee, board 
diversity and leadership structure as independent variables, and ROA and a market-
based measure (Tobin’s Q) as dependent variables. The study used a sample of 90 
organisations that were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, which were selected 
from the five largest South African industries, including the financial industry. Two 
methods of data analysis were employed, namely GMM and generalised least square. 
The study found that organisations apply corporate governance differently during financial 
crises and post-financial crises. In some organisations, the application of corporate 
governance positively influences organisational performance during and post-financial 
crises. Another result revealed that the market perceives larger boards, board activities, 
board committees and leadership structures to provide adequate monitoring and reduce 
agency costs. The next section discusses capital structure and bank performance. 
3.3.4 Capital structure and bank performance 
De Wet (2013) analysed the determinants of the capital structure of banks in South Africa 
and bank performance from 1994 to 2010.  
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The study employed panel data to analyse data from the four largest commercial banks 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – Absa, FirstRand, SBSA and Nedbank. The 
study measured performance using ROA, ROE and earnings per share, and used price-
earnings ratio and market to book value to measure capital. 
The results showed that capital structure does not influence profitability and market value 
positivity and does not necessarily influence banks’ financial distress. The results thus 
failed to align the with capital structure theory conclusively. 
Duasa, Zain and Al-Kayad (2014) examined the effects of capital structure on Islamic 
banks from 2003 to 2008. A sample of 85 Islamic banks was employed over 19 countries 
and data were analysed using two least square model Performance was measured using 
ROE, ROA and NIM and capital over total assets over book value of assets and loan to 
asset ratio. The results indicated that there is a relationship between capital structure and 
bank performance. The conclusion was made that capital structure influences bank 
performance.  
Studies by Dawar (2014) investigated the impact of capital structure’s choice on 
organisational performance in India as an emerging economy from 2003 to 2012. The 
following variables were used: size, age, tangibility, growth, leverage, liquidity and 
advertising. The findings were that leverage does not have an influence on financial 
performance in organisations in India, which is in contrast with the assumptions of agency 
theory, which are commonly accepted in other developed as well as in emerging 
economies. 
Nikoo (2015) examined the impact of capital structure and bank performance for 12 
commercial banks in Jordan covering the period 2007 to 2011. The study employed panel 
regression to analyse data of the 12 commercial banks that were listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange. Performance was measured by; namely, net profit, return on capital 
employed, ROE and net interest margin and to capital, structure variables were a total 
debt to funds and total debt-equity.  
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The results indicated that performance, which was measured by net profit, return on 
capital employed and net interest margin, is positively associated with total debt, whereas 
debt was insignificant in determining ROE in the banking industry of Jordan.  
Anarfo (2015) examined the relationship between capital structure and the bank 
performance of Sub-Saharan African banks for the period 2000 to 2006. The following 
variables were used to measure performance: ROA, ROE and net interest margin, and 
capital structure was measured by total debt ratio. The study employed a sample of 37 
countries, and data were analysed using the statistical software package (SSP) model. 
The results indicate that capital structure does not determine bank performance; however, 
bank performance determines capital structure. Nikoo (2015) investigated the relationship 
between capital structure and bank performance in 18 banks listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange from 2009 to 2014. The study used ROA, ROE and earnings per share to 
measure the effect of capital structure on bank performance. The study determined that 
there is a positive relationship between capital structure and bank performance by using 
SSP to analyse the data.  
Marandu and Sibindi (2016) examined the relationship between capital structure-specific 
determinants and the profitability of South African banks for 12 years from 2002 to 2013. 
The bank-specific determinants were capital adequacy, size, business risk, growth rate 
and tax on banks. The study employed panel regression to analyse data for six major 
banks, Absa, Nedbank, FirstRand, Standard Bank, Capitec Bank and African Bank. 
Profitability was measured using ROA and ROE, and capital was measured using 
deposits, credit risk, and interest rates. The results showed a significant relationship 
between profitability measured by ROA, and the determinants of capital structure which 
was measured by capital adequacy, size, deposit and credit risk. 
On the other hand, the relationship between ROA, deposits as well as credit risk, seem 
to be sensitive to the business risk. The study also found no relationship between capital 
structure and ROE. The study revealed that the composition of debt-equity equity in South 
African banks is higher.  
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Maduane and Tsaurai (2016) investigated the link between capital structure and 
profitability in the South African banks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for 
the period 2010 to 2014. Panel regression analysis was used to analyse data for these 
banks. The measurement variables for performance were ROA and ROA, and for the 
capital structure, they were short term debt to total assets, long term debts to total assets, 
and total debt to total assets.  
The results showed that capital structure is a key determinant of the profitability of banks 
in South Africa, and there is a positive relationship between the two.  
The study also found that there is a positive relationship between capital structure and 
profitability in the banking sector in South Africa, particularly higher equity and low debt-
equity. The study recommended that policymakers need to persuade banks to use 
finance equity as opposed to debt-equity to ensure the sound performance of the bank. 
Olajide, Funmi and Olayemi (2017) examined the relationship between capital structure 
and bank performance in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa from 1996 to 2014. The study 
employed GMM to analyse data obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and used 
ROA, ROE and earnings per share to measure bank performance and debt ratio to 
measure the capital structure. The study found positive and negative results in Nigeria 
and other African countries, including a negative relationship between capital structure 
and bank performance in Nigeria. The study concluded that African banks have relatively 
high agency costs, which leads to the negative performance of banks in Nigeria and also 
mixed results in other African countries. 
Musah (2018) examined the effects of capital structure on the profitability of banks in 
Ghana from 2010 to 2015. A sample of 23 banks was employed, and the study used short 
term debt ratios and long-term ratios to measure the capital structure, and ROA and 
ROEA to measure profitability. The results indicated that banks in Ghana are highly 
leveraged, with debt financing making up approximately 84% of capital, of which 77% is 
based on the short-term debt, regardless of the increase of minimum capital equity of 
these selected banks.  
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Another result revealed that short term and long-term debt ratios have negative 
relationships with profitability, whereas there was a positive relationship between total 
debt and profitability. Finally, the results indicated that banks in Ghana are heavily reliant 
on short term financing, and deposits reduce the profitability of the bank. Banks in Ghana 
should shift their financing from deposits to other sources. Banks must choose a mix of 
short and long-term financing debt to maximise profitability.    
Serwadda (2019) investigated the effects of capital structure on bank performance in 
Uganda for ten years from 2006 to 2015. A sample of 20 commercial banks was used, 
and four variables measured for performance: ROE, ROA, net interest margin and cost 
to income ratio. 
Long term debt to total assets, short term debt to total assets and total debt ratio were 
used to measure capital structure. Finally, the study used panel regression to analyse the 
data. The study found a positive relationship between capital structure variables and bank 
performance, and between long term debts, total debts and interest margins. The study 
also found a positive relationship between total debt and ROA, and between total debt 
and ROE. However, there was a negative relationship between short term debt and ROA.  
This implies that profitable banks rely heavily on debt financing as their financing option 
for business operations. This was advanced by the fact that roughly 68% of total assets 
were represented by short term debts. Recommendations by the study; the executive 
management of the bank teams and policymakers design and implement prudent 
financing decisions aimed at reducing over-reliance on debt financing, as opposed to 
equity financing or capital structure levels. 
Anyaogu, Ezirim and Ezirim (2018) examined the impact of capital structure and bank 
performance in Nigeria from 1985 to 2013. The GMM was used to analyse 13 listed banks 
selected from the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study measured capital structure with 
debt and equity finances, and performance with return on investment. The findings were 
that there is a long-term relationship between capital structure and bank performance. 
Debt and equity finance and leverage positively influence returns on investments for both 
the short and long term.  
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The results further indicated a significant negative relationship between leverage and 
bank performance. Equity was affected by performance significantly, while the debt effect 
was not significant. The conclusion can thus be made that Nigerian banks would perform 
better when using equity finance as opposed to debt financing in capital structuring to 
boost their returns on investment.  
The above results are consistent with the capital structure theory, which argues that 
banks should have a better performance than those who do not put into practice capital 
structure theory, which is triggers this information through higher capital ratio except for 
results by de Wet (2013).  
The agency theory aims to clarify the organisational capital structure in an attempt to 
minimise the costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. 
Serwadda (2019), Anyaogu et al. (2018), Musah (2018), Maduane and Tsaurai (2016), 
Marandu and Sibindi (2016), Nikoo (2015) and Duasa et al. (2014) found a positive 
correlation between capital structure and bank performance. Yet, some scholars have 
observed a negative relationship, including De Wet (2013). Anarfo (2015) found no 
connection between the two, while Olajide et al. (2017) and Anarfo (2015) observed both 
a positive and negative impact on bank performance. There could be several reasons for 
there being both a positive and negative relationship; for example, the researchers may 
have used a different analysis model to others who found positive results. For example, 
Anarfo (2015) used SSP, whereas Olajide et al. (2017) used GMM, and their study was 
conducted in African countries. 
The current study examined the effects of capital structure on South African banks by 
employing both dependent and independent variables. By following performance proxies 
ROA, ROE and net interest margin and capital adequacy. These proxies were chosen 
because they have been applied previously by empirical studies as determinants. The 
next section discusses bank regulation and bank performance. 
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3.3.5 Market power and bank performance 
Hamza and Kachtouli (2014) examined the competitive conditions and market power of 
the conventional and Islamic banks in MENA and Southeast Asia from 2004 to 2009. 
Their study used the following measurements: the (HHI), H static Panzar-Rosse and the 
Lerner Index models, which are based on econometric estimations that evaluate the 
structure of the market and measure its power in terms of its price setting.  
The panel regression method was used to analyse the data of 62 Islamic banks and 128 
conventional banks operating in 18 countries. The study used both a structured and non-
structured approach. The results indicated that under the HHI, both markets are low 
concentrated competition and market power, while according to concentration ratios, the 
Islamic market is considered to be moderately concentrated. The H static Panzar-Rosses 
is related to the degree of competition, while the Lerner Index of market power showed 
that both markets are characterised by monopolistic competition. Islamic banks 
expressed a high degree of market power. 
In a competitive environment, normally individual banks analyse the structure of their 
market and competitive conditions to implement a business strategy and effect action 
plans. The Islamic banks in the MENA and Southeast Asia have enhanced their 
competitiveness by offering new products, which is considered as a determinant for their 
success. 
Garza-Garcia (2012) examined whether market power influenced the profits in the 
Mexican banking sector for the period 2001 to 2009. Market power was measured by 
Structure Conduct Performance and Relative Market Power (SCP) Relative Market Power 
(RMP). An unbalanced panel regression was used to analyse the data. The results thus 
indicate that bank profits are determined by good market share, confirming relative market 
power. The findings also show that profits persist over time and adjust slowly to the 
average level, meaning that the banking sector is not strongly competitive. However, 
there was no positive relationship between greater efficiency and bank profits. Lastly, 
while the capitalisation level increases bank profit, liquidity risk decreases them. 
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Cupian and Abduh (2017) examined the competitive conditions and market power of 
Islamic banks in Indonesia from 2006 to 2013 using structured and non-structured 
measures related to the traditional approach and industry organisation. The study used 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to ascertain the competitiveness level, while the H static 
Panzar- Rosse and Lerner Index was used to examine market power and analyse the 
data of 27 banks in Indonesia.  
H static Panzar- Rose was used to test the profitability of banks, with the results revealing 
that banks with a higher degree of market power lead to a less competitive market. Other 
studies indicated that Islamic banks earn their revenues under monopolistic competition, 
yet banks that were operating in a monopolistic environment were less efficient during the 
period of the study. Lastly, those banks that operated under a monopolistic environment 
were not able to achieve high records of profitability. 
Wang, Zeng and Zhang (2014) examined the relationship between market power and the 
efficiency of 21 Chinese commercial banks from 2000 to 2009. The Lerner Index and Z- 
Index were used to measure market power and stability.  
These banks included four state-owned banks and 17 joint-stock and city commercial 
banks in Hong Kong and the mainland. The results were that the relationship between 
market power and bank efficiency in Hong Kong and the mainland are inconsistent with 
the traditional efficient structure; banks with higher market power are dependent on their 
monopoly position and have no strategy to improve bank efficiency. The four state-owned 
commercial banks had strong market power and relatively low bank efficiency. 
Sanderson and Pierre (2016) examined the relationship between banking competition 
and efficiency in Zimbabwe for the period covering 2009 to 2014.  Competition was 
approximated using the Lerner Index, and efficiency and data envelope was used for 
analysis. The findings showed that the banking sector operates under monopolistic 
competition, and there was a positive relationship between cost efficiency and market 
power and competition. They further confirmed that banks pose some market power in 
pricing their products, because banks sell products that are different in terms of 
advertising and branding, among other products.  
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Market power was determined by capital adequacy, non-performing loans, liquidity risk, 
cost-income ratio and regulatory incentives. The intervention of policymakers and the 
government is needed to put measures in place that increase economic activity in the 
country, because an increase in economic growth will increase the demand for banking 
products.  
Lastly, the study found that the memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
banking sector and the regulators that was introduced by the government reduces the 
market power of the banks as it defines the pricing formula for banking products, for 
example, they are overcharging customers in bank charges and interest rates. 
Different methods were used to measure market power and bank performance by 
different scholars, structured vs. non-structured approaches, and variables such as ROA, 
ROE, capital adequacy, non-performing loans, liquidity ratios and cost to income ratios. 
Varying results were also found by different researchers. 
3.6 SUMMARY CHAPTER 
This chapter focused on empirical studies reported in the literature, the theme of the 
empirical studies listed above reflected different results reached regarding regulations 
and bank performance. Although different scholars reached diverse results, the more 
dominant and common results were those that focused on internal determinants, for 
example, capital adequacy, net interest margin, Basel III, ROA and ROE, as well as 
external determinants of bank performance, namely inflation, growth and GDP, and their 
relationship with bank performance. In the majority of the above studies, the scholars 
used a regression model to analyse the data to determine any relationship, which is why 
this study used regression analysis and capital adequacy, net interest margin, ROE and 
ROA as measurements.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the research methodology and the research approach adopted for 
this study. These give direction to a researcher when planning and implementing a study 
in order to achieve the intended outcomes (Bradley, 2007). Ndou (2016) and Cormack 
(2000) defined research methodology as the method that is followed by a set of 
procedures applicable for a particular study. According to Burns and Grove (2003), the 
research methodology comprises the entire strategy of study, from the identification and 
assessment of the problem, to the final phase of data analysis, conclusion and 
recommendations. Leedy and Ormrod (2015) noted that there are two approaches to 
research methodology, namely qualitative research and quantitative research. These 
have some similarities; for instance, they both entail identifying a research problem, 
reviewing related literature, and collecting and analysing data. Both approaches also have 
specific characteristics. Quantitative research involves the use of numerical data, it is 
represented by a large sample, and statistical analysis is used, while for qualitative 
research, textual data is used, it is informative, and a small sample is used (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2016; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015; Yin, 2014).  
For this study, a quantitative approach was used, with the secondary data being 
numerical in nature. Kana (2017) emphasised that quantitative research is the type of 
research which applies empirical analysis and empirical statements. These empirical 
statements are expressed in numerical terms, and their explanations take into account 
empirical analysis.  
They describe what the case is in the real world rather than what the case should be. This 
chapter also deals with the research design, research methods and regression analysis 
used in the study. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND PARADIGM  
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007), research design is essential for any 
study to answer the research questions and achieve the study’s objectives.  
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Cooper and Schindler (2008) defined research design as the plan and framework of an 
investigation developed to obtain answers to the research question, while Saunders et al. 
(2016) defined research design as the framework that links the philosophical paradigms 
and the methodological assumptions of a research approach. A quantitative research 
design was used in this research to investigate the nexus between bank performance and 
independent variables.  According to Msweli (2019), quantitative research is described as 
a systematic way of collecting primary data from a large population, sample some 
information out of these data, and generalise them to a broader population. Msweli (2019) 
added that, in the field of social science, the traditional approach of positivism is not 
materially different from that in the natural sciences. 
The positivist research paradigm refers to researchers who maintain objectivity in their 
judgement and explanation of social research. The researcher’s view is not linked to the 
problem being studied, but explains the findings, based on empirical evidence and tested 
theories using quantitative research methods. These findings are considered to be 
objective and generalisable (Saunders et al., 2016).  For this study, the deductive 
approach was followed. 
The deductive approach involves the testing of theoretical propositions about the 
relationship between two or more variables (Mutezo, 2015). As the objective of this study 
was to investigate the impact of regulatory requirements on bank performance, the 
deductive reasoning approach applied, which uses existing literature to analyse data by 
converting theory to data.  
Deductive reasoning uses generalisability from general statement and examines the 
probabilities to reach a specific logical conclusion, verifies theories, and uses propositions 
or existing theory for data collection (Saunders et al., 2016). The theories related to a 
study help to generalise the findings that can be relevant to other populations. 
In this study, the data used included locally registered banks in terms of the Banks Act 94 
of 1990 for the period 2009 to 2019 and liquidity ratios. These ratios were derived s from 
the SARB (BA900) as the source of secondary data. 
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The evaluative design is concerned with assessing the relationship between two or more 
variables. In this study, evaluative design was used to analyse the relationship between 
bank performance and regulatory requirements for South African banks, that were 
registered in South Africa for the period 2009 to 2019, and this were done by assessing 
how these banks were complying or implementing regulatory requirements in comparison 
with the existing theories (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2016:176). This study relied on 
secondary data by analysing existing data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Leedy and Ormrod 
(2010) explain secondary data as data collected earlier for other purposes. This data were 
readily available for use and derived from primary data. A literature review of secondary 
sources was conducted to establish the background to the problem and the context of the 
study. Secondary data were collected from the SARB’s website under See BA900)  
economic returns. 
4.3 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACH 
The quantitative research approach was employed to achieve the predetermined 
objectives of this study. The main objective of the study was to determine the impact of 
bank performance on regulatory requirements in South African registered banks for the 
period 2009 to 2019. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) defined quantitative research 
as an illustration of numerical data and an interpretation of observations for the purpose 
of assessing and clarifying the singularities that are reflected by the observations.  
According to Creswell (2013), quantitative research is research that explains singularities 
by collecting numerical data and analysing them using mathematically based models. 
Ryan (2006) noted a number of advantages of the quantitative research approach, it 
provides estimates of population at large; it provides results which can be condensed to 
statistics, and it allows for statistical comparison between various groups. In this study, 
the population was the banking sector and statistics from a ten-year period were used. 
The researcher used regression analysis to come to a conclusion regarding the 
relationship between bank performance and regulatory requirements. This was done by 
replicating previous empirical studies conducted by other researchers in various 
countries.  
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4.3.1 Research objectives 
Using a sample of 18 locally registered South African banks for the period 2009 to 2019, 
in terms of the Banks Act 94 of 1990, the overall objectives of this study were to 
investigate the relationship between: 
a) bank performance and capital adequacy; 
b) bank performance and liquidity coverage; 
c) bank performance and net stable funding ratio; and 
d) bank performance, bank-specific variables and macroeconomic factors.  
4.3.2  Population and sampling  
Saunders et al., (2016) and Archaya, Prakash and Saxena (2013) defined a population 
as the number of possible units or elements that are included in a study. If it is not possible 
to evaluate an entire population due to its large size or a lack of research resources, then 
a sample of elements needs to be selected and investigated by the researcher. The target 
population for a study is the group that the researcher would like to speak about in their 
findings (Kana, 2017).  
4.3.3 Population 
According to Yin (2014), a population may be individuals or groups of individuals that the 
study is focusing on. Ndou (2016) and Leedy and Ormrod (2016) defined a population as 
the larger pool from which sampling elements are drawn and to which findings will be 
generalised. However, it might not be possible to evaluate the entire population due to its 
larger size or lack of research resources, and then only selected samples of elements 
under review can be considered by the researcher. 
The population for this study was drawn from South African registered banks in terms of 
the Banks Act 94 of 1990, and the data were obtained from the SARB. The sample of the 
study is listed below. The table lists the names of the banks according to their size and 
total assets. 
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Table 4.1: South African banks registered in terms of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 as 
at 31 December 2019 and their rankings 
Name of bank Total assets as at 31 December 
2019 (R millions) 
Ranking of the bank by 
total assets 
Standard Bank- South Africa Ltd 94 616    1 
FirstRand Bank Ltd 80 283    2 
Absa Bank Ltd 75 099    3 
Nedbank Ltd 67 583    4 
African Bank Ltd 1864    5 
Merchantile Bank limited 922    6 
Sasfin Bank Ltd 898    7 
Grindrod Bank limited 897    8 
Deutsche Bank AG 846    9 
HBZ Bank Limited 372   10 
Ithala Soc limited 235   11 
Grobank 231   12 
Tyme Bank 118   13 
GBS Mutual Bank 106   14 
Habib Overseas Bank Ltd 104   15 
Finbond Mutual Limited 93   16 
Small Enterprise Development 
Agency (SEDA) 
22   17 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2019) 
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4.3.4 Sampling 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2015), a sample is defined as a subset of a population 
that is selected to represent the entire population. For this study, non-probability sampling 
was used to select the most appropriate sample. This type of sampling method represents 
a group of sampling techniques that assists researchers in identifying a unit from a 
population that they are interested in studying (Saunders et al. 2016; Leedy & Ormrod, 
2015).  
4.3.5 Sample size 
The sample size refers to the number of units in the population were the study is based 
(Yin, 2014). The population for this study was the banking sector, and the sample was 
comprised of 12 locally registered banks from the period 2009 to 2019. Data on the 
banking regulatory framework was available from 2009 to 2019, being the latest data 
available from the SARB. The study was limited to 10 years, which gave a sample size of 
120 number of observations. The 12 banks were chosen for the reason that, at the time 
of this study, together, they accounted for almost 99% of the sector’s total assets (SARB, 
2019). In addition, they were selected because data were available on the variables for 
the period under review.  
4.4 DATA COLLECTION TOOLS 
For this study, only secondary data were collected, which was appropriate for the 
quantitative research approach.  
The data consist of raw data and published summaries, including data for the construction 
of the banking regulatory framework, audited financial statements, and data from the 
SARB. Data from audited financial statements were available from 2009 to 2019. 
These data were collected from the SARB BA 900 research database, which is accessible 
from the SARB’s website. Data for macroeconomic variable factors, for example, 
unemployment and interest rates, including other sources which were relevant to this 
study were used with regards to bank performance.  
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In the BA 900 research database, data for South African banks were accessible, which 
were used for the analysis of bank performance and regulatory requirements. Most 
organisations collect and store a variety of data to support their operations (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2009:256). 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS 
The analysis for this study was a panel data regression analysis, which was used to 
determine whether there is any statistical relationship between bank performance 
variables, regulatory requirements variables, liquidity variables and risk-taking variables. 
In order to run regression models, the GMM was used. According to Camero and Trivedip 
(2009), EViews software is unable to run diagnostic for panel data regression, whereas 
STATA software can handle both time series and panel data analysis, supports 
environment forums, and provides access to users’ written commands. This makes 
STATA software one of the best tools to run regression models.  
Panel data regression tools were used in the majority of the studies undertaken in this 
field by the following researchers: Marozva (2017), Taranhike (2017), Makonko (2016), 
Alam (2013), Barth et al. (2013) and Marczyk, Dematteo and Festinger (2005). 
4.5.1 Panel data regression analysis 
This study uses panel data regression as its operational. In this study, the control 
variables were regressed on each variable representing bank performance, bank risk-
taking, liquidity, and variables representing the bank’s regulatory requirements.  
According to Matthews and Thompson (2014), one of the benefits of using panel data is 
that it assumes that the banks being investigated are heterogeneous, while cross-
sectional and time-series studies do not control for heterogeneity. For this reason, they 
tend to report biased results (Marozva, 2017). Another benefit of panel data is that it 
provides more informative data, thus offering more reliability and less collinearity among 
the variables, a larger degree of freedom and more efficiency (Barth et al., 2013).  
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The study used panel regression techniques to test the relationship between bank-
specific variables, industry-specific variables and macro determinants with regards to 
bank performance. Panel data is a dataset in which the behaviour of organisations is 
observed across time. These organisations could be states, companies, banks, 
individuals, or countries (Alam, 2013). Arguably, regression analysis has been an 
essential tool for empirical research since the mid-1970s (Chmelarova, 2007). 
According to Choon, Hooi, Murthi and Shven (2013) there are two several heterogeneous 
of multicollinearity, namely random effects and fixed effects. These took into account the 
individual differences when estimating an economic relationship with panel data (Sibindi, 
2017). In order to determine whether to use fixed-effects or random-effects model, the 
Hausemen test in this study was conducted. 
Since in this study, the GMM framework was used as the most appropriate estimation 
technique, the fixed effects were also run for robustness purposes. The idea behind the 
fixed effects model is that there is one real value for the treatment effect and that all the 
trials will estimate this one value. The fixed effects framework was used in order to take 
into account all the individual differences when evaluating an economic relationship with 
the panel data. 
In order to investigate the impact of the regulatory framework on bank performance, there 
was a need to estimate which variables would proxy the bank’s performance and 
regulatory framework. Barth et al. (2013) and Taranhike (2017) developed a model for 
the banking regulatory framework, which is based on the following pillars: Basel II Accord, 
capital adequacy and market discipline.  
Variables that model bank performance include accounting ratios and scores (Taranhike, 
2017), which were previously used by a number of scholars in their studies (Nyoka, 2017; 
Taranhike, 2017 Makonko, 2016; Alam, 2013). In this study, similar variables and proxies 
for the banking regulatory framework and the banking performance were used. The 
empirical model took the form of the panel regression equation, proposed by Raz, Irawan, 
Tamarind, Indra and Darisman (2014), Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) and Chortareas, 
Girardone and Ventouri (2011).  
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Twelve different equations were estimated for the study, of which nine were for 
unadjusted bank performance. Measures for ROE, ROA and NIM and the remaining three 
were for bank performance adjusted for risk, that is, the Z-Score. 
4.6  GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENTS (GMM) 
The GMM is defined as a generic method for estimating parameters in a statistical model; 
it uses moment conditions that are functions of the model parameters and the data, such 
that their expectation is zero at the parameter’s actual value (Blundell & Bond,1998). The 
GMM is also a dynamic panel data estimator (Zhou, 2009). Panel data are also known as 
longitudinal data, which are multi-dimensional data involving measurements over time. 
The GMM is used to control for endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable in a 
dynamic panel model when there is a correlation between the explanatory variable and 
the error term in a model (Bond, Hoeffler & Templete, 2001). The GMM is used for omitted 
variables bias, and also controls for unobserved panel heterogeneity. Lastly, it also 
controls measurement errors (Arellano & Bond,1991). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed different systems of GMM, namely one-step GMM 
and two-step GMM. Both the different GMM corrects endogeneity by transforming all 
regressors through difference and removes fixed effects in the process. However, this 
first difference transformation has a weakness because it subtracts the previous 
observation from the contemporaneous one, thereby magnifying a gap in an unbalanced 
panel. Application of GMM estimator yields both a biased and inefficient estimate of ∅ in 
finite samples, which is particularly acute when T is short. According to Blundell and Bond 
(1998), the poor performance of the different estimator in such circumstances can be 
attributed to the use of weak instruments. In this case, the system GMM is applicable 
because it expresses one equation in one level form with first differences as instruments.  
The second equation is in a different form with levels as instruments; this approach 
involves the use of a greater number of moment condition. Still, Monte Carlo evidence 
simulation suggests that when T is short, the dependent variable is persistent, there again 
in precision, and the small sample is reduced when the system GMM is applied (Blundell 
& Bond,1998).  
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Also, in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, a two-step system GMM 
estimator should be used by exploiting a weighting matrix using residuals from the first 
step. The two-step GMM is regarded as the augmented difference GMM for the following 
reasons: it requires more robustness than the one-step system GMM, and it is more 
efficient and robust than heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Roodman, 2006). The 
two-step system GMM requires panel data that may be balanced or unbalanced, and the 
number of cross-sections is greater than the number of the dimensions N>T.  Lastly, it 
also generates dummies yearly, and it specifies a dynamic model. 
However, in finite samples, such standard errors tend to be downward biased; the 
conventional approach by practitioners in such circumstances is to use what is known as 
the windmeijer adjust to correct for small sample bias. Bond (2001) proposed a rule of 
thumb that first, the dynamic model should be initially estimated by pooled OLS and the 
LSDV approach, for example, using the within or fixed-effects approach. The pooled OLS 
estimate for ∅ should be considered on the upper-bound estimate, while the 
corresponding fixed effects estimate should be viewed as a lower-bound estimate. 
This section presents the econometric methodology in sequential order to address the 
research objectives, as stated in Chapter 1:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,               (1) 
where: 
− the variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡  represent one of the liquidity measures for bank i in time t;  
− 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of independent variables for bank i in time t, to be more precise, 
they represent the bank-specific variable and macroeconomic variables;  
− 𝛼 is the slope of the lagged liquidity variable;  
− 𝛽 is the elasticity of the explanatory variables, for example., slope of variables;  
− 𝜇𝑖 denotes fixed effects in bank i;  
− 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term; and  
− the subscript i denotes the cross-section and t represents the time-series 
dimension. 
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The central estimation used in this study was the two-step GMM; this is because the two-
step GMM was more appropriate than other estimation techniques.  
When a two-step estimator produces consistent point estimates but inconsistent standard 
errors, it is known as the two-step estimation problem. For example, two-step estimators 
use the first step problem because all the computations are performed jointly. Also, when 
using two-step GMM, it promotes efficiency, and reduces bias or more specific 
parameters in order to avoid the bias of the order due to the presence of many time 
dummies. The data transformation approach may be used to eliminate the dummies 
(Roodman, 2009). This is because the transformed equation can be treated as a partial 
likelihood and result in an ML estimator, which may have the same asymptomatic 
efficiency as the direct estimator. This study employed the two-step system GMM 
estimation approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), with 
level and lagged values of the variables used as instruments. The two-step GMM system 
estimation approach is used in this study because it assumed an improvement from 
Arellano and Bond (2009) GMM estimation technique. The relationship between the bank 
performance and regulatory requirements and the independent variables of bank-specific 
factors and macroeconomic factors can be expressed mathematically as per equations 1 
to 12. 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (1)   
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (2)     
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (3)                                                       
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (4)   
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (5)     
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (6)                                                     
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (7)   
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (8)     
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (9)       
                                               
𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (10)   
𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (11)     
𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  (𝛼 − 1)∆𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∑ ∆𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽2 ∑ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∆𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛽5 ∑ ∆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (12)                                                     
The symbols in these equations are explained in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Explanations of equation symbols 
Symbols Meaning of symbols 
ROE Return on equities of the bank, ‘n’ where n=12 (number of banks) at 
time/year ‘t’, where t= (10 years) 2009, 2010, …, 2019. 
ROA Return on assets of the bank, ‘n’ where n=12 (number of banks) at 
time/year ‘t’, where t= (10 years) 2009, 2010, …, 2019. 
NIM it Net interest margin of the bank, ‘n’ where n=12 (number of banks) at 
time/year ‘t’, where t= (10 years) 2009, 2010, ..., 2019. 
ZSCORE it The Z-Score it is the bank performance adjusted for risk  
Z-Score it’ for bank ‘i’, where i=12 (number of banks) at time/year ‘t’, 
where t= (10 years) 2009, 2010, …, 2019. 
St The vector o matrix (specific, e.g. capital requirements (CR), and 
NFSR).  
𝜕𝑏 Vector matrix of a coefficient variant of bank characteristics. 
Bit The 2X1 vector of the matrix for individual bank characteristics (size, 
profitability) for the bank “n”, where n=12 at time/year, ‘t’ where t= (10 
years) 2009, 2010, …, 2019. 
Dummy it The Dummy variables represents whether the bank complied with Basel 
III capital adequacy ratio or not 1- the bank was compliant with Basel III 
capital adequacy ratio; 0- the bank was not compliant with Basel III 
capital adequacy ratio 
∅𝑐 1X2 ve 
ctor matrix of respective coefficients of country-specific control variable. 
∝ Constant term or intercept (formula). 
 ∈𝑖𝑡  Is the error term (idiosyncratic errors). 
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Sources: Marozva (2017), Taranhike (2017), Matthews and Thompson (2014) and 
Heffernan (2010).  
Although there is a plethora of literature on bank performance that indicates that 
regulations are one of the drivers of bank performance, most of the theoretical models 
and empirical models provide details on how regulatory requirements affect bank 
performance (Mathew & Thompson, 2014). However, there is a need to empirically test 
the effects of regulatory requirements that account for performance. Bank performance is 
a good example, which was put into perspective and tested empirically (Taranhike, 2017).
                                                                                          
 
4.7  MEASUREMENT PERFORMANCE VARIABLES OF THE BANK 
Leedy and Ormrod (2015) and Saunders et al. (2016) maintained that performance 
variables are individual components or characteristics of how data have been collected. 
Performance variables are the organisation’s measurements, which are expressed in 
terms of performance and efficiency (Hu, & Liu, 2018; Coetzee). This section discusses 
the performance variables measurements in detail, using measurements from previous 
empirical studies. 
The identified measurements helped the researcher to determine how the banks applied 
the regulatory framework. The purpose of this section is to provide a general overview of 
the performance of the locally registered South African banking industry by using selected 
performance indicators generally considered to be the most important to the industry 
(Coetzee, 2016:58). 
4.7.1 Dependent variables 
Bank performance was measured by net interest margins (NIM), which measure how 
successful an organisation is at investing its funds compared to its expenses for the same 
investment. A negative value shows that an organisation has not made an optimal 
investment decision because the investment expense exceeds the amount of returns 
generated by the investment. 
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 According to Saksonova (2014), NIM is considered the most appropriate criterion for 
evaluating the effectiveness and stability of banks’ operations, as it is superior to the 
return on assets in illustrating how successfully banks manage their interest-bearing 
assets. 
The formula for NIM =
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑋 100     (4.7) 
The overall risk-taking of the banks was measured by their Z-scores (RISK). This ratio is 
mostly applied in accounting-based measurements of bank risk. The Z-score is deducted 
from the probability that bank losses exceed the capital but under the unrealistic 
assumption of normally distributed return on assets (Swanepoel, Estheehuysen, van 
Vuurren & Lotriet, 2017; Chiaramonte, Crici & Poli, 2015). Most researchers use a ratio 
of non-performing loans, losses on loan distributions, total loan books or total earning 
assets and the bank’s Z-score. The difference between the two formulas (NIM and Z-
score) is that non-performing loans mainly proxy credit or default risk, whereas the Z-
score proxies the overall risk exposure of the bank (Taranhike, 2017). 
Bank’s overall risk= (Z-score) Risk = 
𝑅𝑂𝐴+𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝜎 (𝑅𝑂𝐴)
      (4.8) 
All these are accounting-based ratios that are calculated from the bank’s integrated 
annual financial statements. 
Empirical studies by Klomp and De Haan (2015) explored whether the impact of the bank 
regulatory framework and supervision have affected the performance of banks, using 
ROA as a measurement. Findings suggest that the stricter the regulation and supervision, 
the better the bank performance. Liquidity restrictions also have a large positive impact 
on banks. 
In this study on the banking regulatory framework, the following performance variables 
measurements − return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE) and capital adequacy 
ratio – are used. 
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4.7.2 Return on assets (ROA) 
Matthews and Thompson (2014) argued that the performance of the bank is measured 
by its return on assets. Return on assets is measured by net income divided by the total 
assets of a bank.  
The return on assets ratio has been used to measure profitability, productivity and 
efficiency, and provides management information on the performance of the bank 
(Marozva, 2015; Narwal & Jindal, 2015). ROA also helps to measure the progress of the 
organisation against its objectives. This ratio assesses the organisational use of 
resources and financial strength of the bank (Savoiu, Banuta &Gadoiu, 2013). 
ROA=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑋 100         (4.9) 
4.7.3 Return on equity 
The return on equity is measured by dividing net income by shareholder equity. The 
purpose of this ratio is to measure returns generated to shareholders (Marozva, 2017). 
Organisations with a higher return on equity are usually more efficient in generating cash 
internally, rely less on debt financing and have a better return generated for shareholders 
(Hall & Geyser, 2004). 
ROE = 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 
           (4.10) 
4.7.4  Independent variables 
The independent variables for the study were the banks’ capital adequacy regulations, 
Basel III liquidity ratios, private sector monitoring of banks and restrictions. 
4.7.5 Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
Capital adequacy ratio is the portion of capital that is kept aside by banks when giving out 
loans to customers as a provision to cover up losses in case customers are unable to pay 
loans. This provision limits the amount of deposits that may be loaned to customers and 
hence limits the creation of credit (Sulaiman & Mohammed, 2014). Capital adequacy is 
linked to the banking regulatory framework (Hu & Liu, 2018). 
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Formula for CAR= 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙+𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
      (4.12) 
4.7.6 Basel III prescribed liquidity ratios  
The following section discusses the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) in detail in relation to this study. 
 
LCR 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠
 
 
 
NSFR 
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
4.7.7 Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to the introduction of Basel III, which addressed the 
weaknesses of Basel II. Banks were required to implement the Basel III requirements 
from 2015. The BCBS under the Basel III Accord, makes it mandatory for banks to hold 
liquid assets of high quality (BCBS, 2013). According to the BCBS (2013), LCR is the 
ratio needed to be implemented in a bid to promote short term resilience. Since 2015, 
banks have been required to hold assets against anticipated net liquid outflows for 30 
days. Liquid assets primarily constitute cash, short term interbank lending, reserves with 
the central bank, marketable securities and any form of lending to the central bank within 
30 days. Primary, liquid assets constitute cash, short-term interbank lending, whereas the 
denominator is expected net cash outflow within 30 days, i.e., the difference between 
bank anticipated cash inflow and bank expected cashflow (Marozva, 2017:106). The 
liquidity weights of the high-quality liquidity assets are determined by the margins required 
for each asset (BCBS, 2013). In summary, this component of LCR measures the funding 
liquidity risk of a particular institution. 
4.7.8 Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
Basel III requires banks to maintain a stable funding profile in the form of an NSFR (BIS 
(2014); 
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banks are required by central bank to have stability in their funds related to the structure 
of their assets and other off-balance sheet activities. According to the BCBS (2014), the 
NSFR is calculated by dividing the available amount of stable funding by the required 
amount of stable funding. This ratio should be greater or equal to 100% on an ongoing 
basis (BCBS, 2013). The available stable funding is the portion of equity capital and 
liabilities expected to be reliable over a given time under review for the calculation of the 
NSFR, which extends to one year (BCBS, 2014). According to Marozva (2017), the 
availability of the stable funding required of a particular bank is likely to be driven by the 
liquidity characteristics and remaining maturities of the different assets held by the bank, 
including off-balance-sheet assets.  
4.7.9 Size of the bank 
The size of a bank is measured by the value of total assets. The total market value of the 
securities in a fund is referred to as total assets (Nyoka, 2017).  
One of the most critical questions regarding bank performance is whether or not bank 
size optimises performance (Kana, 2017). In general, the effect of size on bank 
performance is expected to be positive to a certain extent, however, for banks that are 
extremely large, the impact on size could negatively affect bank performance due to 
bureaucracy and other reasons. Studies by Taranhike (2017), Aladwan (2015), 
Mashonganyika (2015), Rahman and Bukair (2015) and Dewar (2014) and concluded 
that larger banks tend to focus more on other objectives as opposed to profitability, and 
lead to poor performance. Smaller banks’ priority is profit-making because they still want 
to grow (Kana, 2017; Taranhike, 2017).  Based on the findings of previous scholars, it is 
evident that the size profitability relationship may be expected to be non-linear.  
4.7.10 Interest rates 
Also known as the lending interest rate, the real interest rate is expected to have a positive 
relationship with performance, according to the lend-long borrowing short term argument 
(Klomp & De Haan, 2015). 
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On the other hand, a rise in real interest rates may increase the real debt burden on 
borrowings, which may lead to fewer assets, resulting in interest rates having a negative 
impact on performance (Nyoka, 2017; Gaganis & Pasiouras, 2013).  
4.7.11 Non-performing loans 
Non-performing loans are the amount of loans in a bank’s loan portfolio to the amount of 
outstanding loans the bank holds (Chen et al., 2017). This happens when borrowers have 
not made regular payments for at least 90 days, as then the loans are considered to be 
non-performing (NPL) (Reinhart & Trebesch, 2016). These are inclusive of both the 
interest component and the principal component (Marozva, 2017). According to Al-Khazili 
and Mirzaei (2017), the NPL makes a good proxy for the quality of bank assets, and 
consists of the most significant portion of the total assets of the bank. The quality of the 
assets of banks has a direct influence on performance (Abbas, Shahid Iqbal & Bilal 
Aziz,2019). Should a bank have a significant risk of default, this implies a substantial 
decline in the performance of the bank (Accornero, Alessadri, Carpinelli & Alberto, 2017). 
Again, failure to collect loans may translate that the bank is struggling and therefore, a 
bank run will be unavoidable. 
4.8     LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Data on the banking regulatory framework in South Africa only considered the period from 
2009-2019. The study relied on secondary data; thus, the researcher assumed they were 
a true reflection of actual events. Due to the mathematical measurement and difficulty 
required in estimating the banks’ variable on performance, in this study, accounting ratios 
were used to measure bank performance. 
4.9 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Reliability refers to the quality of the measurement method. Reliability recommends that 
adaptable data be collected at every occurrence if repeated observations of the same 
phenomenon were conducted (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  
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According to Gill and Johnson (2010), reliability relates to consistency, which is the extent 
to which the measuring tool will give similar results when applied several times to the 
same phenomenon under similar conditions. The reliability of secondary data is ensured 
by accessing a reliable and credible website, such as the SARB’s. South African banks 
were studied for this research, and the data were evaluated using specific criteria. Audited 
financial statements of the individual banks were also used as secondary data, chiefly 
because of the reliability and trustworthiness of the institutional sources that compiled the 
data. This type of measurement has been used repeatedly in a variety of studies by 
different scholars, and produced accurate, consistent, comparable and reliable results. 
Locally registered banks in South Africa for the period 2009 to 2019 were the subject of 
the investigation, and the data were evaluated using criteria that focused on the type of 
annual report and the purpose of the report. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010) and Bash, Mouton, Sapsford and Jupp (1996) defined validity 
as a lack of self-contradiction, and consistency in the results. Validity refers to the extent 
to which the data collection method or research method is described. Validity can also 
refer to the measurement of what must be described or measured (Crowther & Lancaster, 
2009). To ensure that the data collected were useful and adequate, and that the valid 
method was used to analyse the data selected, panel data regression. 
4.10  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010) and Diener and Crandall (1978) encouraged the use of four 
main categories to ensure that research is conducted ethically. These categories include 
protection from harm, informed consent, right to privacy, and honesty with professional 
colleagues. These categories were applied to ensure that the research was conducted 
ethically.  
For this research, a desktop study was used as the information was available in the public 
domain and was secondary in nature. An ethics application for conducting research using 
existing data was submitted to the Research Ethics Committee at the University of South 
Africa (UNISA).  
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The researcher also requested permission to receive data from the SARB, which was 
granted by UNISA’s Ethics Review Committee.  
The researcher confirms that the methods, results, findings, conclusions and 
recommendations made in this study will only be used for academic purposes and 
remains the property of UNISA.  
The results, findings and conclusions remain the property of the UNISA, and will only be 
disclosed by the university if necessary and only to authorised officials. 
4.11 SUMMARY CHAPTER 
In this chapter, the study presented sources of data collected.  The financial ratio 
technique and macroeconomic factors were adopted to estimate the relationship between 
bank performance and regulatory requirements. The study used twelve South African 
Banks registered in terms of the Banks Act 94 of 1990. In this study, the researcher also 
discussed the methodology used to analyse the data, was used to enable the researcher 
to determine measurement testing, and to determine the outcome of this study. The next 
chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis, as it related to panel data 
investigations of the selected South African Banks, and discusses major findings, and 
make recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the findings of this empirical study on the effect of bank regulation 
on bank performance in South Africa using the balanced panel data, where all the 
variables are observed for each cross-section and each period. This study incorporated 
time series data for the period 2009-2019 and the cross-section segments of 12 banks in 
South Africa. Initially, the chapter presents the relationship between bank performance 
and bank regulation, the descriptive statistics of the selected variables, a correlation 
analysis determining how the variables are related, and finally, the estimated models. The 
Hausman test was used to determine whether to use the fixed effects model or the 
random-effects model. In this case, the fixed effects model was considered most 
appropriate. The panel data was then diagnosed for the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The regression was used to quantify how many of the explanatory 
variables impacted on ROA. The model was fitted to the data for each dependent variable 
using only continuous explanatory variables. 
5.2 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, the data sources and sample used in the current study are discussed. 
Moreover, descriptive statistics are presented briefly below.  
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics variables 
The summary statistics of the variables used in the estimations for the entire sample of 
the banks were considered in the research. The sample of this study was 12, and using 
pooled estimates, the descriptive statistics for the performance measures are presented 
below in Table 5.1. The table below reports the mean, median, maximum, minimum, 
standard deviation and number of observations. The descriptive statistics are then 
presented; a total of 120 observations were used in the study. The descriptive statistics 
for the bank performance measures, the Basel III profitability measures on (LCR, NIM 
and NSFR) were drawn from the estimation model calculated on standard deviations and 
are summarised in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics: Analysis from 2009 to 2019 
Variables   Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum  Std. 
Dev. 
Observations 
CAR               
0.1386  
         
0.0852  
               
0.4374  
              
0.0373  
             
0.0964  
120 
UNEMPL               
0.2549  
         
0.2500  
               
0.2870  
              
0.2250  
             
0.0165  
120 
GDPG               
0.0078  
         
0.0050  
               
0.0600  
            
(0.0270) 
             
0.0209  
120 
INT               
0.0682  
         
0.0699  
               
0.1061  
              
0.0507  
             
0.0146  
120 
LCR               
1.6936  
         
1.6029  
               
4.8135  
              
0.8461  
             
0.4968  
120 
LOAN               
0.7046  
         
0.0904  
             
82.9824  
            
(0.9827) 
             
6.9079  
120 
NIM               
0.0696  
         
0.0435  
               
1.3764  
              
0.0007  
             
0.1306  
120 
NPL               
0.0135  
         
0.0073  
               
0.1234  
            
(0.0011) 
             
0.0214  
120 
NSFR               
0.2361  
         
0.2641  
               
0.5774  
              
0.0080  
             
0.1336  
120 
ROA               
0.0169  
         
0.0166  
               
0.0244  
              
0.0152  
             
0.0014  
120 
ROE        
 0.3854  
      
  0.2262  
            
 9.0869  
    
 0.0045  
 
  0.8803  
120 
120 
SIZE (000)    
4,425,467  
 
  3,935,225  
 
1,410,421,761  
 
1,472,065  
 
 1.0539  
120 
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Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Dev. 
Observations 
PRIME_RATE               
0.1004  
         
0.0988  
               
0.1500  
              
0.0850  
             
0.0166  
120 
Z_SCORE            
19.8212  
       
17.5883  
             
55.7306  
              
0.2340  
           
14.0276  
120 
Source: Authors computation 
As illustrated in Table 5.1, the primary measure of bank regulatory requirements is the 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which measures the solvency of the banking sector. Basel 
III recommends that banks maintain a CAR of 8%, as discussed in Chapter 2. As per the 
analysis above, there was a total number of observations of 144, the average CAR was 
found to be 13.86%, and the standard deviation was 9.64%. 
The minimum CAR was 3.73%, and the maximum was 43.47%, indicating that during the 
study period, the least capitalised bank was below the 8% recommended by Basel III. 
The majority of banks’ CARs were above the recommendations of Basel III. A higher CAR 
indicates that regulatory authorities are strictly enforcing capital requirements. 
The unemployment rate (UNMPL) in South Africa, on average was 25.49%, which shows 
that there was an increase from the unemployment rate. The minimum was 22.5%, and 
the maximum was 28.7%, giving a range of unemployment of -6.2%. The standard 
deviation for unemployment was -1.65%. 
The increase in the unemployment rate could be the result of high-interest rates and the 
global recession.  Unemployment causes workers to suffer financial difficulties that may 
lead to emotional difficulties, while consumer spending, which is one of the economy’s 
key drivers of growth, goes down, leading to an even worse recession or even depression 
when left unchecked. 
As per Table 5.1, the GDP growth rate (GDPG) had a mean of 0.0078, a minimum of 
0.0270, a maximum of 0.0600, and a standard deviation of 0.0209. GDPG measures the 
growth of the economy; thus, the results indicated that between 2007 and 2019, the South 
                                                                                           
106 
 
African economy grew on average 0.78%. The leading cause of the negative economic 
growth was weak aggregate demand. Another reason was that the GDP growth was 
statistically significant, which affected the liquidity of the banks under review. 
The average interest rate (INTR) was 0.0682. Currently, in South Africa, the INTR is 
4.25%, and the rate of 0.0682 is higher than the current rate. This could be caused by the 
unstable economy. The minimum INTR was 0.057, the maximum was 0.1061, and the 
standard deviation was 0.0146, implying a range of 0.0554 during the period of the study. 
The standard deviation for interest rates were 0.0146. 
The average liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for the period of the study was 1.6936, the 
minimum was 0.8461, the maximum was 4.8135, and the standard deviation was 0.4968. 
The average LCR for the banks showed that they held a large portion of high liquidity 
assets, even where a funding gap was possible. According to Basel III, a number which 
is above one is considered to be good because it represents high-quality assets, and the 
bank will be able to cover its short-term liabilities. Therefore, the mean of 1.6936 is a good 
ratio as it is above 1, and on average, the banks were able to pay their short-term debt 
within 30 days. The minimum was 0.8461, meaning that of the banks under review, one 
appears to have an LCR problem. This implies that it was unable to cover its short-term 
obligations. The low LCR may be due to the financial market turmoil at the time of this 
study, market liquidity may have decreased, and the bank might have been under 
pressure to comply with the prescribed LCR requirements. This may primarily have been 
driven by risk-averse depositors moving out of long-term funding into short term funding. 
The maximum LCR was 4.8135, which is very good. The majority of banks were thus able 
to pay their short-term liabilities within 30 days. LCR represents one of the critical 
regulatory reforms of Basel III, which aimed to develop a more resilient banking sector. 
Its objective was to promote the short-term resilience of banks. The standard deviation 
was 0.4968.   
The LOANS growth rate on average was 70.46%, the minimum growth rate was -0.9827, 
the maximum was 82.9824, and the standard deviation was 6.9079.  
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In light of the above preliminary analysis, this explains that the most profitable banks have 
quite a substantial loan advantage. 
NIM is an indicator of the financial stability of banks. The net interest margin (NIM) was 
on average 6.96%, the minimum was 0.07%, the maximum was 137.64 %, and the 
standard deviation was 13.06%. The mean, minimum and maximum had positive 
percentages, which suggests that all the banks under review for the period of the study 
were operating profitably. 
The descriptive statistics showed that the non-performing loans (NPL) on average 
was0.0135, the minimum was -0.0011, the maximum was 0.1234, and the standard 
deviation was 0.0214. The descriptive statistics analysis reveals that some banks 
generally have a low-risk preference as perceived by having low ratios on loans loss 
provisions of totals loans and higher overall risk computed in Z-scores. These banks were 
also characterised by low NIM, indicating that they lend to low-risk customers at the lowest 
interest rates. 
The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for the period under review showed an average of 
0.2361, a minimum of 0.0080, a maximum of 0.5774, and a standard deviation of 0.1336. 
This is evidence that majority of banks are not managing their NSFR well, as other banks 
were able to maintain the minimum acceptable ratio of greater than one as recommended 
by Basel III. With a mean of 0.2361, a minimum of 0.0080 and a maximum of 0.5774, all 
the ratios were below the acceptable ratio. 
NSFR provides effective protection for liquidity shortages and mismatches. Following the 
above analysis of NSFR, the conclusion can be reached that that majority of banks under 
review failed to comply with the NSFR minimum requirements as recommended by Basel 
III. This could be caused by the early liquidity phase of the financial crisis starting in 2007, 
when many banks, despite the existing capital requirements, experienced difficulties, for 
example, they were not prudently managing their liquidity.  
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The main measures of the banks’ profitability were return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equities (ROE). Table 5.1 indicates that the banks under review, in general, had positive 
ROEs and low ROAs over the period of analysis. The ROAs and ROEs had an average 
of 1.69%, and 38.54%, with a minimum of 1.152% and 0.45% and a maximum of 2.44% 
and 9.0869% respectively.  The average ROA was not good relative to the stock market, 
the negative impact on net income, and the heaviness in the total assets holding. The 
average ROA was far below the inflation rate during the period of the study. A ROA of 5% 
and above is considered to be good; in this review, the ROA was below the minimum 
required. Any rate greater than 10 % is good because it covers the cost of capital on ROE. 
The ROE was also above inflation, which makes the ROE a good rate. The standard 
deviation for ROA was 0.0014, and for ROE was 0.8803. 
Table 5.1 shows that the average size of the bank's total assets was R4,425,467, the 
minimum was R14,010,421,761, and the maximum was R1,472,065. This shows 
significant growth size, which is in line with the growth in asset base and the loan growth. 
The standard deviation was 1.0539.  
The descriptive statistics showed that the prime rate on average was 10.4% with a 
minimum of 8.085%, a maximum of 15%, and a standard deviation of 1.66%. On average, 
the banks were able to maintain a 10.4% prime rate compared to the current prime rate 
of 10.25%. It is therefore clear that banks are still able to make a higher profit through 
properties and bonds should there be any movement in the prime and repo rates.  
The Z-score on average was 19.8212, and the median was also close to the average at 
17.5883. The minimum was 0.2340, the maximum was 55.7306, and the standard 
deviation was 14.0276. The following are the correlations between the main variables 
employed in this study.        
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Table 5.2: Cross-correlation table analysis- bank performance measurement and independent variables 
              
               
Variables  Z_SCORE  ROE  ROA  NIM  CAR  NSFR  LCR  GDPG  INT  EMPL  NPL  SIZE  PRIME_RATE  LOAN  
Z_SCORE  1              
ROE  -0.2501*** 1             
ROA  0.1841** -0.016494 1            
NIM  -0.1282 0.9104 -0.0469 1           
CAR  0.0967 -0.0402 -0.1673 0.1663** 1          
NSFR  0.0876 -0.1621* 0.046 -0.1215 -0.4501 1         
LCR  0.0904 -0.1369 -0.0872 -0.0014 0.0148 0.7278 1        
GDPG  0.0377 0.0336 0.0854 0.0351 0.1042 -0.0715 -0.0447                   1        
INT  0.0200 0.1486* 0.0345 0.1913** -0.0159 -0.0402 -0.0238 -0.2131*                 1       
EMPL  -0.0193 -0.1834** 0.0190 -0.2054** -0.1054 0.0650 -0.0503 -0.2979*** -0.1109                   1      
NPL  0.0528 0.4704*** -0.0379 0.6346*** 0.1607* 0.2685*** 0.5404*** 0.0262 0.0837 -0.1133                1     
SIZE  0.1452* -0.1839** 0.2906*** -0.2691*** -0.5546*** 0.6500*** 0.1863** -0.0579 -0.0127 0.1675** -0.0252                1    
PRIME_RAT
E  0.0227 0.1889** 0.0243 0.2327*** 0.0092 -0.0485 -0.0098 -0.1023 0.9666*** -0.3263*** 0.1030 -0.0527 
                      
1   
LOAN  -0.1037 -0.0295 -0.0221 -0.0382 -0.0605 0.1284 0.0830 -0.0354 -0.0002 -0.0151 -0.0433 0.0664 -0.0139             1  
               
Where *** (p<0.01), **(P<0.05), *(p<0.1)            
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Table 5.2 above presents the results of the preliminary data analysis on the effects of 
bank regulations on bank performance using independent variables and bank-specific 
variables.  
The findings show that there is a negative relationship between ROE and risk adjusted 
performance measured by Z-score and the coefficient is -0.2501. However, the 
relationship is fragile but significant. There is a significant positive relationship between 
Z-score and two variables, namely ROA (0.1841) and size of bank (0.1452), and the 
relationship is weak.  
ROE is negatively correlated with ROA (-0.1694), NSFR (-0.1621), UNEMPL (-0.1838) 
and size (-0.1839), and the relationship is weak but significant. ROE is also positively 
related to INT (0.1486), NPL (0.4704), and prime rate (0.1889).  
 The relationship is significant but weak. ROA is positively related to size (0.2691), and 
the relationship is weak but significant. 
NIM is positively correlated with the three variables, namely the CAR (0.1663), INT 
(0.1913) and prime rate (0.2327); the relationship is significant but weak. There is a strong 
positive, significant correlation relationship between NIM and NPL (0.6364). The NIM is 
also negatively correlated to UNEMP (-0.2054) and size (-0.2691); however, the 
relationship is substantial but weak not contradictory.  
There is a positive relationship between CAR and NPL (0.1607), which is significant but 
weak. Again, the bigger the size of the bank, the lower the CAR because there is a 
negative relationship. The higher the NSFR, the higher the NPL, and the relationship is 
significant but weak. There is also a strong significant positive relationship between NSFR 
and size (0.6500). 
The correlation analysis revealed a significant and robust relationship between LCR and 
NPL. There is also a positive relationship between LCR and size (0.1863); the relationship 
is significant but weak. GDPG is negatively correlated to two variables, which are INT (-
0.2131) and UNEMP (-0.2979). The relationship is significant but weak. INT indicated a 
strong positive relationship with prime rate (0.9666), which is significant. 
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 Lastly, there is a positive relationship between UNEMP and size (0.1675), and the 
relationship is weak and significant.  
The results are presented in four sections. The regression results are shown in Tables 
5.3 to 5.10. Each table has seven columns representing four regression equations defined 
in Chapter 4. The dependent variables for each regression equation are shown on top of 
each table as ROE (return on equities), ROA (return on assets), NIM (net interest margin 
and Z-score (the overall risk-taking as measured by Z-score). The rows are the 
independent or explanatory variables that are the regressors in the regression equations. 
The first three dependent variables, namely ROE, ROA and NIM, represent the 
performance of the bank, whereas the last variable, namely the Z-score, as a measure of 
bank performance adjusted for risk. Tables 5.3 to 5.10 summarise the regression results 
and post-diagnostic estimation statistics obtained from the analysis of the banks under 
review. The tables also show the regression results obtained using the fixed effects 
method for robustness.  
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Table 5.3: Empirical results for Models 1 to 3 where ROE is the profitability measure 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Authors computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
 Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  
L.ROE 0.427*** 0.400*** 0.518*** 0.409*** 0.471*** 0.402*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0121) (0.0815) (0.00701) (0.0321) (0.00855) 
       
CAR -6.637* -0.312     
 (2.879) (0.610)     
       
SIZE -0.399** -0.0657 0.773 -0.00794 0.111 -0.0556 
 (0.118) (0.0795) (0.695) (0.0402) (0.168) (0.0385) 
       
NPL -9.302** 1.708 -10.50* 1.005 -6.849* 0.910 
 (2.476) (1.156) (4.565) (0.781) (2.714) (0.788) 
       
INT -32.47* -2.721 -32.19* -3.097 -21.68* -2.736 
 (11.59) (3.904) (10.92) (4.347) (8.541) (4.050) 
       
DUMMY 0.0780 0.0121 0.309 0.00385 -0.192* -0.00386 
 (0.185) (0.0338) (0.391) (0.0356) (0.0729) (0.0430) 
       
NSFR   -6.385 -0.290   
   (4.216) (0.187)   
       
LCR     -1.141 -0.0793 
     (0.631) (0.0723) 
       
_cons 6.275*** 0.863 -2.141 0.480 2.845* 0.896 
 (0.605) (0.909) (4.711) (0.329) (0.957) (0.558) 
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 
R2  0.768  0.770  0.772 
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Table 5.4: Post estimation diagnostic statistics for 2-step system GMM model 
results presented in Table 5.3  
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The post-diagnostic statistics showed that the models are robust and not weakened by 
any instrument as the number of instruments does not exceed the number of groups. 
Table 5.3 captures the results for the regression analysis between bank performance as 
measured by ROE and the independent variables. The equation one output represents 
the relationship between ROE and CAR, amongst other control variables. Table 5.3 
shows the estimation results, and there is a positive and significant relationship with the 
previous ROE. This confirms the results that Marozva (2017) found that the ROE is 
persistent as; ROE depends on the previous level of ROE. There is a negative and 
significant relationship between ROE and CAR. These results show that banks with 
higher capital are associated with lower returns on equities, and banks with lower capital 
are associated with higher returns on equities. This simply means that banks with higher 
capital have lower performance relative to lower capital. Banks with lower CAR tend to 
take more risks, and as a result, they tend to perform better.  
These results are in line with those of Taranhike (2017), Soile-Bologum (2017) and Yusuf 
and Ekundayo (2018), who also found a negative relationship between CAR and bank 
performance. 
 2 Step System GMM 2 Step System GMM 2 Step System GMM 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) -0.92 -1.71 -0.91 
Prob>z 0.358 0.479 0.362 
    
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 1.55 0.98 -0.66 
Prob>z 0.121 0.325 0.511 
    
Sargan test of overid 8.11 12.35 11.39 
Prob>  
 
0.230 0.054 0.170 
Hansen test of overid  9.37 5.56 4.81 
Prob>  
 
0.154 0.475 0.569 
Instruments  12 12 12 
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The regulatory implication is that a lower CAR should be maintained by banks to improve 
their performance. Banks should keep their CAR as low as possible as long as it is above 
the minimum threshold required of 10%. Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) argued 
against the buffer capital adequacy theory, i.e. that banks that hold capital above 
minimum regulatory requirements, but this does not prevent banks from poor financial 
performance. These scholars found a negative deterministic relationship between capital 
adequacy and bank performance. 
In equation one, there is a negative and significant relationship between the ROE and 
size, i.e. the bigger the bank, the worse it performs. This implies that when banks become 
too big, they tend to focus on other objectives as opposed to profit-making, yet for smaller 
banks, profit-making is a priority because they still want to grow. These results are in line 
with Taranhike (2017), Bukair and Rahman (2015), Mashonganyika (2015), Dawar (2014) 
and Jara-Bertin (2014), who have also found a negative relationship between ROE and 
performance. 
The results further indicate that there is a significant negative relationship between NPL 
and ROE, meaning the higher the NPL, the lower the performance. This result is in line, 
with of Charmier et al. (2018) and Chen et al. (2017), who also found a negative 
relationship between NPL and bank performance. As per equation one, there is a 
negative relationship between INT and ROE, meaning the higher the interest rate, the 
worse the performance of the bank. These results corresponded with those of Charmier 
et al. (2018) and Chen et al. (2017), who also found a negative relationship between INT 
and bank performance. However, the dummy variable was not significant in this case, i.e. 
there is no significant difference between banks that are compliant and those that are not 
compliant with Basel III capital adequacy ratio. 
Equation two shows the relationship between ROE and liquidity as measured by NSF, 
amongst the other control variables. ROE is mainly with one of the regulatory variables 
which are NSFR representing liquidity as prescribed by Basel III. Unfortunately, in this 
case, there is a negative relationship, but the relationship is not significant. In equation 
two, ROE is persistent because it depends on previous ROE.  
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The relationship is positive and significant, which confirms the results in equation one. 
The coefficient was insignificant of the size insignificant. The NPL is negative and 
significant, which confirms the findings of equation one. There is a negative relationship 
between ROE and INT, which reinforces the results of equation one. The dummy variable 
was not significant, i.e. there was no significant difference between those banks that 
comply and those that do not, which thus confirms the results of equation one. 
As per equation three, there is a significant positive relationship between ROE compared 
to the previous ROE, which confirms the findings in equations one and two. Equation 
three captures the relationship between ROE and LCR. Unfortunately, the relationship is 
not significant but negative. The relationship between ROE and size is positive but not 
significant. With NPL, there is a significant negative relationship, which is in line with 
equations one and two. There is a negative and significant relationship between ROE and 
size, which is in line with equations one and two. The dummy is significant, i.e. there is a 
difference between the banks that comply and those that do not. These results are similar 
to those of Ofoeda (2016), Klomp and Haan (2015) and Alan (2013), who concluded that 
consistency in complying with strict regulations sustains banks, prevent failures and 
increases efficiency.  The next section discusses the relationship between ROA and bank 
performance. 
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Table 5.5: Empirical results for Models 4 to 6 where ROA is the profitability measure 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
 Equation 4  Equation 5  Equation 6  
L.ROA 0.234 0.354*** 0.265 0.352*** 0.473* 0.353*** 
 (0.459) (0.00586) (0.455) (0.00356) (0.211) (0.00498) 
       
CAR 0.00761** 0.000258***     
 (0.00918) (0.000500)     
       
SIZE 6.32e-08 0.000106 -0.0000145 0.000144 0.0000306* 0.0000492* 
 (0.00117) (0.000114) (0.00127) (0.000174) (0.000945) (0.0000760) 
       
NPL -0.0111* -0.00475*** 0.0204 -0.00565* 0.0267 -0.00547* 
 (0.0459) (0.00578) (0.0457) (0.00680) (0.0465) (0.00659) 
       
INT 0.0109 -0.00380 -0.000313** -0.00446** -0.00440* -0.00359** 
 (0.0189) (0.00410) (0.00887) (0.00489) (0.0123) (0.00389) 
       
DUMMY -0.00189 0.0000625 -0.00110 0.0000647 -0.00145 0.0000582 
 (0.00210) (0.0000623) (0.00140) (0.0000697) (0.00102) (0.0000594) 
       
NSFR   -0.00139 -0.000882   
   (0.00739) (0.00102)   
       
LCR     -0.000340* -0.0000944** 
     (0.00137) (0.000127) 
       
_cons 0.0122 0.0103*** 0.0132* 0.0104*** 0.0101** 0.0110*** 
 (0.00623) (0.000711) (0.00459) (0.000827) (0.00316) (0.000487) 
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 
R2  0.325  0.328  0.326 
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Table 5.6: Post estimation diagnostic statistics for the 2-step system GMM model 
results presented in Table 5.5  
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The post-diagnostic statistics showed that the models are robust and are weakened by 
any instrument as the number of instruments does not exceed the number of groups, and 
there is no autocorrelation and all instruments are valid. Table 5.5 captures the results for 
the regression analysis between bank performance as measured by ROA and the 
independent variables. The analysis focuses on two-step GMM results as this was the 
most appropriate estimation technique; however, the fixed effects model results are 
presented for robustness. Equation 4’s output represents the relationship between ROA 
and CAR, amongst other control variables.  
Table 5.5 shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between ROA and 
CAR. This result is similar to that of Kana (2017), Majumder and Li (2017), Nyoka (2017), 
Okoye et al. (2017), Ofoeda et al. (2016), Rachdi and Ben Bouhen (2016) and Almazari 
(2013), who concluded that there is a positive relationship between ROA and bank 
performance. The results showed that ROA has a statistically more significant and 
positive effect on CAR than previous ROA.  
 
 2 Step System GMM 2 Step System GMM 2 Step System GMM 
 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) -0.63 -0.71 -0.96 
Prob>z 0.531 0.480 0.337 
    
Arellano-Bond AR(2) -1.18 -0.97 -1.05 
Prob>z 0.239 0.331 0.293 
    
Sargan test of overid 4.29 3.89 7.17 
Prob>  
 
0.638 0.692 0.305 
Hansen test of overid  2.42 1.46 1.64 
Prob>  
 
0.878 0.962 0.950 
Instruments  12 12 12 
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Furthermore, a positive relationship between ROA and CAR suggests that less working 
capital can lead to an increase in performance. These findings show that banks with 
higher capital are associated with a higher return on equities, and banks with lower capital 
are associated with lower returns on equities. These means that banks with higher capital 
perform higher s relative to those with lower capital, and banks with lower CAR tend to 
take more risk, and as a result, tend to perform worse. The results of equation four further 
revealed that there is a significant negative relationship between ROA and NPL, i.e. the 
higher the NPL, the lower the performance. This result is in line with Chen et al. (2017), 
who also found a negative relationship between NPL and bank performance. The dummy 
variable was not significant; therefore, there was a significant difference between the 
banks that are compliant with Basel III capital adequacy ratio and those that do not. 
Equation five shows that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between ROA 
and the previous ROA, which confirms the results of equation four. Equation five’s output 
represents the relationship between ROA and NSFR, amongst other control variables. 
There is a negative relationship between ROA and NSFR, but the relationship is not 
significant. There is a negative and significant relationship between ROA and INT, 
meaning the higher the interest rate, the lower the performance of the bank. These results 
are contrary to those of Charmier et al. (2018), Kana, (2017), Marandu and Sibindi (2016) 
and Ngure (2014), who found a positive relationship between ROA and INT.  According 
to Ngure (2014), this positive relationship has a beneficial effect on banks, which may be 
crowded out by reduced demand for loans. The contrast could be that in their studies, the 
different independent variables, populations and periods of the study were different from 
the current study. Another factor of this negative relationship could be the recession 
experienced globally.  
Schumpeter (1939) proposed a cycle theory for the fluctuation of INTR, which leads to a 
negative relationship with bank performance. This theory assumes that recessions and 
periods of economic growth are the reason for exogenous changes in the real economic 
environment, and lead to a decline in bank performance. 
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This, in turn, leads to a fall in the price of assets, increase in NPL, lowers borrowers’ 
financial capacity, increases UNEMPL levels and depresses the value of the collateral as 
a secondary means of servicing debts. Schumpeter (1939) also criticised the theory, 
which has a common misconception that macroeconomy is purely a shock to supply as 
opposed to a shock to demand and ignores the demands of the economy.  
According to Hanweck and Ryu (2005), fluctuations in interest rates have a significant 
positive relationship with ROA. This is because interest rates are closely related to returns 
on a bank’s liabilities, which will quickly adjust with changes in interest rates in the 
financial market. Given the discussion above, it is clear that ROA is influenced by long-
term interest rates and slowly adjust to the changes in the market. In relation to this study, 
the theory views INTR changes as a normal economic occurrence which will affect a 
bank’s performance.  
The theory disregards the argument that INTR is determined by liquidity in the economy, 
but is defined by the prevailing macroeconomic environment as determined by the 
business cycle. Moreover, according to the theory, INTR will keep on changing according 
to the macroeconomic environment.  
In equation six, the estimation results show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between ROA and the previous ROA. This confirms the results of Marozva 
(2017), who found persistent results with the previous ROA. Equation six investigated the 
relationship between ROA and liquidity as measured by LCR, amongst the other control 
variables. There is a negative and significant relationship between ROA and LCR, which 
correlates with the findings of Sahyouni, and Wang (2019), who also investigated the 
relationship between liquidity as measured by LCR and bank performance and found a 
statistically negative and significant relationship. The practical implication of this result is 
that bank managers must practice the principles of trade-off theory between, the 
advantages and disadvantages of liquidity creation and consider the negative relationship 
between liquidity creation and bank performance when making decisions.  
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The results support insolvency, which posits that liquidity creation can increase the level 
of illiquidity risk, which in turn reduces the performance of the bank and increases the 
probability of solvency. The results are consistent with those obtained in the robustness 
check. The size was positively related to ROA, and the relationship was significant.  
This result is in agreement with Ali and Paul (2019), Rassid (2017), Singh and Sharma 
(2016), Terreza (2015), Jara-Bertin, Moya and Parales (2014) and Westhuizen and 
Oberholzer (2003), who also found a positive relationship between ROA and size. The 
above scholars concluded that larger banks focus more on other objectives, as opposed 
to smaller banks that focus more on profitability. An increase in bank size is thus 
associated with poor performance. This result is contrary to theoretical predictions that 
larger banks are more effective, an increase in size undermines performance. The results 
of this study suggest that reducing the size of banks increases bank performance. The 
relationship between ROA and INT was negative and significant. This result is similar to 
that of Ali and Paul (2019), Ariwati and Maksum (2018), Rasid (2017), Jara-Bertin, Moya 
and Parales (2014) and Westhuizen and Oberholzer (2003). Their study implies that 
firstly, performance increases as the bank size decreases, while bank size increases as 
the size bank performance decreases. In a nutshell, the size of the bank affects 
profitability. The current study agrees that small and medium banks are likely to be more 
profitable than large banks. The dummy is not significant, which is in line with equation 
four and equation five. The following section discusses the relationship between NIM and 
bank performance. 
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Table 5.7: Empirical results for Models 7 to 9 where NIM is the profitability measure 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
 Equation 7  Equation 8  Equation 9  
L.NIM 0.509*** 0.360*** 0.593*** 0.361*** 0.525*** 0.343*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0339) (0.0990) (0.0380) (0.0593) (0.0367) 
       
CAR -0.444** 0.299**     
 (0.570) (0.0778)     
       
SIZE -0.0437 -0.0176 0.0640 -0.0404 -0.00698 -0.0611 
 (0.0423) (0.0305) (0.117) (0.0312) (0.0406) (0.0294) 
       
NPL -3.586** 0.531 -3.599** 0.461 -3.313* 0.423 
 (0.892) (1.109) (1.077) (1.251) (1.075) (1.294) 
       
INT -2.437** 0.282 -3.197* 0.269 -2.053** 0.427 
 (1.436) (0.254) (1.207) (0.316) (1.484) (0.263) 
       
DUMMY 0.0262 0.00979 0.0404 0.0160 0.0149 0.0134 
 (0.0329) (0.00680) (0.0645) (0.0104) (0.0248) (0.00816) 
       
NSFR   -0.725* -0.124**   
   (1.011) (0.0550)   
       
LCR     -0.115** -0.0349** 
     (0.160) (0.00862) 
       
_cons 0.610 0.0976 -0.0644 0.342 0.440 0.523 
 (0.320) (0.245) (0.740) (0.235) (0.204) (0.240) 
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 
R2  0.807  0.799  0.813 
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Table 5.8: Post estimation diagnostic statistics for 2-step system GMM model 
results presented in Table 5.7  
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The post-diagnostic statistics showed that the models are robust and not weakened by 
any instrument as the number of instruments does not exceed the number of groups. 
Table 5.7 captures the results for the regression analysis between bank performance as 
measured by NIM and the independent variables. The analysis focuses on the two-step 
GMM’s results as they were the most appropriate estimation technique. The fixed-effects 
model results are also presented for robustness.  
Equation seven shows the relationship between NIM and CAR, amongst other control 
variables. Table 5.7 shows the estimation results for equation seven, where there is a 
positive and significant relationship between NIM and the previous NIM. These confirm 
the results of Charmier et al. (2018), Lee and Lu (2015) and Joshi (2004), who also found 
that the previous NIM is persistent as current, and NIM depends on the legged level of 
NIM.  
Equation seven shows a negative and significant relationship between NIM and CAR with 
a coefficient of -0.444, which is in contrast with the study’s expectations.  
 
 2-Step System GMM 2-Step System GMM 2-Step System GMM 
 Equation 7 Equation 8 Equation 9 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) -1.08 -1.35 -1.46 
Prob>z 0.280 0.175 0.145 
    
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.70 0.04 -0.11 
Prob>z 0.484 0.972 0.910 
    
Sargan test of overid 3.26 1.76 3.53 
Prob>  
 
0.775 0.940 0.740 
Hansen test of overid  6.54 5.75 8.72 
Prob>  
 
0.366 0.452 0.190 
Instruments  12 12 12 
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The researcher expected to find a positive relationship since the majority of the banks 
under review maintained higher levels of capital. This result also contradicts that of 
Majumder and Li (2017), Aktasa (2015) and Osie-Assibey and Aseno (2015), who found 
a significant positive relationship between NIM and CAR. Osie-Assibey and Aseno (2015) 
concluded that a high net minimum capital requirement would widen the spread between 
the lending rates and savings rates; however, this study’s results suggest that a higher 
CAR weakens the spread between lending rates and savings rates.  The current study 
contributes to the research of the above scholars by finding that having CAR than the 
minimum requirements does not guarantee better performance of the bank. The negative 
coefficient suggests that banks create more loans when they have access to capital over 
the requirement threshold, leading to more non-performing loans. Banks must discourage 
reckless lending by increasing the cost of borrowing to customers and adhere to the 
minimum CAR. The adoption of the Basel III Accord would assist banks by reducing the 
equity pressure of making more profits by giving out bad loans or making bad credit 
decisions, which in turn leads to NPL. Complying with the minimum capital requirements 
would be ideal as a buffer against risk.  
NPL is negatively and significantly related to NIM, which is in line with Le (2017) and Dhar 
and Bakshi (2015), who found a negative relationship between NIM and bank 
performance. The evidence suggests a trade-off between NPL and traditional lending, as 
the majority of the banks under review for the period 2009 to 2019 tend to use NPL to 
expand leverage by not adhering to lending requirements, thus leading to economic 
downturns. For this reason, the banks are exposed to a greater risk of NPL, thus bank 
supervisors, policymakers and regulators must assist banks to comply with lending 
requirements in terms of the Banking Act 94 of 1990. According to Dhar and Bakshi 
(2015), banks must make a provision against NPL because this helps for the stability of 
the banking sector. Provision can be made by identifying an appropriate cause of NPL, 
which is important for managing the credit portfolio of a bank.  
 
                                                                                           
124 
 
The banks under review must thus give adequate attention to NIM and CAR to control the 
problems with NPL. Again, the Basel III Accord emphasises the rate of CAR as an 
important driving factor for the financial soundness of banks. 
The INT shows a significant negative relationship, which is as per Iftikhar’s (2016) 
findings. It is important to note that in a weakly regulated and supervised bank 
environment, financial liberalisation tends to hurt NIM; thus, these empirical findings 
suggest that sound and strong financial reform policies play a significant role in narrowing 
interest margins. Some of the banks under review are facing high-interest margins, which 
can be reduced by taking measures such as deregulating interest rate controls, removing 
of entry barriers and strengthening regulations. These procedures will increase the 
competition, efficiency and stability of the banking system, leading to a reduction of NIM. 
The dummy variable was not significant. 
Table 5.7 shows the estimation results for equation eight, which found a positive and 
significant relationship between NIM and the previous NIM. This confirms the findings of 
equation seven. The NPL is negatively and significantly related to NIM which also 
confirms the results of equation seven. The dummy was not significant, which further 
reinforces the results of equation seven. The NSFR is negatively and significantly related 
to NIM. This confirms financial fragility theory; the findings confirm that any policy 
implemented with the intention of increasing bank capital is good for liquidity since the 
financial fragility is crowding out the bank deposit ratio by outweighing the risk absorption, 
which suggests a negative relationship between bank capital and bank liquidity (Marozva, 
2017). Diamond (2006), in his early studies, indicated that limited capital, highly fragile 
banks tend to hold higher liquidity buffers than more stable and less vulnerable banks. 
In equation nine, the estimation results show a significant positive relationship between 
the NIM with the previous results, which confirms the findings of equation seven and 
equation eight. The estimation results from equation seven to equation nine revealed that 
NIM is negatively and significantly related to NPL. This implies that as the banks’ NPLs 
decrease, their performance as measured by NIM decreases.  
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This result confirms the findings of equation seven, equation eight and equation nine that 
the banks under review lack appropriate control when it comes to borrowing. Banks must, 
therefore, thoroughly conduct a risk assessment, sensitivity analysis and a stress test 
analysis when managing their loans books. The estimation results of equation seven, 
equation eight and equation nine show that NIM is negatively and significantly related to 
INTR. This implies that the banks’ INTR increases bank performance as measured by 
NIM. The results confirm the findings of equation seven, equation eight and equation nine.  
The LCR is negatively and significantly related to NIM, which is consistent with the view 
that there is a significant negative relationship between NIT and funding liquidity risk 
(Charmier, 2018; Pradhan & Shrestha, 2016; Marozva, 2015). This could point to the fact 
that higher liquidity hurts bank performance. The overall finding is not in line with the 
theoretical predictions; however, it is in line with the results of other authors who have 
investigated the relationship between NIM and funding liquidity ratio. Basel III regulates 
that banks must maintain a minimum CAR in order to resolve liquidity requirements. 
These minimum requirements assist banks to recover as quickly as possible, should there 
be any financial crisis. Therefore, the banks under review appear not to have followed the 
Basel III Accord. The next section discusses the results found between Z-score and bank 
performance.  
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Table 5.9: Empirical results for Models 10 to 12 where Z-score is the profitability 
measure 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
2 Step 
System 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
 Equation 10  Equation 11   Equation 12  
L.Z-SCORE 0.0937 0.209 0.162 0.386* 0.477 0.394* 
 (0.115) (0.0955) (0.211) (0.156) (0.360) (0.170) 
       
CAR 121.5* 66.69***     
 (74.66) (9.875)     
       
SIZE 6.849** 3.359** 7.364* -2.015 5.666 -4.011 
 (5.147) (1.048) (7.636) (2.067) (10.65) (2.915) 
       
NPL 5.473 -10.22* 212.6 -11.04** 665.8 -8.393** 
 (145.8) (27.88) (285.6) (30.87) (1017.7) (43.50) 
       
INT 15.63 10.40 -74.82** 4.740 -145.3 23.07 
 (49.83) (17.98) (83.78) (39.92) (82.22) (42.25) 
       
DUMMY 3.190* 0.617 3.646* 2.056* 8.793 1.924 
 (4.620) (1.115) (8.197) (0.708) (13.20) (1.065) 
       
NSFR   -49.58 -18.37**   
   (40.80) (4.149)   
       
LCR     -11.12* -2.079** 
     (17.74) (0.734) 
       
_cons -56.04 -20.25* -30.85 30.65 -18.36 43.81 
 (43.70) (8.921) (52.54) (15.23) (67.12) (22.09) 
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 
R2  0.717  0.444  0.361 
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Table 5.10: Post estimation diagnostic statistics for the 2-step system GMM model 
results presented in Table 5.9  
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The post-diagnostic statistics show that the models are robust and are not weakened by 
any instrument, as the number of instruments does not exceed the number of groups. 
Table 5.9 captures the results for the regression analysis between bank performance and  
Z-score as a measure of performance adjusted for risk and the independent variables. 
The analysis focuses on the two-step GMM results, as this was the most appropriate 
estimation technique; however, the fixed effects model results are presented for 
robustness. Equation 10’s output represents the relationship between Z-score and bank 
performance, amongst other control variables. Table 5.9 shows the estimation results for 
equation 10, where there is a positive but not significant relationship between Z-score 
and the previous Z-score. The CAR is positive and significant, which is more or less 
consistent with the capital buffer theory. This confirms the results of Pradhan and 
Shrestha (2017) and Zheng et al. (2012), who also found a positive relationship between 
the two variables. According to Zheng et al. (2012), banks with adequate capital adjust 
their capital buffer and risk positively, as opposed to banks that maintain higher levels of 
capital.  
 
 
 2-Step System GMM 2-Step System GMM 2-Step System GMM 
 Equation 10 Equation 11 Equation 12 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) -0.66 -0.76 -0.53 
Prob>z 0.507 0.448 0.327 
    
Arellano-Bond AR(2) -0.74 -0.48 -0.98 
Prob>z 0.460 0.628 0.327 
    
Sargan test of overid 8.94 2.63 2.99 
Prob>  
 
0.177 0.853 0.810 
Hansen test of overid  3.31 2.51 2.38 
Prob>  
 
0.768 0.867 0.882 
Instruments  12 12 12 
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It is important for banks to understand which overall risk factors have a greater impact on 
financial performance, and use better risk-adjusted performance measures to support 
their strategies. 
 For example, banks must establish a credit risk process from the initiation to the appraisal 
of loans, considering the sound credit risk management scenarios imposed by regulatory 
bodies. The banks also need to enhance their internal control measures to ensure the 
strict implementation of internal processes on lending. 
Size is positive and significant, which is similar to the findings of Ariwati and Maksum 
(2018), who concluded that the greater the size the more the profitability. Larger banks 
tend to focus less on performance, and thus take higher risk. The dummy variable is 
significant in this case, and there is a significant difference between the banks that are 
compliant with Basel III and those that do not. This result is in line with Klomp and Haan 
(2015) and Alam (2013), who also found a difference between the banks that comply with 
regulations and those that do not.  According to Nyoka (2017), complying with the banking 
regulations in terms of Basel III determines for how long a banking organisation will 
remain in business from a regulatory point of view. Klomp and Haan (2015) concluded 
that consistency in complying with strict regulations sustains banks, prevents bank 
failures and increases efficiency.  
Equation 11 shows positive but not significant results with the previous Z-score, which 
confirms the findings of equation ten. The estimation results from equations ten and 
eleven revealed that size is positively and significantly related to the Z-score. This implies 
that as the bank's size increases, bank performance increases. This result confirms that 
larger banks focus on objectives other than profit-making, while profit-making is a priority 
for smaller banks because they want to grow. The dummy variable is significant, which 
confirms the results of equation 10. The estimation results in equations 10 and 11 
revealed that risk measured by Z-score is significantly related to dummy, i.e. there is a 
significant difference between the performances of banks that comply and those that do 
not. Equation 12 shows a positive but not significant relationship with the previous lagged 
effects. This confirms the results of equations ten and eleven, where the LCR was 
negative and significant.  
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This result is in line with that of Chen et al. (2017) and Alshatti (2014), who concluded 
that liquidity risk lowers bank performance. 
Banks with insufficient stable funding use liquid assets or rely on external financing to 
meet demand, which increases their cost of funding. Banks that possess a high level of 
illiquid assets in loans are likely to receive higher interest income. Liquidity risk is a threat 
to bank performance. These results suggest that applying capital requirements to LCR 
will require the banks under review to manage their assets appropriately, encourage their 
financial intermediation process, and introduce more innovative products. The dummy is 
positive and not significant, i.e. there is no difference between the banks that comply and 
those that do not. 
5.3 SUMMARY CHAPTER 
In this chapter, the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and independent 
variables were discussed. The post-diagnostic statistics were presented, which showed 
that the models are robust and not weakened by any instrument as the number of 
instruments does not exceed the number of groups. The fixed-effect model was presented 
for robustness. The GMM two-step regression was conducted on the panel data as this 
was the most appropriate estimation technique. The discussion in this chapter revealed 
that the nexus between bank performance and bank regulatory requirements, although 
somewhat the same, differ depending on the measurement or variable of performance 
used. Some significant results included that CAR has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on bank performance, while NPL had a negative and statistically 
significant impact on bank performance. Some analysis of bank-specific data revealed 
that the behaviours of banks in terms of performance and risk-taking are influenced by 
their size as measured by total assets. Larger banks generally operate at low NIM and 
overall risk as measured by Z-scores compared to smaller banks. Conversely, smaller 
banks are moderate, both in terms of performance and risk-taking. They operate at a 
moderate NIM and overall risk takings compared to larger banks.  
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Additionally, during the period under review, the South African regulatory bodies were 
lenient about restricting banking activities and implementing reviews, but were strict on 
capital, regulatory requirements and market discipline. The next chapter focuses on the 
theoretical framework for the current study, the conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of the study, draws conclusions and presents 
recommendations for future research. Furthermore, final remarks on the theories, 
empirical studies and findings relating to the nexus between bank performance and 
regulatory requirements in South African banks are explained. The findings are based on 
the tests reported on in Chapter 5. The research findings are discussed within the context 
of other empirical studies, and some important insights are drawn, including policy, 
theoretical and social implications. This chapter provides a conclusion as well as 
recommendations to key stakeholders, policymakers and regulators in the banking sector 
regarding how to leverage the results of the relationship between bank performance and 
regulatory requirements. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study aimed to determine the impact of regulatory requirements on bank 
performance. The study was motivated by previous studies which were conducted by 
numerous scholars on the application of regulatory requirements in both South Africa and 
globally. Despite such efforts, banks are still failing globally, which remains an unresolved 
issue (Boora & Jongra, 2019; Taranhike, 2017). The study intended to fill the gap in 
knowledge by analysing the impact of regulatory requirements on bank performance in 
South Africa.  Whilst the study objectives were outlined as follows: 
• To examine the relationship between bank performance and capital adequacy. 
• To investigate the relationship between bank performance and liquidity coverage 
ratio.  
• To examine the relationship between bank performance and net stable funding 
ratio. 
•  To examine the relationship between bank performance and bank-specific 
variables and macroeconomic factors. 
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The summary findings for this study were as follows. The regression analysis was 
inconsistent, as the capital adequacy ratio have both positive and negative significant 
effect on bank performance. There is negative and significant constant relationship 
between bank permeance and liquidity coverage ratio. The results also showed a 
negative significant relationship between bank performance and net stable funding ratio, 
which supports the financial fragility theory. Furthermore, the results under bank specific 
variables showed the following; the size showed both negative and positive significant 
relationship with the bank performance. Lastly, non-performing loans and interest showed 
a negative significant relationship on bank performance. The next section discusses the 
results in detail. 
6.2.1 Findings on CAR and policy implications 
The results from the regression presented the following. There was a negative significant 
relationship between CAR and ROE. The relationship between CAR and ROA showed 
positive and significant. The results further showed a negative significant relationship 
between CAR and NIM which is in contrast with the study expectations. The researcher 
expected a positive relationship since majority of the banks under review maintain higher 
levels of capital. The relationship between CAR and ZSCORE was positive and significant 
which is more or less consistent with the capital buffer theory.  
The GMM showed both positive and significant relationship with the bank performance. 
The negative and significant relationship between CAR and bank performance results 
were in line with those of Taranhike (2017), Soile-Bologum (2017) and Yusuf and 
Eundayo (2018). These results show that banks with higher capital are associated with a 
lower return on equities, and banks with lower capital are associated with higher returns 
on equities. These means that banks with higher capital have a lower performance 
relative to lower capital. Banks with lower CAR tend to take more risks, and as a result, 
they tend to perform better. 
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Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) argued that banks that hold capital above minimum 
regulatory requirements are not necessarily prevented from the negative effects of 
financial crises. The buffer capital adequacy theory is relevant to the study because it 
does not support holding CAR above the minimum requirement. The holding of higher 
capital will lead to banks taking excessive risk-taking by focusing less on profit-making, 
which may lead to penalties if there are any non-compliance issues. Moreover, holding 
more capital does not support the operations of the bank to improve bank performance. 
The negative relationship suggests that banks create more loans when having capital 
above the requirement, leading to more non-performing loans. This study implies that 
regulators must discourage banks from reckless lending to customers and impose 
sanctions for non-adherence to the minimum CAR. 
However, when performance was measured by CAR, the estimation results showed a 
positive and significant relationship. This confirms the results of Kana (2017), Majumder 
and Li (2017), Nyoka (2017), Okoye et al. (2017), Ofoeda et al. (2016), Rachdi and Ben 
Bouhen (2016) and Almazari (2013). These results show that banks with higher capital 
are associated with a lower return on equities, and banks with lower capital are associated 
with higher returns on equities. This simply means that banks with higher capital have 
lower performance relative to lower capital, and banks with lower CAR tend to take less 
risk. As a result, the latter tend to perform better.  The positive relationship implies that 
the higher the CAR, the higher the banks’ capacity to absorb risk, therefore banks need 
to create higher levels of CAR by accepting deposits and issuing loans to maintain 
profitability (Luvuno, 2018; Vodavo, 2011). This study implies that the SARB should 
consider increasing the level of capital held by banks in South Africa by introducing the 
transfer of an increased percentage of profit to the capital to strengthen the banks’ credit 
loss absorption capacity further. The study thus found contradictory results, but both are 
significant. 
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The results imply that the adoption of the Basel III Accord can assist banks in South Africa 
by reducing equity pressure to make more profits, and reduce give out bad loans or make 
bad credit decisions, which in turn leads to NPL. Complying with the minimum capital 
requirements would be ideal as a buffer against risk. 
6.2.2 Findings on NSFR and LCR and policy implications 
Lastly, the study conducted a regression analysis to test the relationship between liquidity 
as measured by NSFR, LCR and bank performance. The results showed a negative and 
significant relationship between NSFR and bank performance, which supports the 
financial fragility theory. This theory crowds out the bank deposit ratio, which suggests a 
negative relationship between bank capital and bank liquidity. The results are in line with 
Berger and Bouwman (2017), who found that a CAR that is above minimum lowers the 
deposit ratio, as higher capital crowds out deposits and lowers liquidity. Diamond (2006) 
also indicated that limited capital, highly fragile banks tend to hold higher liquidity buffers 
than more stable and less vulnerable banks.  
On the other hand, the GMM estimation results analysis showed a constant negative 
relationship and significant results between LCR and bank performance. This consistent 
with the view that there is a significant negative relationship between LCR and bank 
performance (Charmier, 2018; Pradhan & Shrestha, 2016; Marozva, 2015). This shows 
that higher liquidity hurts bank performance, but the overall finding is not in line with the 
theoretical predictions. It is, however, in line with the results of other authors who have 
investigated the relationship between LCR and bank performance, as listed above. Basel 
III was issued with the regulation that banks need to maintain a minimum CAR to resolve 
any liquidity requirements. The policy implication is that banks under review must comply 
with the minimum standards to recover as quickly as possible, should there be any 
financial crisis.  
6.2.3 Bank specific and macroeconomic factors affecting performance 
The secondary variables for the study such as size, non-performing loans, interest rates, 
and dummy are discussed below in detail. 
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6.3.1 Findings on size and policy implications 
The study also investigated the relationship between the size of a bank and its 
performance. The results from the regression analysis were inconsistent as the GMM for 
size showed negative and significant, as well as positive and significant. The results that 
showed a negative and significant relationship were in line with those of Ariwati and 
Maksum (2018), Taranhike (2017), Bukair and Rahman (2015), Mashonganyika (2015), 
Dawar (2014) and Jara-Bertin (2014), who emphasised that the bigger the bank, the 
worse it performs. This implies that when banks become too big, they tend to focus on 
objectives other than profit-making, yet for smaller banks, profit-making is a priority 
because they still want to grow.  
The estimation results showed a positive and significant relationship between CAR and 
size. These findings were consistent with those of Ali and Paul (2019), Rassid (2017), 
Singh and Sharma (2016), Terreza (2015), Jara-Bertin, Moya and Parales (2014) and 
Westhuizen and Oberholzer (2003). These scholars agreed that larger banks tend to 
focus more on other objectives, unlike smaller banks that focus more on profitability. An 
increase in bank size is thus associated with poor performance.  
The study thus found two contradictory sets of results that were all significant. The study 
implies that the South African banking sector should keep the size of the banks as small 
as possible because larger banks tend to focus more on growing than profit-making, 
whereas smaller banks focus more on profit-making and take more moderate risks. 
6.3.2 Findings on NPL and policy implications 
The estimation results analysis conducted on NPL and bank performance showed 
negative and significant results. This is in line with studies conducted by Luvuno (2018), 
Charmier et al. (2018), Chen et al. (2017), Le (2017) and Dhar and Bakshi (2015). 
 Le, and Dhar and Bakshi asserted that the higher the NPL, the lower the banks’ ability to 
offer credit to customers, which results in a liquidity crunch that in turn, impacts 
performance. This eventually leads to investors and depositors withdrawing their funds, 
pushing the bank into a mismatch which will also affect their returns.  
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The result thus implies that banks should bolster their credit underwriting policies to 
ensure good quality loans are brought onto their books. In addition, banks in South Africa 
should implement rigorous collection strategies to ensure that their collection of debts is 
efficient. Lastly, banks must make a provision against NPL to ensure stability in the 
banking sector, which will reduce the number of NPLs and improve performance. 
6.3.2 Findings on INTR and policy implications 
This study examined the relationship between INTR (repo rate) and bank performance, 
and found a negative and significant relationship. The GMM results were consistent and 
implied that the higher the INTR, the lower the bank performance. However, these results 
were not in line with Charmier et al. (2018), Kana (2017), Marandu and Sibindi (2016) 
and Ngure (2014), who found a positive relationship between INTR and bank 
performance. Hanweck and Ryu (2005) also insist that fluctuations in interest rates have 
a significant positive relationship with bank performance. Their justification was that 
interest rates are strictly related to returns on a bank’s liabilities, which quickly adjust to 
changes in interest rates in the financial market. The results of this study confirm that an 
increase in INTR negatively affects performance.  
The results of this study are in line with the theory of Schumpeter (1939), who suggested 
that recessions and periods of economic growth are the reason for exogenous changes 
in the real economic environment. As a result, this leads to declines in profitability, a fall 
in asset prices, NPL, a lowering of borrowers’ financial capacity, a fall in employment 
levels, and a depressed value of collateral as a secondary means of servicing debts. The 
bank’s risk-taking increases and consequently raises the need for more substantial loan 
provisions and higher levels of capital, exactly when it is more excessive or not available. 
These may put a bank under pressure by reducing their amount of lending, especially if 
they have low capital buffers above the minimum capital requirements.  
Therefore, the effects of the economic downturn as well as increasing the lending rates 
critics the theory by stating that it is a common misconception that macroeconomic purely 
based on shocks to supply as opposed to shocks on demand.  
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This leads to the common criticism of Schumpeter of economic cycle theory by ignoring 
the demand side of the economy. Ngure (2014) criticised this theory because it only 
considers the supply of loans by banks to customers and ignores the demands of the 
economy, for example, the fluctuations of interest rates.  These results imply that the 
SARB should consider increasing the capital buffer requirements during times of 
economic boom to ensure that banks have adequate capital during an economic 
recession, as liquidity crises affect bank performance. Another policy implication is that 
banks need to consider the movement of interest rates to ensure that any changes in the 
economy driven by macroeconomic factors (GDP and inflation) are factored in so that 
they do not affect bank performance.  
6.2.5 Findings on DUMMY and policy implications 
When performance was measured by CAR, and Z-score measured overall risk, the 
dummy variable was found to be significant. These results mean that there is a difference 
in performance between the banks that are compliant and those that are not compliant 
with Basel III capital adequacy ratio. 
These results are similar to those of Ofoeda (2016), Klomp and De Haan (2015) and Alan 
(2013), who concluded that consistency in complying with strict regulations sustains the 
bank, prevents bank failures and increases efficiency, and again, that there is a difference 
between the banks that comply and those that do not. Nyoka (2017) noted that complying 
with Basel III determines for how long a banking organisation will remain in business from 
a regulatory point of view. Klomp and De Haan (2015) concluded that consistency in 
complying with strict regulations will sustain a bank, prevent failures and increase 
efficiency. The policy implication is that banks must be consistent in complying with the 
regulatory requirements to ensure good performance.  
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The following can be seen as limitations of the study: 
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1. Limited studies have focused on the impact of bank performance on regulatory 
requirements in South Africa, which resulted in this study using theoretical and 
empirical studies from other countries as a point of reference. 
2. The study focused on 12 registered banks in terms of Bank Act 94 in South Africa 
for the period 2009 to 2019. The study excluded a number of smaller banks in 
terms of assets, and because of the unavailability of financial statements. Had they 
been included, the analysis would have provided another paradigm in terms of 
bank size and performance. The results of smaller banks’ responses to the global 
financial crisis would have been of great value; however, the exclusion was based 
on the lack of incomplete data for the period under review. 
3. Lastly, the study focused on the period 2009 to 2019, which partially covered the 
period of the global financial crisis. To further understand bank performance 
dynamics and regulatory requirements dynamic, and management responses 
during the crisis period, a recommendation for future studies would be to cover the 
periods before, during and after a financial crisis. 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS TO BANKS 
The banks under investigation must improve their credit risk assessment framework to be 
more prudent in their lending practices, as this will enhance the lending quality of their 
loan books and thus their performance. To keep their capital levels at a minimum to avoid 
excessive risk-taking, the banks must grow their capital levels by embarking on efficient 
revenue enhancement activities such as increasing retained earnings. This can be done 
by looking at their clients on an overall basis, not only on a transactional basis, as this will 
improve non-interest revenue income by introducing innovated products.  
Lastly, banks must lower their liquidity risk exposure by collectively managing their capital 
adequacy ratio, size of the bank, interest rates, non-performing loans, liquidity coverage 
ratio and net stable funding ratio. 
The SARB should consider increasing regulatory capital requirements and ensuring that 
the banking sector and merging smaller banks are compliant with the Basel III capital 
adequacy ratio.  
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The SARB must improve its supervision and oversight functions by enforcing prudential 
regulations, ensuring adherence to lending practices, and fostering healthy and 
adequately capitalised balance sheets. Lastly, the SARB must align its macroeconomic 
forecast for INTR (lending rates) with regulatory requirements to ensure that economic 
performance is a catalyst for bank performance.  
The banks under review need to enhance their deposit-taking ability to tighten their loan 
underwriting criteria and credit offering policies, and should create rigorous and proactive 
collection strategies. The regulatory bodies should consider monitoring the minimum 
required ratio of CAR more closely to avoid excessive risk-taking, as banks with an excess 
of capital tend to take more risks.  
Lastly, during an economic crisis, the SARB must explore ways to factor in economic 
changes driven by INTR in order to reflect a change in bank performance.  
6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
The study was limited to South African registered banks in terms of the Banks Act 94 of 
1990, whose data information for the period 2009 to 2019 was available and accessible. 
A number of small banks whose financial information was not available for the duration 
of the study were thus excluded from the study. The consequence of excluding these 
smaller banks was that crucial information regarding bank size and performance was not 
assessed. Furthermore, this study only considered banks that were registered in terms of 
the South African Banks Act 94 of 1990, for example, it excluded mutual banks. Research 
which incorporates both registered and non-registered banks should be pursued in order 
to understand the impacts of registered and non-registered banks in South Africa.  
Secondly, a study could be undertaken which incorporates both locally registered banks 
and international banks, in order to understand the differences between the two groups.  
The period of this study covered the global financial crisis in the 2007 to 2009 period. A 
further recommendation is for a study to be conducted that differentiates further by 
examining before, during and after the global financial crisis.  
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Lastly, the current study discovered that only internal bank-specific variables impact bank 
performance, thus a recommendation is to research whether bank performance is 
affected by internal or external (inflation and GDP) variables, or both. 
6.6 SUMMARY CHAPTER 
The study investigated the relationship between bank performance and regulatory 
requirements in South African Banks that are registered in terms of the Banks Act 94 of 
1990. The panel data was used for the sample of twelve banks in South Africa from 2009 
to 2019. Data was presented using descriptive statistics, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation were conducted on the data as part of the 
diagnostics.  
Correlation and regression analysis for four performance measurement, for example, 
ROE, ROA, NIM and ZSCORE were conducted. The Hausman test was also conducted 
to determine which model was preferred between fixed effects and random effects. A 
regression analysis was conducted on four bank performance ratios using pooled 
ordinary least square regression. However, the two-step GMM was preferred over the 
other methods due to the endogeneity problem that existed among the banks at the time 
of this study. The bank-specific variables were, CAR, SIZE, NPL, INTR, LCR, and NSFR, 
the macroeconomic dependent was GDGP and UMPL, were chosen and analysed. The 
following results can be confirmed; capital adequacy and size have both a positive and 
negative significant effect on bank performance, while interest rates, non-performing 
loans, liquidity coverage ratios and net stable funding ratios had a negative and significant 
effect on bank performance. The study recommends further study on the subject matter 
through examining pre and post global financial crisis data.  
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